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                                                         Abstract 
 
 
 
     The problems of social and economic reform were at the center of academic and 
political activities of Maksim M. Kovalevskii (1851-1916), a prominent Russian historian 
and sociologist. The comparative study of rural communal institutions led him to 
conclude that the village commune remained a viable social and economic institution in 
late imperial Russia. Although he believed firmly in private agriculture, he criticized the 
Stolypin land reform for attempting to pressure peasants to separate from communes. 
Kovalevskii argued that in a country dominated by communal traditions the state must 
not destroy the collective economy by legislative fiat. He urged Russian policy-makers to 
support the village commune instead of destroying it and pointed to substantial evidence 
of the commune’s economic potential. Recent studies have confirmed Kovalevskii’s 
assertions that communal economic arrangements in the post-Emancipation Russian 
village were flexible enough to allow for innovation and improvement. Kovalevskii’s 
analysis challenges us to revise our understanding of rural communal institutions and of 
the general dynamic of social and economic change. 
      
 
 
 
 1  
                                                         Introduction 
 
     Economic modernization constituted one of the pressing issues in late imperial Russia. 
Agricultural development was a matter of particularly strong scholarly and practical 
concern. Educated Russians of all political persuasions sought to understand the peasants 
and rural institutions, passionately debated the “peasant question”, and offered various 
solutions to it. All, however, agreed on the significance of the successful modernization 
of the countryside to Russia's political and economic progress. Because the peasantry 
comprised the overwhelming majority of the Russian population, the rapid and effective 
resolution of problems of the agricultural sector came to be seen as the matter of the 
survival of the entire social order. As radical political movements became increasingly 
influential in Russian society, it was no longer possible to maintain social stability 
without improving the economic condition of the rural population. 
     The problems of social and economic reform were at the center of Maksim M. 
Kovalevskii's academic and political activities. He received a world-wide recognition as 
the author of numerous monographs on sociology, comparative law, political science, 
anthropology, and ethnography. His historical works covered a wide range of topics, 
including social, political, and economic history, the history of law and family, and the 
evolution of peasant institutions. Kovalevskii placed particular stress on the complex 
processes of transition from traditional to modern societies in different cultures. 
Influenced by positivist and liberal thought, he believed in the universal laws of historical 
evolution and viewed gradual change as a key factor of progress. His analysis of the 
general patterns of development of political, economic, and legal institutions led him to 
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conclude that modernization could be successful only when it was based on existing 
institutions and culture. Any radical break with traditional values and practices would 
lead to social upheavals. Based on his scholarly findings, he warned Russian policy-
makers that reforms aimed at destroying traditional peasant institutions would not 
improve the status quo, but would only provoke social and economic degradation and 
thus discredit the very idea of reform. 
     Born on August 27, 1851, in a family of wealthy aristocratic landowners, he studied at 
the University of Kharkov, one of Russia's best educational institutions, from 1868 to 
1872. His major professor, Dmitrii I. Kachenovskii, a prominent legal historian, a liberal, 
and a positivist, fostered his interest in positivist ideas and in the comparative historical 
study of institutions, an interest he maintained throughout his academic career. After 
graduating from the University of Kharkov, Kovalevskii continued his education as a 
graduate student in Europe. In Berlin, he studied with Rudolf Gneist, Heinrich Brunner, 
and Adolf Wagner. Most of the time he spent in France, where he attended lectures at the 
School of Paleography and Librarianship (École des Chartes) and conducted research at 
the Bibliothèque Nationale and the historical archives in Lyon, Montpellier, Rouen, and 
Aix-en-Provence.1 
     He spent one year in England using the rich resources of the British Museum. In 
London, he met Henry S. Maine and Herbert Spencer, both of whom greatly influenced 
his scholarship. In England he also met Karl Marx, whose philosophy inspired him to 
turn to the study of economics as a major factor in social and political change. Although 
                                                 
1 For an outline of Kovalevskii’s life and works, see, for example: Nikolai Ia. Kuprits, Kovalevskii 
(Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1978); S.N. Pogodin, Russkaia shkola istorikov: N.I. Kareev, I.V. 
Luchitskii, M.M. Kovalevskii (St. Petersburg: Izd-vo SPBGTU, 1997); and Boris G. Safronov, M.M. 
Kovalevskii kak sotsiolog (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1960). 
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he rejected the Marxist theory of class struggle, Kovalevskii recognized Marx as a great 
scholar passionately devoted to intellectual inquiry.  
     After his return to Russia in 1876, his academic career advanced rapidly. He 
completed his thesis, received a master's degree from the University of Moscow, and 
joined the University's Department of Law as an instructor (dotsent) in comparative legal 
history. Three years later, he defended his doctoral dissertation, obtained his Ph.D., and 
became a full professor at the University of Moscow. His exceptional erudition and 
brilliant oratorial skills made him very popular with his students. Kovalevskii never 
limited himself, however, to strictly professorial activities. He published books and 
regularly contributed to liberal periodicals and academic journals. In collaboration with 
Vsevolod F. Miller, a famous Russian historian and ethnographer, he published and 
edited the Kriticheskoe obozrenie (Critical Survey, 1879-80). He undertook three 
ethnographic expeditions to the Caucasus, where he conducted extensive field work on 
the culture and customs of local ethnic groups.  
     Kovalevskii figured prominently in the circle of Moscow liberal professors which 
included Aleksandr I. Chuprov, Ivan I. Ianzhul, and Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii. After the 
assassination of the Emperor Alexander II in 1881, the government declared a war on 
terrorism. Increasingly suspicious of any potentially dangerous activity, the authorities 
became particularly apprehensive of the situation in Russian universities, which they saw 
as a major source of political radicalism. As it often happens, however, the government 
victimized those who had nothing to do with terrorist activities. Despite Kovalevskii's 
moderate liberal platform and strong opposition to revolution, his close association with 
influential liberal leaders such as Sergei A. Muromtsev, a lawyer and a proponent of 
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constitutional reform, made him a dangerous troublemaker in the eyes of the authorities. 
Conservative bureaucrats, including the Minister of Education Ivan D. Delianov, 
particularly disliked Kovalevskii's emphasis on the advantages of Western democratic 
institutions, which implied criticism of tsarist autocracy. Accused of maintaining a 
“negative attitude to the existing regime,” he was forced to resign his position in June 
1887.  
     Kovalevskii left Russia again, this time for eighteen years. He taught at the best 
European universities: Oxford University, Collège Libre des Sciences Sociales in Paris, 
the Free University in Brussels, and the University of Stockholm. During two visits to the 
United States, he lectured at the universities of Chicago and San Francisco. He spoke 
English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish fluently, and read Latin and Greek. One of 
the founders of the International Institute of Sociology in Paris, he served as its vice-
president in 1895 and as president in 1907.  
     While abroad, Kovalevskii produced his most influential books. To his estate in 
Beaulieu in southern France, near Nice, he brought from Russia his private library of 
50,000 volumes. He published extensively in the most prestigious scholarly periodicals, 
including the Nouvelle revue historique de droit, the Rivista italiana di sociologia, the 
Archaeological Review, and the Law Quarterly Review. Kovalevskii, however, never lost 
touch with the developments in Russia. He maintained a regular correspondence with his 
Russian colleagues, read books and periodicals from Russia, and continued to contribute 
numerous articles to the Russian liberal press, notably the newspaper Russkie vedomosti 
(Russian News) and the journals Vestnik Evropy (Herald of Europe) and Russkaia mysl' 
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(Russian Thought). Many of his European publications dealt with Russian history and 
economics.2 
     In 1901, Kovalevskii became one of the organizers of the Russian School of Social 
Sciences in Paris, where he served as its director and a faculty member. The French 
authorities closed the School in 1906, after persistent requests from the Russian 
government, which disapproved of the teaching of “provocative” subjects to young 
Russians who came to France as visitors or political refugees. In fact, most of the school's 
teachers openly opposed the tsarist regime and many of its courses were unavailable in 
Russian universities. Because the school's faculty consisted of only a few persons, it 
relied mainly on visiting lecturers of various political persuasions. Many prominent 
Russian scholars and politicians such as Pavel N. Miliukov and Sergei A. Muromtsev, the 
economists Petr B. Struve and Mikhail I. Tugan-Baranovskii, and the world famous 
biologists Il'ia Mechnikov and Konstantin A. Timiriazev lectured at the school. To 
represent a broad spectrum of oppositional thought, Kovalevskii invited the leaders of 
Russian Marxism, Vladimir I. Lenin and Georgii V. Plekhanov, to deliver a series of 
lectures. After Lenin's lecture on “Marxist Views on the Agrarian Question in Europe and 
Russia” in February 1903, Kovalevskii commented that Lenin “would be a good 
professor of political economy if he were not so hateful of any thought different from his 
own.”3   
                                                 
2 In addition to numerous articles, Kovalevskii published several monographs on Russia, including Modern 
Customs and Ancient Laws in Russia: The Ilchester Lectures for 1889-1890 (London: David Nutt, 1891), 
Le régime économique de la Russie (Paris: V. Giard & E. Briere, 1898), and Russian Political Institutions: 
The Growth and Development of These Institutions from the Beginnings of Russian History to the Present 
Time (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902).  
3 Cited in Dmitry Shlapentokh, The French Revolution in Russian Intellectual Life, 1865-1905 (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 75. 
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     Kovalevskii returned to Russia during the Revolution of 1905. He continued his 
academic career at the University of St. Petersburg, the Polytechnic Institute, and the 
Psychoneurological Institute in St. Petersburg, but also engaged in political activities. In 
1906, he was elected to the First State Duma (the lower chamber of the new Russian 
parliament), where he represented the moderate liberal Party of Democratic Reform. 
Although his party never enjoyed success among the masses, the educated public 
recognized him as one of Russia's leading liberal politicians. Second in popularity only to 
Pavel N. Miliukov, leader of the liberal Constitutional-Democratic (Kadet) Party, he was 
known simply as Maksim Maksimovich or “our Maksim”.4 
     In 1907, the academic community elected him to the State Council (the upper chamber 
of the parliament), where he served on many legislative committees until his death in 
1916. A strong advocate of agricultural modernization, he strongly opposed the Stolypin 
land reform. The summer of 1914 Kovalevskii spent in Karlsbad, then part of Austria, for 
treatment of a heart condition. When the World War I broke out, the Austrian authorities 
detained him as a civil prisoner but soon released him after the intervention of his 
influential friends, including President Woodrow Wilson. His health declined rapidly, 
however, and he died in March 1916. His funeral became a national event that attracted 
tens of thousands of people in St. Petersburg. Tugan-Baranovskii considered his death the 
heaviest loss for Russia since the death of Lev N. Tolstoi in 1910. The French parliament 
sent a telegram to Russia mourning his death and praising his Proiskhozhdenie 
sovremennoi demokratii (Origins of Contemporary Democracy) as a great contribution to 
French historiography. 
                                                 
4 N.B. Khailova, “Maksim Maksimovich Kovalevskii,” in Rossiiskie liberaly, eds. Boris S. Itenberg and 
Valentin V. Shelokhaev (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 366-370. 
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     Peculiarly, despite Kovalevskii's outstanding academic achievements, historians have 
ignored much of his scholarship. The only monographic study about Kovalevskii, which 
appeared in the 1960s, focused primarily on his sociological work and was infused with a 
heavy dose of the Soviet Marxist ideology. Recovering and re-evaluating Kovalevskii's 
extensive scholarship is certainly much needed, especially when it comes to his works on 
peasant communes. 
     This study represents the first attempt to examine Kovalevskii’s writings on peasant 
communal institutions in light of the evidence provided by pre-revolutionary Russian 
economists, agronomists, and zemstvo statisticians. His analysis of the family and village 
commune is also discussed in the context of twentieth-century peasant studies and recent 
works by Western and Russian historians and economists. Finally, the study evaluates the 
significance of Kovalevskii’s scholarly findings and investigates their relevance to the 
complex processes of rural modernization in Russia and other parts of the world today.  
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                                 Chapter I. Two Types of Communes: 
                        The Historical Evolution of the Family Commune  
 
     Using a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, Kovalevskii studied communal 
forms of agriculture in different societies throughout history. He believed that the cross-
cultural study of the historical evolution of rural institutions would provide his 
contemporaries with “positive” knowledge about the dynamics of social and economic 
change and thus help them better understand current problems of agricultural 
development. 
     Kovalevskii offered the first extensive discussion of communal life and economy in 
Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie, prichiny, khod i posledstviia ego razlozheniia (Communal 
Landholding: Causes and Consequences of Its Disintegration, 1879).5 This work 
represented his initial attempt to examine the commune as a cross-cultural phenomenon, 
evidence of which he found in India, Latin America, and North Africa. In later works, he 
expanded his analysis to other regions of the world. Having collected ethnographic 
material during field trips to the Caucasus, he described the commune as an institution 
widely spread among the Dagestanians, Ossets, Pshavs, and other local populations. In a 
series of monographs between 1886 and 1905, he synthesized his own extensive research 
and numerous secondary sources. He concluded that the commune was a universal form 
of social and economic organization that existed in various cultures around the world and 
survived in many societies until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
     Kovalevskii distinguished between the two main types of the commune: the 
patriarchal family and the village commune. Following Henry S. Maine and Lewis H. 
                                                 
5 Kovalevskii, Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie, prichiny, khod i posledstviia ego razlozheniia (Moscow: F.B. 
Miller, 1879). 
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Morgan, he described both types of the commune as archaic institutions, the origins of 
which he traced back to prehistoric times. At the initial stage of human evolution all 
property, including land, was owned collectively. In fact, no notion of property existed 
until the development of settled forms of life and the subsequent emergence of 
agriculture. Primitive people lived as nomadic tribes who made their living primarily by 
fishing, hunting, and gathering. In the absence of individual property, everything except 
clothing was owned by the entire tribe. 
     As settled forms of life developed, tribes gradually divided into clans, or gens: large 
agnatic kin groups. Clans, in turn, separated over time into smaller groups, the so-called 
extended patriarchal families consisting of three or rarely four generations of the 
descendants of one common male ancestor. These patrilineal relatives, together with their 
wives and children, lived under the same roof, thus comprising one big household. Most 
importantly, the extended family formed an economic unit that cultivated its land 
together, shared the products of its labor, and fed and clothed itself from a common stock. 
The patriarchal family thus exemplified the earliest type of the commune, the family 
commune.  
     Kovalevskii demonstrated that the so-called zadruga (association, or partnership) still 
existed among some Southern Slavic peoples in the form of an extended family in the late 
nineteenth century. As a living example, or a “survival,” of the archaic patriarchal family, 
the zadruga had been probably the best known example of the family commune by the 
time Kovalevskii began studying it. Historians and ethnographers “discovered” it in the 
early nineteenth century. Vuk Karadzić, a famous Serbian scholar, mentioned the 
zadruga in 1818 in his Dictionary of the Serbian language (Srpski Rječnik). In the 1850s-
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1870s, Serbian historians Valtasar Bogišić and O.M. Utesenović published their first 
monographic studies of the zadruga.1 During the same period, the first studies of the 
zadruga appeared in Russia. The emancipation of the serfs provoked heated debates over 
the future of Russian agriculture and fostered an increased interest in peasant institutions. 
In the late 1860s and early 1870s, the works of Bogišić and Utesenovič were translated 
into Russian and the first major studies by Russian scholars appeared in print.6  
     In his discussion of the zadruga, Kovalevskii relied largely on the findings of Bogišić, 
Leontovich, and Zigel', as well as on research by Friedrich S. Kraus.7 From these sources, 
he found that the earliest Southern Slavic legal documents mentioned the zadruga. The 
Vinodol Law of 1288, Stefan Dushan's Law Code (Zakonnik Stefana Dushana) of 1349, 
and the Poljitsa Statute of 1440 spoke of the large family groups that lived together under 
the leadership of the patriarch, bound by common land ownership and mutual financial 
responsibilities. These records, Kovalevskii concluded, provided evidence that the 
contemporary zadruga represented a survival of the archaic communal family with its 
typical characteristics and functions.8 
     The zadruga constituted an economic unit based on collective property ownership and 
joint production and consumption of goods. Its members owned land, livestock, tools, 
and immovable property in common, performed all work together, and shared the 
products of their labor. The family's property remained undivided even after the death of 
the head of the household, although customary law gave individual members the right to 
                                                 
1 Valtasar Bogišić, Pravni običaji u slovena: privatno pravo (Zagreb: D. Albrecht, 1867); Zbornik 
sadašnjih pravnih običaja u južnih slovena (Zagreb: D. Albrecht, 1874); O. M. Utesenović, Die 
Hauskommunion der Sudslaven (Vienna, 1859). 
6 Fedor I. Leontovich, Drevnee khorvato-dalmatskoe zakonodatel'stvo (Odessa: Tip. G. Ul’rikha, 1868); 
Fedor F. Zigel', Zakonnik Stefana Dushana (St. Petersburg: Tip. T-va Obshchestvennaia pol’za, 1872). 
7 Friedrich S. Kraus, Sitte und Brauch der Sudslaven (Vienna: A. Hölder, 1885). 
8 Maksim M. Kovalevskii, Rodovoi byt v nastoiashchem, nedavnem i otdalennom proshlom: opyty v oblasti 
sravnitel'noi etnografii i istorii prava, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1905), vol. 1, 77-86. 
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request their share of property and to separate from the commune. The entire family 
assumed joint responsibility for all financial and legal obligations, for repaying debts 
accumulated by the family, and for the payment of any monetary compensation for the 
crimes committed by a family member against a member of another family (vira). 
     In accordance with such a strong emphasis on communal economy, a relative who 
separated from the zadruga was automatically excluded from the group. On the other 
hand, non-relatives could join the family through adoption or marriage if they agreed to 
participate in the family's economic activities. Elderly people from outside the family 
could also be admitted to the zadruga after they had lost all their relatives capable of 
caring for them. As an act of confirmation of their membership, they usually transferred 
their property to the family's common fund.9 
     Substantial authority in the zadruga belonged to the head of the family, domaćin 
(literally, house leader), elected by all members of the zadruga. The domaćin, usually the 
most capable and respectable male member, but not necessarily the oldest one, presided 
over the family meetings, controlled the family funds, and acted as the family’s 
representative in all outside matters, primarily in legal and commercial affairs. The 
supreme authority, however, rested with the family council, the assembly of all adult 
household members of both sexes. The council made all important decisions, especially 
those pertaining to land cultivation, the sale and purchase of property, agricultural 
produce, and instruments, financial loans, and any other actions affecting the entire 
community. The council could also replace a domaćin with another one in case he acted 
without its unanimous consent. The domaćica (female house leader) assisted the domaćin 
                                                 
9 Kovalevskii, Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia i razvitiia sem'i i sobstvennosti (St. Petersburg: Tip. Iu.N. Erlikha, 
1895), 66-67. 
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in the supervision of the female members of the zadruga. All adult women in the family 
elected the domaćica, subject to approval by the entire family council. Most often, the 
domaćin’s wife or the oldest woman in the family occupied the post. She supervised the 
women’s daily work, kept the order in the house, mediated disputes, and often had a 
decisive voice in marriage arrangements.10 
     Every member of the zadruga performed assigned work and received a share of food, 
clothing, and other necessities. Most importantly, all adult family members, both men and 
women, had a right to vote in the family council and to speak at council meetings. The 
family council usually gathered every evening after supper. The domaćin presiding, it 
discussed current matters, listened to the domaćin’s reports, and approved or disapproved 
his suggestions concerning the sale of property and other financial affairs. With the 
council’s sanction, any family members could leave the commune and form their separate 
household. Males were allowed to seek seasonal employment elsewhere, especially 
during the winter, when there was no agricultural work. In this case, they could usually 
keep their supplemental income to themselves, except when training provided by the 
family or at its expense made the extra earnings possible. As a rule, the family and an 
individual member who was planning to leave concluded an agreement specifying the 
exact part of the personal income to be given to the common family fund. 
Characteristically, even when family members worked outside the family for several 
years, they still retained family membership and all the benefits associated with it, such 
as the right to property inheritance, economic protection, and support of the commune.11 
                                                 
10 Kovalevskii, Modern Customs, 54-58; Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 66-68; Rodovoi byt, 23-30. 
11 Kovalevskii, Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 67-68; Rodovoi byt, 23-30. 
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     Not surprisingly, Kovalevskii paid particular attention to the patriarchal family in 
Russia, abundant evidence of which he found in many regions of the country. Trained as 
a legal historian, he based his understanding of the Russian family commune on his own 
extensive research in Russian legal history and on numerous secondary sources, primarily 
those of Russian historians and ethnographers such as Aleksandra Ia. Efimenko, Semen 
V. Pakhman, and Dmitrii Ia. Samokvasov. By the late 1870s, when Kovalevskii 
published his first books on communal landownership, the study of the Russian 
patriarchal family had still remained at its initial stage. The earliest published description 
of the extended peasant family, by Nikolai S. Stremukhov, appeared in 1829 in the 
Zemledel’cheskii zhurnal (Agricultural Journal). Stremukhov, a Ukrainian gentry 
landlord, noted that the odnodvortsy (single householders) and udel (appanage) peasants 
often lived in large communal families, which tended to be more prosperous than small 
individual households.12 August von Haxthausen offered a more detailed and vivid 
depiction of the structure and practices of the Russian Familiengemeinde in his 
magisterial Studies of the Interior of Russia.13 Like other observers of that period, 
Haxthausen considered the large patriarchal family a uniquely Russian form of social 
organization deeply rooted in the Russian tradition of collectivism and paternalism. 
Almost simultaneously, a French sociologist, Frédéric LePlay, described numerous 
examples of extended families in Central European Russia, in Orenburg province, and 
among the Bashkirs and the Kazakhs. Unlike Haxthausen, however, LePlay regarded the 
                                                 
12 Mark O. Kosven, Semeinaia obshchina i patronimiia (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1963), 15. 
13 August von Haxthausen, Studien über die inneren Zustände, das Volksleben und insbesondere die 
ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands, 3 vols. (Hannover: Hahn’sche Buchhandlung, 1847). In English, 
Studies on the Interior of Russia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).  
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patriarchal family as an anachronistic social institution, one that retarded the economic 
and social development of Russia.14   
     The systematic investigation of the Russian family commune began during the era of 
the Great Reforms. Despite the publication of numerous specialized studies in the 1860s 
and 1870s, Kovalevskii complained that Russian scholars concentrated on the 
examination of the village commune but virtually ignored the existence of the family 
commune. He believed that, like the Serbian zadruga, the Russian patriarchal family 
represented an archaic communal institution dating back to the earliest stages of the 
history of the Slavic peoples. He agreed with Fedor I. Leontovich's thesis that the old 
Slavic verv’, recorded by the eleventh-century Russian code of law, Grand Prince 
Iaroslav’s Russkaia Pravda, designated the family commune, not the village commune, 
as some historians argued. Kovalevskii found later evidence of the family commune in 
the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century tax registers (pistsovye knigi). The documents 
referred to it as the hearth (pechishche), using the term as a unit of taxation. Legal 
documents in the northern provinces of Russia also referred to the family commune as the 
hearth-fire (ognishche), which reflected the practice of the members of the extended 
family to cook food at the common hearth. In western and southern parts of Russia 
members of the family communes were known as co-partners (siabry), mentioned 
frequently in the Judicial Charter of Pskov (1397-1467), the Statute of Lithuania (1529), 
and the Ukrainian laws of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.15  
     Like the zadruga, the Russian household commune included agnatic relatives, 
descendants of one common forefather, living together with their spouses and children in 
                                                 
14 Frédéric LePlay, Les ouvrièrs européens. Études sur les travaux, la vie domestique et la condition morale 
des populations ouvrières de l'Europe (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1855). 
15 Kovalevskii, Modern Customs, 49-53; Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 66; Rodovoi byt, 35-37. 
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one homestead and united by the common worship of ancestors. The number of family 
members could vary from ten to fifty and even more. Most households consisted of 
approximately twenty or thirty co-residing relatives: grandparents and parents, their 
children and grandchildren, brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, daughters-in-law 
and sons-in-law. Non-relatives could also be incorporated into the family through 
marriage and adoption or when a widow married a member of another family and her 
children came to live with her under the roof of her new husband’s family. Like the 
zadruga, the Russian patriarchal family functioned as a corporate economic organization 
based on communal economic activity, collective ownership of land and other property, 
and joint production and consumption of goods. Typically, all family members shared the 
food prepared in a common kitchen. Participation in the daily economic activities of the 
family gave an adopted person the status and full rights of the relative.16 
     The head of the family, or bol'shak (literally “the big man”), embodied patriarchal 
authority in the family, as did the domaćin in the zadruga. The bol'shak represented the 
entire family in its contacts with the outside world. He dealt with the governmental and 
judicial authorities. He appeared in the court to answer the complaints against the family 
and to defend its rights in case they had been violated. He was responsible for ensuring 
that the family complied with the law, provided military conscripts, and paid taxes on 
time. He presided over the family assembly, mediated disputes between the family 
members, consulted them on marriage issues, and supervised their daily work. He acted 
as a legal guardian of young orphans and sent them to school or to artisan shops to learn a 
trade by which they could make a living in the future.17 
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     Despite these powers, Kovalevskii stressed, the bol'shak's authority should not be 
exaggerated. Unlike the Roman paterfamilias, for example, he was but the first among 
equals. He had no right to make decisions on any major issues without the unanimous 
consent of the family council, comprised of all adult members of the family, both male 
and female. Most importantly, he could not make any major economic decisions, such as 
buying or selling land or any other family property, without the approval of the council. 
If some members of the family could not find work within the commune, the council 
allowed them to seek employment elsewhere. The council also assisted the bol'shak in 
settling disputes between the family members, including marriage issues. The council, for 
instance, decided whether a young woman should accept or refuse a marriage offer and 
determined the amount of the dowry.18 
     The fact that Kovalevskii did not limit himself to the study of the relatively well-
researched zadruga and the Russian patriarchal family added particular value to his work. 
He sought to extend his analysis to a global scale and to find evidence of family 
communes in various regions of the world and at different time periods. One of his most 
notable scholarly achievements was the discovery of numerous instances of family 
communes among the Dagestanians, Kabardinians, Ossets, Pshavs, and other small ethnic 
groups, which he observed during his multiple field trips to the Caucasus. He pointed to 
striking similarities between them and the zadruga and the Russian extended family. The 
differences were few and minor in character. For example, the head of the Osset family 
was not elected by family members, but appointed by his predecessor; and the family 
council included only male adults. 
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     In the Indian literary epics Avesta and Rigveda Kovalevskii found evidence of ancient 
forms of Indian family communes called the janmana. Early Indian legal codes (the 
Manu, the Mitakshara, the Ushanas, and others) also mentioned the sapindas, a 
multigenerational large family living under the same roof, owning property collectively, 
and worshipping common ancestors. The sapindas was headed by the oldest male, whose 
decisions had to be approved by all family members. Although the principle of indivisible 
property governed their property relations, individuals could claim their portion of the 
property and start a separate household upon the approval of all family members. 
Personal earnings accumulated outside the commune were to be shared with the entire 
family unless a person proved that he or she owed their earnings exclusively to individual 
knowledge and skills.19 
     Drawing on a myriad of primary and secondary sources, Kovalevskii demonstrated the 
existence of family communes in ancient Greece and Rome and in early Celtic, 
Germanic, and Scandinavian settlements. He made a particularly valuable contribution to 
the nineteenth-century debate about the evolution of communal institutions by 
investigating the ancient German Hausgenossenschaft. Containing not only direct 
relatives but also servants, slaves, laborers, and all those who depended on the family 
economically and contributed to its daily activities, the Hausgenossenschaft united the 
individuals who lived under the same roof and recognized the authority of the head of the 
house. As a proof, Kovalevskii cited Julius Caesar’s reference to consaguinitates, qui una 
coierunt (relatives who eat at the same table) and Tacitus’ mention of the propinquitates 
(co-residing relatives).20  
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     Kovalevskii also demonstrated that the terms confraternitates, consortes, 
consorteriae, genealogiae, and socii, often mentioned in the Allemanic, Bavarian, 
Burgundian, Frankish, and Langobardian laws, all designated the same phenomenon: an 
extended family composed of three or four generations of patrilineal relatives living 
together and owning land and other immovable property in common. The charters of the 
Lower Rhine also referred to them as cohaeredes, conparticipes et consaguinei, that is, 
co-residents, co-owners, and relatives. In Southern Germany, this type of family was also 
known as the Pfund. Citing the lack of any reference in the Germanic legal codes to the 
right of testament and sale of land by individual owners, Kovalevskii argued that family 
property customarily remained undivided after the father’s death. According to the 
French coutumes (customary laws) and the German Weisthümer (written records of 
customary laws), a family member could exercise the right to individual property 
(Beispruchsrecht) and receive a personal allotment of land only upon the approval of 
other family members. The Germanic laws also specified in great detail the joint 
responsibility of the family for crimes committed by family members against the 
members of other families and for the payment of monetary compensations for such 
crimes.21 
     Kovalevskii found similar communal structures in almost every region of medieval 
Europe. In Wales, the Celtic family associations, known as wele or gwely (literally 
translated as “bed”), used land (common pasture and woodland) and other property 
collectively. The chieftain granted a da to each adult male, usually in the form of an 
allotment of cattle, which gave him the right to join in the communal ploughing of the 
waste. When a man died, his da reverted to the family’s common stock. The members of 
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the wele were also tied by the joint responsibility of paying the galanas, a monetary 
compensation for a crime committed by a family member against a member of another 
family. Kovalevskii’s study of the Brehon laws and Irish epic sources of the pre-conquest 
period led him to conclude that the Irish term geilfines referred to groups of close agnatic 
relatives who lived in undivided families under the leadership of the family patriarch. 
Such groups practiced open-field agriculture, owned and worked the land collectively, 
and did not partition their property even after the patriarch’s death. Like the Welsh wele, 
they held joint responsibility for the payment of the ericfine as a compensation for crimes 
committed by family members. Other European examples of the family commune 
included the companias in Spanish Galicia and the parçonneries (coparceners) in France. 
Characteristically, the French parçonneries survived until the nineteenth century. The 
traditions of Galician companias remained strong in northern Spain in the early twentieth 
century.22 
     As evidence from other parts of the world, Kovalevskii cited the ancient Mexican 
calpulli and the North African Kabylian family. According to Spanish reports during the 
American conquest, native Indians lived in calpulli, family communes headed by the 
chief of the family. They owned the land in common and never divided the property 
among their children. In North Africa, the Kabylian three-generational families lived 
together, owned property in common, and shared the products of their labor.23  
     A detailed analysis of examples from all over the world allowed Kovalevskii to 
discern the common characteristics of the family commune. Clearly, it represented a 
complex, multi-functional institution that operated on multiple levels. First and most 
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important, it functioned as an economic unit based on collective ownership of property 
and joint production and consumption of goods. Second, the family commune existed as 
a territorial unit, as its members typically co-resided in one homestead. In accordance 
with the patrilocal residence pattern prescribed by custom, young men did not leave the 
parental house upon marriage to form a separate household but continued to live in the 
family together with their wives, children and grandchildren. Third, the family commune 
constituted an autonomous administrative unit governed by the family council under the 
leadership of the household head. Finally, the family commune served as a legal unit. 
Ruled by customary law, it comprised a joint object of legal obligations. Family members 
assumed joint responsibility for paying taxes, providing military recruits, and dealing 
with judicial and administrative authorities. In earlier stages of development, the family 
also held joint responsibility for any crimes committed by a family member against a 
member of another family. As Kovalevskii showed, when a family member was 
murdered, wounded, or otherwise victimized, customary law in many cultures prescribed 
the payment of a monetary compensation by the family whose member had caused the 
damage. After formal legal systems emerged, the head of the family appeared in the court 
as representative of the entire household and signed contracts and legal documents on 
behalf of it.   
     The importance of the economic functions of the family commune led some of 
Kovalevskii's contemporaries to view it simply as a form of cooperative (artel'), thus 
underestimating the kinship aspect. Kovalevskii criticized Efimenko for equating the 
family commune with the cooperative and rejecting kinship as its essential component. 
The fact that agnatic relatives made up the core of the commune appeared essential to 
 21  
Kovalevskii. Outsiders could join it only through marriage or adoption, that is, by 
acquiring the status of a relative. Otherwise, they did not enjoy the full membership 
rights. Membership in the cooperative, on the other hand, was based solely on a contract, 
not on kinship ties. Accordingly, Kovalevskii dismissed Efimenko's contention that the 
authority of the head of the family pertained only to managing the family economy, and 
was similar to that of the chief (starosta) in the cooperative. The nature of the family 
head's authority, he emphasized, was exclusively patriarchal. It derived primarily from 
the status and the power of the patriarch as the chief administrator of the family 
economy.24     
     The notion of the family commune as a universal, cross-cultural phenomenon also 
distinguished Kovalevskii’s work from that of many of his colleagues. Despite the 
proliferation of peasant studies in the 1870s and 1880s, such a global vision of the family 
commune still appeared to many as innovative, if not revolutionary. Although the earliest 
descriptions of the extended family appeared in the early nineteenth century, all of them 
treated it as an exclusively local and particularistic phenomenon. Anthropological and 
legal historical studies in the 1860s and 1870s gave the first impulse to comparative 
studies of communal family forms across cultures. The works of Johann J. Bachofen, 
John Lubbock, Lewis H. Morgan, and Edward B. Tylor provided a broad theoretical 
framework for such studies.25  Among the pioneers in the newly emerging field were 
Frédéric LePlay, Henry S. Maine, and Émile de Laveleye. LePlay offered a typology of 
family forms and described extended family households in Russia, North Africa, southern 
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France, Italy, and Spain. Maine convincingly demonstrated that the Hindu joint family, 
the Slavic house community, the Irish sept or fine (mentioned in the Brehon laws), and 
the communal families in the French province of Nièvre displayed the same 
characteristics of “a community of kinsmen” who shared “the common dwelling” and 
“common table” and practiced “the collective enjoyment of property and its 
administration by an elected manager.”26 
     Kovalevskii belonged to the first generation of Russian historians and ethnographers 
who addressed this issue. Like many of his contemporaries, he sought to investigate the 
causes and potential effects of the growing disintegration of the family commune in post-
Emancipation Russia. His research revealed the complex social processes within the 
family commune. On the one hand, collectivism and patriarchal authority permeated the 
fabric of communal family life. Age and sex defined the person's status in the family 
hierarchy. Women were subordinate to men, wives to their husbands, children to their 
parents. The group interests prevailed over those of the individual. As a collective 
institution, it promoted social cohesion and solidarity of its members, “the feeling of 
mutual dependence and joint relationship without which no system of social reform can 
have any chance of success.” Group work fostered the sense of mutual responsibility and 
“reliance on one another.”27 
     On the other hand, Kovalevskii maintained, patriarchy fostered the growth of 
individualistic tendencies within the family commune. The very foundations of the 
patriarchal order contained the “seeds of its decline.” Submission of the individual to 
patriarchal authority sooner or later led to increasing attempts on the part of family 
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members to assert their individual rights. Kovalevskii cited many examples from 
different societies and time periods to demonstrate that the “instinct of individualism” 
always existed in the patriarchal family and exerted a huge impact on family practices, 
particularly on property relations.28 
     In India, a country with a strong communal tradition, individualism displayed itself 
very early during the era of the Brahman laws. According to the ancient Indian law code 
of Manu, members of the joint family who accumulated their personal earnings outside 
the family were required to contribute it entirely to the common fund. The same law, on 
the other hand, granted to these individuals the privilege of receiving a larger portion of 
property in case of the family division. By the fifth century B.C., individualism had made 
even greater progress, which was reflected in the practice of considering the inheritance 
received from the father, as well as gifts from friends, as belonging to the recipient 
exclusively. Furthermore, the code of Narada stipulated that in case of property division, 
individual members were entitled to full possession of any property acquired as a result 
of their personal skills and expertise.29 
     Similar individualistic tendencies developed in the ancient Roman family. Military 
booty (peculium castrense) represented the earliest form of personal property that 
individuals could keep for themselves without sharing with other family members. 
Gradually, personal property came to include quasi-military acquisitions (peculium quasi 
castrense), that is, everything that individuals earned outside the family. In the Slavic 
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zadruga, the similar practice of personal peculium gradually replaced the tradition of 
sharing all personal earnings with the entire family.30 
     The growth of individualism, Kovalevskii noted, was particularly manifest in the 
evolution of attitudes toward household divisions. Initially, the custom allowed 
divisions of family property only after the death of the patriarch. Over time, however, 
divisions during the patriarch's lifetime became increasingly frequent. In India, the code 
of Manu recognized property divisions only approved by the patriarch, but the later code 
of Narada extended the right to sanction a partition to the entire family council. 
Nineteenth-century Indian courts acknowledged the right of any family member to 
demand a portion of family property. Similarly, ancient German and French laws 
stipulated that the head of the family had the right to decide whether or not to grant a part 
of family property to his sons. The Schwabenspiegel statute of the thirteenth century was 
the first to require the father to give at least two-fifths of the family property to his son if 
he requested a partition.31 
     In Russia, family break-ups remained rare before the emancipation of the serfs in 
1861. For the state, the family commune represented a convenient unit of taxation. Joint 
responsibility for the payment of taxes guaranteed that taxes would be paid on time. 
Because of its large size, the patriarchal family could also relatively easily provide 
military recruits without a severe loss of labor force. For the gentry, the family commune 
served as a well-organized unit of agricultural labor, supervised and coordinated by the 
family head. Joint financial responsibility facilitated the collection of money dues. It was 
precisely for this reason, Kovalevskii suggested, that even after the Emancipation the 
                                                 
30 Kovalevskii, Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 116-118. 
31  Kovalevskii, Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 118-121. 
 25  
government and the gentry continued to discourage frequent family fissions. The law of 
1886 exemplified one of the attempts on the part of the state to place restrictions on 
household divisions by legitimizing only those divisions that received the approval of the 
village commune.32  
     Despite restrictions, the process of disintegration of family communes gathered 
momentum in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Kovalevskii estimated that about 
two or three million household divisions took place between 1861 and 1891. In southern 
and southwestern parts of Russia, this process went particularly rapidly. In his opinion, 
the fertility of the black soil in these regions allowed a peasant to expect generally good 
harvests and to manage the payment of taxes without his relatives' help. The “spirit of 
independence” of the Ukrainian Cossacks also affected the peasant mentality in southern 
areas and thus contributed to the acceleration of this process. Characteristically, 
Kovalevskii never doubted the prospect that all regions of Russia would “sooner or later 
follow the same path,” and the patriarchal house community would disappear in Russia, 
just as it had disappeared in many parts of Europe.33 
     Thus, Kovalevskii insisted that the pressures of the patriarchal order did not make the 
Russian peasant completely “insensible to the advantages of individualism.” Like many 
of his contemporaries, he attributed the increase in household divisions after 1861 to the 
growth of individualism and the decline of patriarchy. The “able and laborious” peasants 
were no longer willing “to work for the idle and incapable”. They desired to abandon 
“their communistic mode of life,” not fearing “the prospect of being deprived of the aid 
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of the relatives.” Guided by the “spirit of personal enterprise,” they wanted “to have their 
own homes and to be their own masters.”34 
     The dilemma many peasants increasingly faced was whether to stay in the family 
commune and continue to accept their subordinate position in the patriarchal order or to 
set up a separate household and try to start an independent life. Younger peasants were 
most likely to have an “urge for independence,” a desire to leave the relative security of 
the commune, and a willingness to take the risks of living on their own. Unmarried sons, 
especially, felt the injustice of being forced to share their personal earnings with their 
relatives who enjoyed “the pleasures of married life and a numerous progeny, who, on 
account of their youth, were not yet able to earn anything by the work of their hands.” 
Younger peasants also wished to leave the overcrowded dwellings, which were often “too 
small to accommodate a large family,” and strove for living “with decency” in a separate 
dwelling.35 
     Women, who suffered most from oppression in the patriarchal system, also often 
initiated household divisions. Kovalevskii cited disputes among women as one of the 
most common causes of partitions. The wives of younger sons were most likely to be 
dissatisfied with their status. They occupied the lowest position in the patriarchal 
hierarchy as newcomers, as women, and as spouses of junior male members of the 
family. The wives of seasonal workers often desired to leave the family commune 
because they felt defenseless in their husbands' absence and saw the separation as the 
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only way to liberate themselves from oppression. No wonder that daughters-in-law 
generally enjoyed the reputation of potentially troublesome family members.36 
     It was not only resistance to patriarchy that, according to Kovalevskii, turned women 
into agents of individualism. Paradoxically, the patriarchal system itself promoted 
women's individualism. The right of women to own individual property within the family 
commune represented, in Kovalevskii's opinion, a factor that promoted “the 
establishment of private property.” Young women could keep for themselves any 
earnings they made during their leisure hours. These private belongings comprised the 
bulk of their future dowry. Their parents contributed only but a small addition to what a 
young woman accumulated by her “industry and thrift.”37  
     Although custom excluded women from property inheritance, widows and unmarried 
daughters received upon the patriarch's death small endowments that provided for their 
care until their death or marriage. Finally, women participated in family assemblies. 
Their opinion, though considered less significant than that of men, did not remain 
completely disregarded, especially given the influence they often exerted on their 
husbands. Kovalevskii thus stressed the important role of women in shaping the family 
life and economy.38 
     Twentieth-century studies corroborated Kovalevskii's thesis that the patriarchal family 
existed in many parts of the world until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
An extensive literature on the zadruga has documented the wide spread of this type of the 
family commune among the Balkan Slavs. Similarly, family historians confirmed the 
existence of extended families in the Caucasus, India, and Western Europe. David I. 
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Kertzer found a high proportion of complex family households in central Italy in the mid-
nineteenth century.39 David S. Reher presented evidence of high incidence if complex 
family households in northern Spain.40 John W. Shaffer described the family communes 
(communauté) in the French province of Nivernais, where they survived well into the 
nineteenth century.41 
     Testing Kovalevskii's findings on the Russian family commune against the current 
state of research on this subject is particularly relevant for our purposes because it 
comprised his primary interest and concern. Western historians have generally agreed 
that the patriarchal family commune represented the dominant form of household 
organization in medieval Russia and survived in many Russian regions until the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Jerome Blum and Geroid T. Robinson, for 
example, showed that throughout centuries Russian peasants lived in “complex or 
patriarchal families which usually included not only the children and grandchildren of the 
head of the household, but other relatives by blood and marriage.”42 Christine D. 
Worobec demonstrated that the structure and culture of the Russian peasant life 
dominated by the complex family displayed a marked continuity over several centuries. 
Despite a significant increase in family divisions in the post-emancipation period, large 
patrilocal households continued to exist in many regions. In 1887-1896, more than two-
thirds (67.4 percent) of peasant households in Voronezh province were composed of 
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extended families. In Kostroma province, the figure stood at nearly 47 percent of all 
households.43 
     Numerous local studies conducted with advanced statistical techniques also confirmed 
Kovalevskii’s generalizations. Peter Czap, one of the leading authorities in the field of 
comparative family history, concluded that “the large multi-generational 
family/household was the predominant form of domestic group among [seigniorial 
peasants] throughout large areas of Russia in the eighteenth and first half of the 
nineteenth centuries.” In Czap’s estimate, complex family households accounted for 
between 62 to 85 percent of all serf households during this period.44 A local study by 
Steven L. Hoch demonstrated the existence of complex family households in Petrovskoe, 
a village estate in Tambov province. According to Hoch, complex family households 
made up 60 to 78 percent of the total before 1856, when a significant drop occurred.45 
Edgar Melton found similarly high populations among serf households in Rastorg, a 
Kursk province estate of the Sheremet’evs. Rodney D. Bohac showed that a majority of 
peasant households of the Manuilovskoe estate in Tver province represented complex 
family structures as well.46 
     In contrast, most Soviet historians believed that the simple nuclear family, not the 
large patriarchal family, dominated Russian rural communities “from the sixteenth right 
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up to the middle of the nineteenth century.”47 Nina A. Minenko, however, pointed to the 
fact that, although the small family predominated in Western Siberia in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the sources also revealed frequent instances of large family 
households, numbering twenty to thirty persons living under the authority of a patriarch 
head.48 Boris N. Mironov criticized Soviet historians for tending to categorize some 
complex families as nuclear and thus exaggerating the number of nuclear family units. 
According to Mironov, complex family households constituted the absolute majority in 
the Kiev, Nizhnii Novgorod, Perm, and Iaroslavl provinces around 1850. By the turn of 
the twentieth century, the nuclear family dominated in all regions of Russia except the 
central black-earth region and Belorussia.49 
     Thus, most of the evidence generated by twentieth-century historians strongly 
supports Kovalevskii’s assertion that the patriarchal family commune represented a 
widespread phenomenon in medieval and modern Russia and that it rapidly declined 
during the post-Emancipation period. Like Kovalevskii, historians today focus on 
explaining the dramatic increase in family divisions in the last several decades of the 
nineteenth century. For the most part, they arrive at conclusions similar to those of 
Kovalevskii. For example, the practice of family divisions, when each of the sons 
received an equal share of all property (land, livestock, and household goods) after the 
patriarch's death, is likewise interpreted not simply in terms of peasant egalitarianism but 
as a function with a pragmatic economic meaning. Equal inheritance system ensured that 
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no heir would be dispossessed and left without the minimum economic resources needed 
for paying taxes and satisfying the basic needs of the newly formed family. By securing 
the peasants from impoverishment and proletarianization, it served as a preventive 
measure against the growth of landless peasant laborers, a potentially destabilizing force 
in the countryside. 
     On the other hand, present-day peasant studies offer a much more detailed and 
nuanced explanation of the process of disintegration of family communes in Russia than 
was possible in the nineteenth century. For example, scholars have found that, despite the 
apparent benefits of equal property distribution, peasants feared that excessively frequent 
use of it might pose a potential threat to household economy. As the number of family 
divisions increased during the post-Emancipation period, peasants became concerned that 
partitions could create economically weak households. Many small families, in fact, 
experienced a labor force shortage because they often contained only one male of 
working age. Such households were extremely vulnerable to crop failure, loss of 
livestock, and injury or ill health of the head the family.50 
     For this reason, the village commune preferred to preserve large communal families as 
economically stable and viable. With their substantial human and material resources, the 
patriarchal families were more likely to operate successfully and to pay rent punctually. 
The village commune generally discouraged household divisions because it believed 
partitions endangered the productive strength and financial stability of both the household 
and the entire village. The inability of new households to survive on their own and to pay 
rent placed increased economic burdens on other households in the village, not to 
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mention the additional economic strains associated with the search for land on which to 
build the dwellings for new families and assigning them a new plot of communal field 
land.51 
     On the other hand, the village commune rarely denied actual requests for partitions. 
Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that even after separation from the family 
commune, new households remained in the village commune and continued to adhere to 
communal practices. Sometimes they retained economic cooperation with the original 
household, continuing to work together and even sharing barn or kiln. As part of the 
village commune, the new household joined in the cooperative enterprise of its 
neighbors.52 
     It was in the interest of the entire village community to ensure the economic viability 
of each new household. During divisions, it checked whether the separating householder 
received a fair share of property from the original household and left with some seed, 
equipment, clothing, grain, and livestock to ease his transition. Peasants themselves 
exercised great caution when it came to property division. To prevent the potential 
dangers of partitions, they often preferred to postpone a partition or to limit the number of 
new branches. Poorer households had an even greater interest in retaining their family 
property intact, which they usually did by disinheriting members of descending 
generations or by sending heirs into other households as adopted sons or in-marrying 
sons-in-law.53 
     As we can see, communal family economy represented a carefully maintained 
equilibrium between the two seemingly conflicting tactics: equal division of property on 
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the one hand and preventing too frequent divisions on the other. Both strategies, in fact, 
served the same economic function. They both were aimed at stabilizing economic 
stratification and maintaining the productive efficiency of the household. Both 
represented pragmatic responses of the peasantry to the complex social and economic 
processes in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Russian countryside. 
     The main weakness of Kovalevskii's vision of the family commune was that he 
understood it exclusively in evolutionary terms. For him, it represented an archaic 
institution, a dying “survival” of the past that essentially had no role to play in modern 
society. As an evolutionist, he recognized the historical transformation of the patriarchal 
family throughout centuries and a great variety of its forms in different parts of the world. 
He demonstrated that the family commune was a dynamic phenomenon that changed 
over time, despite the fact that its basic customs remained substantially unaltered 
throughout centuries. Its functions and property relations were modified in response to 
changing social and economic conditions. Most importantly, he showed that the 
communal family changed as a result of internal processes, due to the growth of 
individualism within it. Tensions between patriarchy and collectivism on the one side and 
individualistic tendencies on the other were transforming its economic and legal 
practices.  
     On the other hand, Kovalevskii failed to explain the longevity of the family commune 
and its persistence into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Viewing it 
merely as a remnant of “archaic communism,” he underestimated its functional 
significance in a contemporary society. Although he identified the multiple functions of 
the family commune, he underrated its adaptability to a changing environment, a key 
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factor that ensured its longevity. Paradoxically, the fact that the family commune still 
existed in most of the non-European world, as well as in southern and eastern regions of 
Europe, did not lead Kovalevskii to realize that it constituted an integral part of modern 
life, not just a  surviving artifact of the past stages of human development. He failed to 
admit that the complex family continued to operate as an effective social and economic 
institution in a contemporary society, despite a significant decrease in numbers. 
     Following anthropologists and ethnographers, historians today have abandoned the 
vision of the family commune as a primitive “survival” of the past. It has come to be seen 
as a type of family that, despite its ancient origins, continues to function effectively in 
some modern societies.54 Due to its high adaptability to changing social and economic 
conditions, the complex family has retained its viability in the modern world. 
     Kovalevskii's failure to recognize the family commune's viability is not surprising 
given the fact that such views dominated scholarly discourse during his lifetime. On the 
other hand, this failure presents a striking contrast with his more complex and dynamic 
understanding of the other communal form, the village commune. By contrast to the 
rapidly decaying family commune, the village commune displayed, according to 
Kovalevskii, the signs of economic vitality and stability. Despite the fact that peasants 
were willing to break up from the patriarchal family, they did not want to leave the 
village commune. As a rule, emerging nuclear families did not separate from the village 
commune but continued to live in it. In fact, as we have seen, family divisions did not 
produce any degenerative effects on the village level. Unlike the family commune, the 
village commune remained a viable institution with a significant economic potential. 
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       Chapter II. The Origins and Historical Evolution of the Village Commune  
 
     Alongside the family commune, another form of collective social and economic 
organization—the village commune—developed in various parts of the world at the 
earliest stages of human evolution. Whereas the family commune represented a kin-based 
group composed of the members of the big patriarchal family with their spouses and 
children, the village commune could include both relatives and non-relatives living on the 
same territory. Because of this distinctive characteristic of the village commune, 
Kovalevskii, like many scholars of his era, also referred to it as the neighborhood, or 
territorial, commune.  
     Kovalevskii recognized that the lack of historical records made the origins of the 
village commune as obscure as those of the family commune. He never doubted, 
however, the ancient character of the village commune and criticized both Russian and 
West European historians who insisted on its relatively recent origins. In some instances, 
he suggested, village communes evolved directly from the tribal communes, similarly to 
the way the family communes originated. In other cases, they appeared as a result of the 
gradual dissolution of family communes and their unification into neighborhood 
associations. In countries like Russia, the process of formation of family communes and 
village communes took place simultaneously, thus leading to the co-existence of both 
communal forms in many regions. Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the majority of Russian village communes still contained family communes, or 
households composed of the members of extended patriarchal families.1 
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     According to Kovalevskii, the main reason for the formation of these territorial 
partnerships was the collective colonization and assimilation of new lands.55 Due to 
enormous labor investment that these tasks required, especially when it came to clearing 
woodlands, only the collective action of peasants living in one village or neighboring 
settlements could make such operations possible. Consequently, the new lands acquired 
by the joint effort of neighbors became to be considered a joint property belonging to all 
those who directly or indirectly contributed to the acquisition, that is, to the entire village 
community. Individual households thus received the right to cultivate their share of 
communal land, but not to own or sell it at will.56 
     At this initial stage of the evolution of the village commune, individual plots of land 
did not have to be equal in size. Peasants who had smaller landholdings did not find it 
necessary to demand egalitarian measures, because the abundance of land allowed them 
to acquire any amount of additional land whenever needed. At some point, however, 
continuous colonization and the growth of population inevitably exhausted the land 
resources. When unoccupied land was no longer available, peasants with less land, who 
typically made up the majority in the village, started demanding the equalization of 
communal land. The families with larger landholdings initially resisted such attempts at 
land redistribution but eventually had to conform to the will of the village majority. As a 
result, sporadic repartitions began to be held in order to ensure equal access to the arable 
land for all households in a village. The process acquired more or less periodic frequency 
over time. Periodic land repartitions, Kovalevskii concluded, did not represent an archaic 
collective practice, as it was commonly thought, but appeared at a later stage of the 
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evolution of the village commune in response to the growing population pressure on the 
land.57    
     In keeping with his notion of the village commune as a universal phenomenon, 
Kovalevskii presented evidence of its existence in various parts of the world and at 
different time periods. Drawing on the studies by the British scholars and colonial 
administrators Henry S. Maine and H. Rose, he showed that the nineteenth-century 
Indian villages practiced the so-called run-rig system, holding the arable land in common 
and carrying out periodic land redistributions between households. He also referred to the 
findings of a Belgian expert in property relations, Émile de Laveleye, to demonstrate the 
presence of similar practices in other regions, including contemporary Afghanistan and 
the Dutch colony of Java. 
     Kovalevskii's own research on European legal and economic history led him to 
conclude that peasants in Western Europe retained the common use of woodland and 
pastures even after the enclosure of the arable land and meadows. The persistence of 
English commons, French communaux, German Gemeinde-güter, Scandinavian 
allmening, and Swiss allmenden testified to the viability of traditional communal 
practices in the modern European village. For Kovalevskii, these contemporary 
phenomena represented the survivals of the medieval rural communes.58 
     Kovalevskii devoted a great deal of attention to the study of the history of the village 
commune in Western Europe. In fact, he became one of the most passionate participants 
in the famous debate among nineteenth-century European scholars about the origins of 
collective property relations. Contrary to his opponents’ view of the European village 
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commune as a by-product of the manorial economy imposed on the rural population in 
order to secure the collection of dues, he insisted that the village commune had existed 
long before the emergence of serfdom and the manorial system. In opposition to 
Frederick Seebohm and his followers, who argued that the manorial lords introduced the 
system of collective use of communal land as part of the enserfment process, Kovalevskii 
emphasized that rural seigneurs simply modified the already existing village commune in 
order to appropriate it to their own needs. Previously free peasants were turned into serfs, 
but their traditional collective practices were enhanced and incorporated into the manorial 
system.59  
     To support his thesis, Kovalevskii cited numerous examples from late ancient and 
early medieval European history. Building on the findings of the German historian Georg 
von Maurer, he showed that the so-called Mark, or Markengenossenschaft, an association 
of neighboring settlements of families that occupied and cultivated land on a collective 
basis, represented an example of the Germanic village commune.60 During ancient and 
early medieval times, he argued, free Teutonic peasant-warriors formed voluntary 
associations in order to manage their local economic and political affairs. Through direct 
assemblies, they regulated their agricultural activities and elected headmen to enforce 
their decisions and to lead them in war. As serfdom and the manorial system spread 
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throughout the Germanic territories during the Carolingian period, the village commune 
became gradually incorporated into the new social and economic order.61 
     Referring to Anglo-Saxon charters and the extensive research by nineteenth-century 
European scholars, Kovalevskii offered a detailed description of the medieval English 
village commune. In opposition to Seebohm's contention that the rural commune 
appeared in post-Norman England as part of the development of the manorial system, 
Kovalevskii argued that communal practices had existed long before the Norman 
conquest. Free Anglo-Saxon farmers had lived in self-governing village communities 
called townships and used the arable and non-arable land in common. As the 
“feudalization” of the English society progressed, seigneurs deprived the village 
communes of their freedoms and converted them into manors, adjusting communal 
practices to the needs of the manorial economy.   
     Kovalevskii’s scrupulous investigation of the Lex Salica, Lex Ripuaria, and other 
early medieval legal documents, led him to postulate the existence of the village 
commune among the Franks. Their concept of individual ownership, according to 
Kovalevskii, applied only to movable property, houses, and gardens. The commune 
owned the land, whereas individual households possessed the right to cultivate a portion 
of it. Similar practices, he pointed out, existed in many other parts of Europe, including 
Italy, Spain, and Russia. 
     Not surprisingly, Kovalevskii expressed a particular interest in the evolution of the 
Russian village commune. Like Pavel G. Vinogradov and other Russian students of 
medieval European history, he confessed that one of the main reasons he devoted so 
much attention to exploring communal forms worldwide was his conviction that his 
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findings could apply to Russia and could thus help him better understand the origins and 
character of the Russian village commune. In his Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of 
Russia, Kovalevskii offered the most detailed exposition of his theory of the evolution of 
the Russian village commune. As his discussion demonstrated, the historical development 
of the Russian village commune indeed resembled that of its counterparts in Western 
Europe and other regions of the world. 
     Citing the earliest references to the village commune in the sixteenth and seventeenth-
century Russian charters, Kovalevskii concluded that by this time many small settlements 
consisting of a few households had united with neighboring settlements into the so-called 
canton (volost') communes similar to the medieval German Mark. At this initial stage of 
the evolution of the village commune, each household continued to own and cultivate its 
arable land individually. The same usually applied to the use of the meadow land. 
Pastures and woodland, on the other hand, were owned by the entire volost' commune. 
“No one had the right to clear the forest or reclaim the wasteland lying within the limits 
of a volost', unless authorized to do so by the elders and the assembly of peasants.”62  
     Most importantly, during this period Russian volost' communes, like their counterparts 
in medieval England and Germany, did not enforce egalitarian measures, which was 
clearly reflected in the charters repeatedly mentioning the “best men” and “the men of 
wealth” (zhitii liudi) side by side with the “smaller men” (molodshie liudi). The size of an 
individual plot of land, as well as the economic standing of a household, could differ 
significantly from those of other households in a volost'. In matters of taxation, 
egalitarianism was similarly unknown. Communes did not distribute tax burdens equally 
among its household members, nor did they bear collective responsibility for the payment 
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of taxes. Each household paid its share of the land tax determined by the amount of land 
it owned.63  
     Significant changes in communal practices started taking place with the emergence of 
serfdom and the “manorial” economy in sixteenth-century Russia. The most dramatic 
change involved the extension of collective ownership and cultivation rights to the arable 
land and meadows. In exchange for dues (obrok) or agricultural labor (barshchina) 
received by the landlord, each peasant household received the right to cultivate its share 
of the village land. Deprived of land-ownership rights they had possessed before, 
individual peasants now became enserfed tenants on the lord's land. In addition to 
manorial obligations, they continued to pay the land tax to the state. Since collecting the 
state tax was the entire village's prerogative, it made perfect economic sense to place the 
customary village land under communal authority and give the commune an exclusive 
right to distribute land among its members. The collectivization of the arable land thus 
benefited both the peasant serfs, who now had access to at least a minimum amount of 
land that could guarantee them subsistence and a sufficient income to meet their financial 
obligations, and the elites, who viewed the communal system as an effective means of 
securing the payment of taxes and manorial dues by each household.64  
     Communes did not yet enforce egalitarian measures at this stage of development. The 
amount of land households could receive for cultivation varied greatly, and so did their 
tax payments and manorial duties as they both depended on the size of a family's land 
allotment. The relative abundance of land, as well as the right of Russian serfs to leave 
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their current landlord and to resettle in another manor, allowed peasants to migrate in 
search of better lands without becoming discontented with the existing allotments.65 
     Further changes in communal organization occurred when, as a result of the growing 
population pressure, arable land became increasingly scarce. The state responded to this 
tendency by changing the taxation system. In 1719, Peter the Great replaced the land tax 
with the poll tax, or the “capitation” tax. When, due to limited land resources, the 
taxation system based on the amount of cultivated land could no longer serve as a stable 
source of revenue, the state decided to secure a flow of money by taxing each household 
according to the number of people in a household. Furthermore, in order to ensure the full 
and regular payment of the new tax, the state enforced the principle of mutual fiscal 
responsibility of the entire village and abolished the peasant serfs' right to free migration.  
     Unable to leave their current residence and confronted with new fiscal obligations, 
communal peasants realized the inadequacy of the previous practice of land distribution, 
which allowed for inequalities between households, and started equalizing their land 
holdings by adjusting the size of each allotment to the number of people in a  household 
that farmed it. This measure made perfect sense in the context of the new poll tax of Peter 
the Great, which fell on all household members. To ensure that the amount of land each 
family cultivated corresponded to changes in its composition over time, communes held 
periodic land redistributions, at least every nineteen years after an official tax revision, or 
even more frequently if needed.  
     State authorities and landlords welcomed these peasant initiatives. Kovalevskii even 
mentioned several instances when provincial governors and gentry landowners enforced 
the practice of equal land distribution among local peasants. Clearly, the principles of 
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egalitarianism and periodic repartition served the interests of the ruling elite by providing 
them with a guarantee of peasants' fulfillment of their financial obligations. 
     By no means, of course, could Kovalevskii be credited with the “discovery” of the 
Russian village commune. By the time he published his first books and articles about the 
commune, it had become a widely researched and hotly debated issue. Andrei T. Bolotov 
and other Russian economists in the eighteenth century debated the advantages and 
disadvantages of communal farming. The issue became a matter of particular intellectual 
interest in the 1840s and 1850s, when both the government and the educated elite realized 
the urgency of rural reform. The public debate over the abolition of serfdom and the fate 
of the peasant commune turned these academic and bureaucratic discussions into one of 
the most heated controversies in Russian history. The numerous publications of the 
Slavophiles and particularly the appearance of the book by the German observer, Baron 
August von Haxthausen, provoked an active response from both their enthusiastic 
supporters and equally enthusiastic critics. Another strong stimulus came from the 
influential liberal thinker and politician Boris N. Chicherin, who in 1856 published his 
famous article about the origins of the Russian village commune. Chicherin's attack on 
the Slavophile vision of the commune provoked a series of monographic studies that 
defended Chicherin's theory or attempted to refute it. Finally, the Emancipation Statute of 
1861, which freed Russian peasants from serfdom but retained and even strengthened the 
power of the village commune, provoked another wave of disputes and arguments. Over 
3,000 books and articles on the subject appeared during the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
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     Despite such enormous numbers of monographic studies on the topic, Kovalevskii's 
writings became recognized as a remarkable contribution to a better understanding of the 
Russian peasant commune. His readers both in Russia and abroad respected him as one of 
the most ardent critics of the Slavophile and populist writers, who considered the village 
commune a uniquely Russian phenomenon that allegedly exemplified the innate nature of 
peasant collectivism and egalitarianism and could thus serve as a safeguard against the 
purported evils of European capitalism and individualism.  
     Kovalevskii ridiculed such views of the commune as idealistic and unsupported by 
historical evidence. He emphasized the universal character of the village commune and 
pointed to its existence in different societies and at different time periods. Moreover, he 
insisted that, despite its collective and egalitarian aspects, the village commune did not 
entirely stifle peasant individualism and initiative. Most importantly, collective and 
egalitarian practices themselves evolved not because of the collectivist instincts allegedly 
inherent in Russian peasant mentality, but as a pragmatic response to the pressures of 
Russia's climate, environmental conditions, and the ever-increasing financial demands of 
the state and gentry. 
     At the same time, Kovalevskii criticized the simplex explanations of the evolution of 
the village commune advanced by Chicherin, a prominent historian of the so-called state 
school, who, like Seebohm, stressed the principal role of the government in the 
emergence of the village commune. According to Chicherin, the state simply invented the 
commune as a collective agency to facilitate tax collection. Chicherin denied the ancient 
origins of the village commune and insisted on its relatively recent appearance due to the 
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government's policy to bind the peasants to their place of residence so no one could 
escape the tax. 
     Kovalevskii argued that Chicherin had distorted the past by focusing exclusively on 
the role of the state and ignoring other factors. Unlike Chicherin, he emphasized the equal 
significance of demographic, environmental, and economic factors in the evolution of the 
village commune. Only multi-causal explanations, in his view, could adequately explain 
both the historical continuity of the commune and the changes it underwent at different 
stages of its development. As an evolutionist, he regarded the commune as a product of 
the natural evolution of peasant practices, not simply a fiscal device imposed by the state. 
Communal forms, he insisted, had evolved long before the state decided to appropriate 
them to its needs. Nor did they remain static, as Chicherin suggested, but changed over 
time in response to changing demographic, economic, and political conditions.  
     It remained to explain the disappearance of communal forms in some countries and 
their continued existence in others. A firm believer in the positivist idea of progress, 
Kovalevskii never doubted that, in accordance with the universal laws of history, 
communal agriculture would inevitably decline and give way to individual farming. 
Generally, this process would take place over a few centuries, although he admitted that 
the sequence of change could vary widely in regions as diverse as Western Europe, 
Russia, India, Africa, and Latin America.  
     Kovalevskii attributed particular importance to the demographic factor in the 
dissolution of communes worldwide. The growth of population, in his opinion, put 
increasing pressure on the village commune by aggravating land shortage. Inevitably, as 
new settlers continued to arrive in villages, diminishing land resources prompted 
 46  
commune members, who used to be more tolerant toward newcomers claiming common 
rights, to became more reluctant to accept them. Gradually, the village commune became 
a sort of a closed corporation where new rural immigrants, denied the right to use the 
common land and pasture, remained virtually landless. This situation caused growing 
tensions between old and new members of the commune and often led to the 
disintegration of many village communes.66 
     If commune members were victorious in the struggle with landless newcomers, the 
commune would continue to exist as a closed corporation, where immigrants were 
allowed to reside in the village but could not claim their rights to communal land. The so-
called partecipanza in the Italian provinces of Emilia and Romagna represented an 
example of a closed village commune that did not extend communal land privileges to 
new immigrants.67  
     More frequently, however, the growing numbers of landless rural elements forced the 
village commune to abandon the practice of common use of arable land and adopt 
individual (podvornoe) land ownership. Commune members feared that their landless 
fellow villagers would exercise the right to vote and take advantage of their majority at 
village assembly meetings to gain access to arable lands. To prevent this, communes 
preferred to allow its member households to own a plot of land individually, still 
retaining the practice of collective use of woodland and pastures. As an example of such 
transformation, Kovalevskii referred to the surviving practice of common use of pastures 
and meadows in some parts of nineteenth-century Europe, including Swiss mountain 
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villages called  Allmenden. If Swiss peasants had a chance to migrate to other regions 
where land was still available, he noted, they would still hold their land in common and 
practice periodic repartitions.68 
     In Russia, the growth of a landless peasantry did not occur because peasants could 
migrate and resettle on lands abundantly available in northern European Russia and 
Siberia. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, a rural proletariat did 
begin to emerge in the Russian countryside. According to the Emancipation statute of 
1861, certain categories of ex-serfs such as personal servants (dvorovye liudi or kholopy), 
who had typically resided in the landlord's house rather than in the village, received very 
small plots of land or none at all. Peasants who had fallen in debt or systematically failed 
to pay taxes (nedoimshchiki) could also lose their land. Their property could be sold to 
wealthier villagers, or their land might be redistributed to a more successful family. 
Often, indebted peasants themselves sold their property or rented their lands to other 
families in order to prevent confiscation. Finally, ex-soldiers who had been absent for a 
long time and new settlers had very meager chances to receive any land. These categories 
of impoverished peasants lived in the village side by side with the commune members, 
participating in the village assembly meetings but lacking the economic privileges that 
commune members would normally enjoy.69  
     Kovalevskii regarded these tendencies as a serious threat to the very existence of the 
commune. At any point, landless peasants could demand their share of arable land. It 
came as no surprise to Kovalevskii that communal peasants in Russia, like their Western 
European counterparts, increasingly accepted the possibility of reforming communal 
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practices, so that individual household members of the commune would gain the 
unalienable right to use and inherit arable land plots, while retaining the common rights 
to pasture and woodland. It was important, in Kovalevskii's opinion, to encourage 
peasants to migrate to Siberia and less populated parts of European Russia in order to 
prevent or at least minimize peasant landlessness and potential social tensions in the 
countryside. Intensive industrialization and urbanization could also contribute to the 
resolution of the problem by absorbing the increasing masses of rural proletariat and 
providing them with employment in the factories and small businesses.70 
     These measures, of course, could only retard the process of the dissolution of the 
village commune, not prevent it. Unlike the Slavophiles and populists, Kovalevskii did 
not believe in the possibility of avoiding the decay and disintegration of the commune. 
As a convinced positivist, he never doubted that the universal laws of historical progress 
and evolution would inevitably replace communal institutions with more advanced forms: 
individual farming and private ownership. How to avoid the devastating social and 
economic consequences of drastic changes in the rural economy and peasant land 
arrangements? This complex issue caused heated debates both in Russia and abroad.71 
     In addition to the demographic factor, economic processes also weakened the village 
commune. Kovalevskii recognized that the rapid spread of capitalism caused private 
agriculture to become predominant in Western Europe earlier than in other parts of the 
world. The expansion of commerce and markets led to fundamental changes in rural land 
arrangements. Growing population density also fostered agricultural transformations by 
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increasing the demand for land, thereby raising land prices. Land became increasingly to 
be seen as a commodity that could be bought and sold for profit.72 
     In England and other parts of Europe, these processes led to the disappearance of 
common fields and massive enclosures of land. To obtain higher profits by renting land 
rather than by collecting dues from serfs, landlords released the communal peasants from 
manorial dues. Deprived of the right to own a piece of communal land, peasants became 
free tenants, who now rented land from the landlord. Capitalist agriculture thus replaced 
the manorial economy, of which the village commune was a part.73 
     Another strong stimulus for the destruction of common fields came from the growth of 
towns. Towns offered large markets for farm products. Increased food prices fostered the 
re-orientation of predominantly subsistence-based communal agriculture to commercial 
farming, in which production of crops and livestock for sale directed the decisions of 
farmers. Communes came to be seen as lacking economic flexibility that the market 
economy required. Enclosed farms, on the other hand, appeared to be more conducive to 
agricultural intensification and specialization, as well as more receptive to market 
demands. Also, urban industries provided extensive employment opportunities, which 
encouraged poorer peasants to withdraw from agriculture. At the same time, the urban 
bourgeoisie invested capital in land and thus created additional incentives for enclosure. 
The commercialization of agriculture, Kovalevskii concluded, formed part of the 
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fundamental process of economic improvement and rationalization in the context of 
population growth and the development of capitalism.74  
     Despite the significance of external factors, Kovalevskii attributed the key role in 
gradual decline of the village commune to internal processes. His comparative economic 
studies provided him with compelling evidence of the growth of individualism within the 
commune. The most enterprising peasants, who took advantage of new commercial 
opportunities and accumulated wealth, eventually viewed their membership in the 
commune as an obstacle to further enrichment. Economic differentiation in the village 
weakened communal ties and intensified internal conflicts between wealthier and poorer 
peasants. “Everywhere the change from common to private property is brought about by 
the same phenomenon one encounters the world over—the conflict of interests.”75     
     Even as Kovalevskii recognized the growth of individualism in the post-Emancipation 
Russian countryside, manifested by the increasing frequency of family repartitions and 
the dissolution of extended patriarchal families, he sought to determine the extent to 
which the Russian village commune still remained a viable social and economic 
institution. For this purpose, he undertook a careful investigation of statistical data, field 
observations, and cross-cultural historical comparisons. Just as he opposed the populist 
and Slavophile exaggeration of the virtues of the village commune as a social and 
economic organization, so he questioned the widespread belief that the commune 
represented an economically outmoded institution that must be replaced by private 
farming as soon as possible. Both the idealistic defense of the village commune and its 
unconditional condemnation appeared to him to be unscientific and abstract.  
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     Kovalevskii's own research, as well as studies by Russian economists, agronomists, 
and zemstvo statisticians, provided him with abundant evidence that, unlike the family 
commune, the village commune remained a viable institution in most regions of Russia. 
Predictions of its rapid decay appeared premature and poorly documented. In the turn-of-
the-century Russian village commune, Kovalevskii wrote, collective and individualistic 
practices not only co-existed peacefully but complemented each other in various ways. 
Most importantly, due to its adaptability, the Russian peasant commune possessed a 
significant economic potential that allowed it to survive rapid change and to contribute to 
rural progress. He viewed communal peasants as capable of productive and profitable 
labor. Insisting on the compatibility of the communal system with agricultural 
innovation, he argued that advanced technology and farming methods could be 
successfully assimilated into communal practices. The rural economy, in his opinion, 
could thus advance without the destruction of the commune. 
     Kovalevskii found historical precedents in Europe demonstrating that communal 
forms did not necessarily present an obstacle to economic improvement and the 
expansion of the capitalist economy. In late medieval Italy, for example, the so-called 
partecipanza in the regions of Emilia and Romagna demonstrated the capacity of the 
commune to adapt to the changing socioeconomic conditions associated with the 
development of capitalism. In fact, criticizing the excesses of the Stolypin land reform, he 
referred to the Italian partecipanza as an example of a potential path of development of 
the Russian village commune.76 
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                Chapter III. The Economic Viability of the Late Nineteenth- 
                    Early Twentieth-Century Russian Village Commune: 
                      Kovalevskii's Argument in Historical Perspective 
  
     Kovalevskii's argument for the compatibility of communal practices with economic 
innovation deserves a detailed examination in light of evidence generated by both his 
contemporaries and recent scholars. Assertions that communal land ownership did not 
necessarily impede rural progress commonly encountered a great deal of skepticism in 
the last few decades of the tsarist period. Today, debates over land privatization cause 
just as much controversy as they did a century ago. 
     Russian economists, agronomists, and zemstvo statisticians gathered much evidence 
testifying to the economic potential of the village commune. For the most part, these 
materials were either ignored or dismissed as containing a strong “populist” bias. Quite 
understandably, opponents of the commune in the tsarist bureaucracy and the liberal and 
Marxist intelligentsia remained unconvinced by the statistical data and economic analyses 
that challenged the very foundations of their political and economic programs. For them, 
the communal system represented not merely an outmoded and backward economic 
institution, but a persistent and dangerous phenomenon that plagued Russian peasant 
culture and prevented peasants from improvement and rational behavior. Traditional 
defenders of the commune, who agreed with the zemstvo's appreciation of the commune's 
economic capacity, did so primarily for political reasons as well, readily accepting the 
supporting evidence for their preconceived ideological constructs. For both the ardent 
critics and supporters of the commune, it represented an ideological phantom, with either 
negative or positive connotations but equally distant from the complex realities of the 
Russian village life. 
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     Kovalevskii studied the village commune with no intention to defend or oppose it. As 
a historian and sociologist, he sought to understand the real state of affairs in the 
countryside. Inevitably, his optimistic assessment of the economic potential of the 
Russian village commune clashed with the prevailing opinions about communal practices 
among many of his contemporaries. Since the Enlightenment, collective ownership and 
economy had been traditionally identified as backward and stagnant. Intellectuals both in 
Europe and Russia commonly condemned peasants as indifferent to agricultural 
improvement and saw village communes as “medieval” obstacles to progress.  
     The French Physiocrats set the stage for the negative assumptions about communal 
practices as inefficient and incompatible with the productive use of land. Quesnay, 
Roubaud, and Turgot unconditionally admired English-style enclosures and endorsed the 
replacement of peasant communes by large private farms. Nineteenth-century positivist 
historians such as Frederic Seebohm and Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges likewise 
stressed the historical primacy of private property, depicting the medieval commune as a 
repressive institution imposed by rulers as a “feudal” constraint upon individual freedom 
of action and economic initiative. According to Seebohm, communal practices 
disappeared in England because of their incompatibility with the productive economic 
behavior characteristic of the modern age.77 
     Karl Marx and his followers similarly portrayed peasants as wretched savages with no 
discernable values or culture who lived in villages that resembled a “sack of potatoes” 
more than a community. Despite his faith in social justice, Marx found nothing positive 
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in rural social relations. Having never researched the peasant economy, he categorized 
village communes as prehistoric and believed that only capitalism could encourage 
rational economic behavior among peasants.78 
     Russian economists likewise excluded communal peasants from their projects of 
agricultural improvement. In the eighteenth-century, such diverse thinkers as Ivan T. 
Pososhkov, Vasilii N. Tatishchev, and Mikhail V. Lomonosov described peasants as idle 
and apathetic. The agronomist Andrei T. Bolotov considered peasants too stubborn and 
ignorant to recognize the technological advantages of individual farming.79 Some post-
Emancipation observers of the commune like Skaldin (F.P. Elenev) and Gleb I. Uspenskii 
perceived apathy and lack of incentive as defining features of communal village life. 
Without any systematic evidence, they generalized their observations of some of the most 
poverty-stricken villages to the entire rural population.80 
     Nineteenth-century Russian Marxists accepted this notion of the peasants’ inherent 
backwardness. Georgii V. Plekhanov, for example, referred to Russian peasants as 
“barbarian tillers of the soil,” incapable of the efficient use of technology and unreceptive 
to modern production methods. Communal peasants, in his description, failed to grasp the 
advantages of private land ownership even after explanations had been repeated to them 
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“ten times over in ten different ways.” Their “Asiatic” apathy and ignorance allegedly 
prevented peasants from becoming individual farmers.81 
     Inspired by both the positivist belief in science and a romantic faith in the civilizing 
mission of capitalism, liberal thinkers blamed communal institutions and practices for 
retarding Russia’s economic growth and preventing the nation from becoming a modern, 
prosperous, and stable society. The liberal economists Ivan V. Vernadskii, I.I. 
Sreznevskii, and D. Strukov blamed the commune for retaining outmoded and 
unproductive field systems and for discouraging peasants from the use of advanced field 
systems, improved tools, and fertilizers.82 Boris N. Chicherin, the liberal historian, 
denounced the Russian land commune as a “social monstrosity” that allegedly suppressed 
all economic incentives for improvement.83 Petr B. Struve, a leading economist, insisted 
that the “backward” system of communal “natural economy” must give way to private 
property relations. He ridiculed any attempts to defend “medieval” communal institutions 
as reactionary, sentimental, and unscientific.84 
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     Dmitrii A. Stolypin, an uncle of the future leader of the land reform Petr A. Stolypin 
and chairman of the Moscow Agricultural Society, published numerous anti-communal 
books and pamphlets. On the basis of an explicitly positivist (and allegedly “scientific”) 
analysis of the rural land system in Russia, he concluded that the peasant commune 
represented a stagnant relic of the medieval past, incompatible with progress and modern 
economic standards. He insisted that the solution to rural Russia's problems lay in the 
introduction of English-style private farming.85 
     By the end of the nineteenth century, non-populist Russian intellectuals and 
government officials had concluded that that the peasant commune had outlived its 
usefulness and represented the key obstacle to Russia’s agricultural advance and overall 
economic growth. The paradox was that such exclusively negative—and presumably 
“scientific”—views of the peasant commune were in fact based predominantly on 
cultural assumptions about the superiority of private ownership over communal tenure 
rather than on empirical studies of rural life. Moreover, they deliberately ignored some 
significant features of the communal economy and avoided the evidence of the 
commune’s flexibility and capacity to change. Poorly informed about the complex 
realities of village life, the critics of the commune confidently denied the ability of 
communal peasants to innovate and improve.86   
     In the 1840s and 1850s, some intellectuals questioned the classical liberal notion of 
the unconditional superiority of the private land system and stressed the necessity of 
researching the Russian peasant commune instead of arrogantly dismissing it as 
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backward. From a romantic socialist perspective, Aleksandr I. Herzen strongly criticized 
both Western European and Russian economists and historians for their cultural 
arrogance toward allegedly “backward” peasant societies.87 Konstantin D. Kavelin, a 
legal historian and the president of the Free Economic Society after 1861, became the 
first liberal Westernizer to challenge the conventional liberal contempt for communal 
practices and to call for a more balanced vision of the Russian village commune. Kavelin 
strongly disagreed with Chicherin's identification as “irrational” any peasant actions that 
did not conform to the classical liberal ideal of the “economic man.” 88  
     The most enthusiastic revisionist impulse came from the Slavophiles, who protested 
against the elitist attitudes of Russian Westernizers toward the peasantry and their 
institutions as based on abstract economic theories rather than on empirical investigations 
of the realities of peasant culture. As romantic nationalists, the Slavophiles pointed to the 
urgent need for systematic studies of Russia’s rural life and economy.89 
     Ludwig V. Tengoborskii, a Polish economist, published one of the first studies of the 
Russian commune based on fresh statistical data. In his three-volume work entitled 
Commentaries on the Productive Forces in Russia, Tengoborskii cited evidence that 
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communal agriculture was indeed compatible with economic growth, even under 
serfdom, as peasants introduced new crops into their field systems and strove to employ 
the most productive farming techniques available to them. Tengoborskii described the 
communal peasants’ economic behavior as being flexible and occasionally innovative 
rather than rigid and conservative.90 
     Aleksandr I. Chuprov, one of the leading Russian economists and Kovalevskii's close 
friend and associate, recognized the scarcity of empirical knowledge about rural life and 
emphasized the need for systematic empirical studies in order to assess the economic 
potential of the Russian village commune. A student of Wilhelm Roscher and Ivan K. 
Babst, who translated into Russian the works of the leaders of the German “historical 
school,” Chuprov became one the most enthusiastic and widely recognized initiators of 
the zemstvo statistical investigations of the Russian countryside in the 1870s-1890s. By 
the turn of the century, zemstvo statisticians had interviewed over 4.5 million peasant 
households and created the world's largest database on peasants.91 
     Today, a century after Kovalevskii and his contemporaries debated the issue of the 
commune's flexibility and compatibility with agricultural progress, strictly negativistic 
conceptions of the Russian peasant commune continue to dominate scholarly discourse. 
Historians continue to argue that village communes in imperial Russia “acted as a 
powerful brake on the rationalization of agriculture” and that the “institutional structure 
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of the repartitional commune made it impossible to improve the technical level of peasant 
agriculture.”92 
     The three-field system represented the most strongly criticized aspect of traditional 
communal agriculture. Opponents blamed it for multiple drawbacks, but the most 
common allegation was that it wasted one-third of the arable land by leaving it fallow. 
Many agricultural specialists also stressed its inefficiency in producing summer and 
winter fodder resources. The majority of educated Russians regarded the three-field 
system as a primitive survival of the past incompatible with progress and innovation. In 
seeking to explain its backwardness, they pointed to the tremendous increases in yields 
and labor productivity in Northern and Western Europe, where more intensive and 
industrialized farming regimes had replaced the three-field system by the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
     Strip cultivation became commonly associated with excessive fragmentation and 
scattering of land holdings. Although the situation varied greatly from region to region, 
zemstvo censuses and government surveys, in fact, revealed disturbing conditions in 
many parts of European Russia, particularly in the provinces of the mixed forest belt. In 
Tver province, for example, peasant households in more than half the communes held 
their lands in forty or more separate strips. In extreme cases, a household might have up 
to a hundred strips. In Riazan province, one of the most affected by fragmentation, 
surveyors found communes with 110 strips per household, although in other Riazan 
communes a typical family held only four or five strips. In the central black-earth region, 
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fragmentation was not as severe. In Tambov province, the average number of strips 
varied from twenty-eight in the north, to sixteen in the center, and only fourteen in the 
south. Three to six strips per household were quite common in Tambov’s southern 
areas.93  
     Extreme land fragmentation was caused by the practice of not only dividing all the 
arable land into three fields but further dividing each field into sections, or furlongs (kony 
or iarusy) according to soil quality, the lay of the land, and the distance from the village. 
The more complicated the landscape, the more strips each field could contain. Every 
household member of the commune received a certain number of long and narrow strips 
(polosy, nadely, or delianki) scattered throughout various sections in each of the three 
fields. Not only did multiple strips held by commune members intermix with one another, 
but communal lands could also intermingle with privately-owned lands within one village 
or even with the lands belonging to neighboring communes.94 
     One of the most troublesome effects of land fragmentation was the progressive 
thinning of individual strips. In Voronezh, the average width of strips equaled 
approximately to five sazheni, while the thinnest strips tended to be only one or two 
sazheni wide. In Tambov province, the typical land strip could be as narrow as two or 
three arshiny (approximately two yards) and the strips wider than two sazheni were 
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considered “thick” (tolstiachki).  In communes most affected by fragmentation, each land 
parcel rarely exceeded one-fifth of a desiatina (half an acre).95  
     Extreme parcelization was believed to waste substantial amounts of land in boundary 
furrows, verges, and headlands. Indeed, the thinner the strips, the more land was lost to 
borders. Zemstvo statisticians calculated that a household with thirty-three strips would 
lose 2.5 percent of the arable land in boundary furrows. In David Kerans's estimate, a 
strip 4.6 sazheni wide (about ten yards) would forfeit 5.6 percent of the land to the 
furrows on its borders. According to an official study in the 1920s, borders between 
multiple strips consumed about 7 percent of the entire arable land in Russia.96  
    Critics also blamed multiple strips for causing significant time losses in transit from 
strip to strip, which could be a pressing issue during tilling and harvest seasons, when 
peasants worked with exhaustive intensity under heavy time constraints. Peasants 
frequently neglected or even abandoned their most distant parcels. The intermingling of 
strips was believed to provoke disputes between neighbors in cases of compaction by 
trampling or furrow stealing. Among the most economically deleterious “neighborhood 
effects” was contamination of contiguous fields with weeds. Untended borders between 
strips might become breeding grounds for weeds and pests that could infect adjacent 
areas of the arable land and decrease their productivity.97  
     Most importantly, holding land in strips, critics argued, prevented peasants from 
innovation and experimentation. Unsuitable for wheeled plows and advanced agricultural 
machines, excessively narrow strips restricted peasants to the use of the sokha and other 
traditional tools. The intermingling of strips allegedly compelled peasants to synchronize 
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the execution of the major farming operations like the sowing and harvesting of crops and 
even to sow the same type of crops within each large field. It has been argued, for 
example, that the communal practice of collective herd grazing required all its members 
to open their arable land after harvesting to the neighbors' livestock and thus put at risk 
those families who did not comply with the commune’s cultivation schedule. Not only 
could foraging livestock consume the crops if a family failed to collect them on time, but 
the same could happen if a strip owner sowed a late-ripening crop like corn among early 
ripening grains like oats growing on adjacent strips. Another disincentive to diversify 
crop selections allegedly stemmed from the peasant practice of the broadcast sowing of 
seeds. Peasants feared the potentially harmful effects of the spraying of unlike crop seeds 
onto neighboring strips, and so chose to grow a single crop.98 
     The practice of periodic land repartitions was blamed for promoting primitive 
egalitarianism, which they believed discouraged peasants from improvements. Frequent 
repartitions, they argued, aggravated the negative effects of strip farming by making land 
holdings even thinner and more scattered with the following redistribution. They ignored 
the well-known fact that non-repartitional communes suffered from land fragmentation as 
much as did those that repartitioned their lands. Moreover, in villages with predominantly 
hereditary tenure, land fragmentation progressed just as rapidly. Repartitions were also 
commonly cited as one of the main causes of poor husbandry and soil degradation. 
Reassigning land to a different household at the next repartition allegedly reduced 
incentives to improve farming methods and soil quality. 
     Critics of the commune system overlooked an important fact that the agricultural 
advancements in Belgium, Denmark, England, Germany, and Holland, had taken place in 
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very different socioeconomic and geographical contexts. The three-field system persisted 
well into the twentieth century in Russia, as well as in many other parts of the world 
because it suited countries where land was plentiful. Not only communal peasants, but 
also many private landowners used it. Throughout centuries, peasants have used 
extensive tillage regimes in areas with a relative abundance of land. American farmers, 
for example, employed the system in parts of the Midwest until the early twentieth 
century. As historians of agriculture have demonstrated, intensive tillage systems without 
fallow appeared first in the Low Countries and eastern England, where land was in such 
short supply that it was reclaimed from the sea or the fens.99  
     Generations of experience have proven the system's appropriateness for Russia’s 
climatic and environmental conditions, particularly for the non-black-earth regions. In 
Russia’s northern latitude, late harvests left insufficient time to prepare the soil for 
sowing winter crops after harvesting. It thus made perfect sense to insert a year between 
spring and winter crops so that the soil could regain moisture and fertility by absorbing 
nitrogen from the air and organic matter from the manure spread on the field. Fallowing 
also allowed peasants to control weeds by plowing and harrowing the field several 
times.100  
     Similarly, European Russia’s long winters and short growing season determined the 
sequential combination of crops in the three-course rotation. Frost-resistant grains like 
rye represented the most commonly used winter crop to be sown in a previously fallow 
land, whereas fast-ripening grains—oats, barley, or buckwheat—comprised the typical 
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spring crops. In the southern black-earth provinces, favored by a longer frost-free period 
and more fertile soil, winter and spring wheat could replace the hardier grains. Various 
combinations of crops used in the rotation cycle stood in a delicate balance relative to 
each other.101  
     Significantly, the three-field system worked well with another important aspect of the 
peasant economy, animal husbandry. Peasants allowed natural vegetation to grow in the 
fallow and used it for pasturing their livestock before other sources of fodder, such as hay 
and crop stubble, were available. Herds, in turn, were believed to improve the fallow soil 
by eating and trampling down the weeds growing there. More importantly, livestock 
produced organic fertilizer for the fields and provided draught power for sokhi, plows, 
and other agricultural tools.102 
     The notion that peasants adhered to strip cultivation because of their strong egalitarian 
sentiments appears erroneous. Communal peasants themselves justified the strip system 
primarily in economic terms, seeing in the proliferation of strips an effective protection 
against the risk of the loss of harvest due to damages caused by hailstorm, drought, pests, 
fire, or livestock trampling. From generations of experience, peasants knew that harvests 
could vary dramatically from area to area in the open fields. Because of the different 
quality and fertility of the soil, some parts of the village lands could be more productive 
than others. Micro-climates and landscapes might also vary to the extent that some 
sections of the fields were likely to be more exposed than others. Damage caused by birds 
and insects, or livestock trampling could affect a portion of a field. All these factors made 
a family with a single plot of land in one area much more vulnerable to weather 
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fluctuations and other risks than a family with many strips scattered around open fields. 
Strip farming allowed all households in the commune to share potential risks and to 
ensure their subsistence by collecting at least a minimum harvest.103 
     Zemstvo experts documented the economic rationality of strip cultivation as a risk-
aversion mechanism. In the 1890s, Vasilii V. Vorontsov, for example, quoted peasants 
who explained the use of land scattering as a guarantee of an “even” harvest in the areas 
where localized hailstorms presented a constant threat to crops. Another leading 
economist of the time, Boris D. Brutskus, observed that peasants commonly viewed strip 
scattering as a more reliable insurance strategy against the potential damages of hailstorm 
than consolidated plots. A survey conducted by the Imperial Free Economic Society a 
few years after the inception of the Stolypin land reform recorded instances of peasants 
justifying their unwillingness to consolidate their strips by the fear that they could lose all 
their crops in a single hailstorm. Numerous cases demonstrated that peasants had all 
practical reasons to defend the communal practice of land scattering. According to widely 
publicized reports, consolidated farms did suffer from crop failures as a result of 
hailstorm damage, and the owners never received compensation from the local land 
settlement organizations.104  
     The continental climate of European Russia, in fact, made crop production extremely 
vulnerable to the localized effects of storm damage, particularly at the end of the growing 
season, when the standing crop was brittle. In many areas, the rain tended to fall in bands, 
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which might expose half of a commune's fields to frequent rains while leaving the other 
half to suffer from drought. Other everyday risks included locust swarms, gopher 
infestations, trampling by livestock, and fires sweeping through a field. Scattered strips 
could reduce the potentially devastating consequences of these conditions.105   
     Contemporary peasant studies have provided compelling evidence of the economic 
utility of strip cultivation in different parts of the world. The economic historian David N. 
McCloskey, for example, argued that the scattering of land in English open fields served 
as an effective insurance policy against risk “in a milieu in which agricultural yields were 
low and unpredictable, and in which the costs of a shortfall—at best crushing debt or 
malnutrition and its associated diseases, at worst starvation—were high.” Strip farming, 
widespread throughout pre-industrial Europe, persisted well into the twentieth century in 
many regions of the world. Wherever peasants employed the practice, they justified its 
economic utility by its risk-spreading benefits. The rationale behind it was essentially 
similar to that of modern investors, who hold diversified portfolios of shares in different 
companies and in different markets.106  
     Importantly, strip cultivation could also allow peasant households to distribute their 
labor resources effectively throughout the year. Because growing conditions might vary 
considerably from spot to spot, land plots would be ready for tillage and harvesting at 
different times. This made it possible to space out the execution of the major agricultural 
operations like tilling the land, sowing crops, and collecting the harvest. Strips thus 
enabled peasants to organize their labor at peak moments with less stress and more 
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efficiency than on unified plots.107 Finally, strip cultivation promoted participation in 
collective livestock grazing by preventing individual households from withdrawing its 
land from the common grazing cycle. The economic historian Carl Dahlman used the 
same argument to explain the persistence of the open-field system in Europe.108 
     Communal enforcement of simultaneous and uniform agricultural operations has also 
been largely exaggerated. To be sure, communes often imposed common work regimes. 
In regions with extremely severe land fragmentation, communes might forbid its 
members to till, sow, or reap ahead of schedule. In those areas where strips and pathways 
leading to them were particularly thin, coordinated execution of agricultural operations 
helped peasants to prevent neighbors from walking over their land and damaging crops. 
However, household members never had to collect crops on their strips exactly at the 
same time. Crops could stand drying in the fields for some time after reaping, and one 
week’s difference in the timing of reaping never caused any problems. Harvesting in the 
spring field required particularly little coordination because the livestock would already 
begin grazing on the winter field stubble before the ripening of spring crops. Grazing on 
the spring field crop stubble would not normally start until September, when all but the 
last crops—beets, potatoes, and sunflowers—would have been harvested.109 
     Significant regional variations in communal practices also proved their economic 
rationality. Repartitions, for example, varied greatly depending on local contexts and 
conditions. The most radical type of repartition, a general, or “black,” repartition 
(obshchii, korennoi, or chernyi peredel), involved a complete restructuring of all the 
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arable land in the village, a removal of all field boundaries, and a full revision of the 
number, size, and location of land strips. All households returned their strips to the 
commune, which then redistributed them between its members. Less radical forms of 
repartition, a repartition “by lot” (zhereb'evka) and a “re-ordering” repartition 
(pereverstka), also implied redistribution of strips between all household members, but 
did not alter the size, number, and location of the existing strips. More frequently, 
communes conducted various types of partial repartitions (chastnye peredely, svalki-
navalki, skidki-nakidki), which involved only a few households, whose land holdings 
were adjusted to changes in the size and structure of a household due to marriages or 
family divisions. Some communes, in fact, never held general repartitions but maintained 
a balance between the sizes of the households and their land allotments exclusively by 
partial repartitions.110  
     The frequency of repartitions also varied across regions and time periods. Whereas 
some communes maintained regular intervals between repartitions, others redistributed 
their lands irregularly, only when needed. Many villages had abandoned repartitioning by 
the late nineteenth century, others continued the practice with increasing frequency. In 
the black-earth zone, general repartitions tended to be more frequent than in the non-
black-earth provinces and might take place as often as every three years. In most parts of 
European Russia, communes undertook general repartitions every ten to fifteen years, 
usually after poll tax censuses, which determined the current number of taxable “souls” in 
a village. It made perfect sense to reapportion taxes and land allotments at the same time, 
after a commune's tax liability had been adjusted according to population changes. 
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Communes could also hold general repartitions after large numbers of villagers had died 
in famines or epidemics, had been conscripted in wartime, or had migrated elsewhere.111  
     The criteria by which communes assigned land to households also varied from locale 
to locale. Before the abolition of serfdom in 1861, communes typically allocated land to 
each household according to its labor capacity measured by the number of marital pairs in 
it (po tiaglam). The serf-owning nobility enforced this system of land distribution in 
order to ensure each family’s capacity to fulfill its obligations to the landlord and the 
state and to have enough resources left to subsist.112 After the emancipation, other 
methods gradually replaced repartitions po tiaglam. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
many communes were redistributing land according to the number of male souls per 
household (po nalichnym dusham muzhskogo pola). Because males constituted the main 
and most productive agricultural labor force, assigning more land to families containing 
more males made perfect economic sense, because all adult male peasants in the village 
remained employed and each household received an adequate amount of land 
commensurate with its male labor force. Not surprisingly, many communes chose to 
reduce their land repartition criteria to the actual number of males of working age in a 
family (repartition po nalichnym rabotnikam muzhskogo pola), thus excluding non-adult 
males from consideration. This measure did help communes to distribute land in more 
precise proportions to each household's male labor force, but often led to more frequent 
repartitions.113 
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     In the late nineteenth century, the migration of male peasants to the cities in search of 
an additional income led to an increased involvement of women in agricultural activities. 
Communes responded to this tendency by practicing repartitions based on the number of 
all workers, or “producers” in a family, including women. Some communes even 
assigned land on the basis of the total number of “consumers”, or mouths to feed, in each 
household (po edokam). This repartition method clearly reflected communes’ growing 
concern for more equal and fair distribution of land in the face of increasing economic 
differentiation. Larger communes, however, feared that such repartitions might contribute 
to extreme land fragmentation and preferred to distribute land according to males per 
household.114   
     Communes in which peasants engaged in non-agricultural activities as well as farming 
might use peasants’ earnings from crafts and trade as a criterion for land repartition. In 
the central non-black-earth zone, land distribution criteria could include the number of 
draught animals owned by the household. In regions with developed animal husbandry, 
such as Siberia, communes allotted meadow land according to the number of cattle that 
each household possessed.115   
     Various repartition rules and procedures represented different pragmatic responses of 
communal peasants to specific local environmental, economic, and social conditions. 
Even within one province, repartitioning practices could vary substantially from village 
to village. Contrary to the common assertion that repartitions manifested above all the 
pervasiveness of primitive egalitarianism in peasant culture, peasants themselves used the 
repartition system to manage land and human resources. To be sure, repartitions played 
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an important welfare function by providing them with the minimum amount of land they 
needed to meet their tax obligations and to satisfy their subsistence needs.116  
         Undoubtedly, repartitions did reflect a certain degree of egalitarianism in communal 
practices. Land redistributions ensured the right of each household to use at least some of 
the commune's best and most accessible land. Peasant egalitarianism should not be 
exaggerated, however. Even repartitions that took into account women workers, in fact, 
treated them unequally. Male peasants were typically entitled to receive three times as 
much land as females. Not uncommonly, communes declined apportioning land to 
widows. Again, as many recent studies have stressed, repartitions served a far broader 
range of economic and social objectives than just an egalitarian distribution of land. They 
allowed communes to respond to changes brought about by out-migrations, family 
divisions, or epidemics, to adjust the shape of the open fields to changes in crop rotations, 
and to bring order into strip fields by reducing their number.117  
     Many of Kovalevskii’s contemporaries, including both the critics of the commune and 
its Slavophile and populist defenders, regarded repartitioning as a uniquely Russian 
phenomenon. Modern scholars, however, found examples of distributional land 
communes throughout Europe, although most communes outside Eastern Europe 
repartitioned only meadows, pastures, and waste lands. Customs similar to Russian 
repartitions also existed in some non-European societies—for example, in pre-colonial 
India and among Mongol nomads, who reassigned grazing rights in particular pastures in 
accordance with changes in household size.118       
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     As paradoxical as it may seem, innovation has always formed an integral part of the 
communal tradition. In fact, the economic strategies and farming techniques of 
communal peasants never remained static. As we have seen, however, most of 
Kovalevskii’s contemporaries never recognized the dynamic nature of communal 
practices. Nineteenth-century scholars focused predominantly on the advantages brought 
about by the large-scale transformation of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European 
agriculture—the Agricultural Revolution—and associated it with land enclosures and 
privatization. Most of them ignored an earlier agricultural revolution that occurred in 
Western and Northern Europe between the sixth and the ninth centuries, the period long 
known as the “Dark Ages,” characterized by alleged economic and political stagnation. 
August Meitzen and a few other nineteenth-century historians pioneered the study of 
early medieval technological progress, particularly the introduction of the heavy wheeled 
plow, as fostering the spread of open-field arrangements and other communal practices in 
medieval German villages.119 Even the prominent twentieth-century historian Henri 
Pirenne, who so brilliantly overturned the stereotypical portrayal of the early medieval 
period as the “Dark Ages,” did not mention the significant innovations that occurred in 
the rural economy during that time. It took an effort of the two other prominent 
historians, Marc Bloch and Lynn White, to draw scholarly attention to technological 
improvements in the predominantly communal medieval agriculture.120  
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     Today it has become common knowledge that the introduction of the heavy wheeled 
plow during the period from the sixth to the ninth century represented a tremendous 
landmark in the evolution of communal farming technology.121 One of the most 
important implications for communal agriculture was that the use of the heavy-wheeled 
plow required a cooperative effort. The deep plowing of heavy soils made its necessary to 
team up a greater number of draught animals, up to eight oxen or four horses. This 
significantly reinforced the economic value of communal farming practices for many 
centuries to come, since only village communes could afford owning and using expensive 
tools and feeding draught animals they required.122  
     The adoption of the three-field system represented another example of the communal 
effort to improve farming methods. In comparison with the previously dominant two-
field system, it increased the amount of land under cultivation from one-half to two-
thirds. The agricultural cycle also changed. In the two-field system, one field was planted 
in the fall and the other left fallow, the process being reversed every year. In the three-
field system, one field was planted in the fall with grain, another one was planted in the 
spring with spring grain and peas, beans, and vetches, and the third lay fallow. In the 
summer, when both winter and spring plantings were harvested, the cycle altered: the 
fallow field became the winter field, the winter field became the spring field, and the 
spring field turned to fallow. As a result, the varieties of vegetable protein from the 
spring planting improved and varied the diet. Even more importantly, the three-field 
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system retarded soil exhaustion and thus increased productivity. The beans yielded by the 
same spring planting returned valuable nitrogen to the soil and the rotation of crops made 
the exhaustion of the soil by exclusive grain growing less likely.123  
     Historians of English agriculture have stressed that innovation and risk-taking have 
always been part of communal peasant practices. According to George E. Mingay, “the 
old picture of an extremely conservative, rigid, and inefficient system which persisted 
unchanged over the centuries has had to be considerably modified.”124 Despite limited 
resources and insufficient agronomic knowledge, English communal peasants who 
survived enclosure introduced many innovations. “Fields were divided so as to allow 
more complex rotations and to reduce fallowing, and holdings were consolidated by 
exchanges among the owners. New crops were brought in and grass leys appeared within 
the common fields.”125 Even Arthur Young, a convinced eighteenth-century advocate of 
enclosures, admitted that some areas under communal cultivation flourished and that 
some open-field farmers were “sensible, intelligent men, for they agreed among 
themselves to sow turnips instead of fallowing on many of their lands.”126 Historians 
increasingly recognize that “the assumption that open fields were old-fashioned and 
enclosed ones new and improved is unhistorical [and] has little bearing on the 
agricultural revolution.”127  
     Along similar lines, historians of Russia have documented the peasant commune’s 
capacity to promote and incorporate innovations. Far from being inflexible, the three-
field system allowed for significant adaptations and modifications. The fallow field could 
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be used for the cultivation of forage crops or could even be cut back to less than one-third 
of the arable area. Peasants employed various strategies to modify the three-field 
practices to include grass cultivation. For example, on the so-called employed fallow 
(zaniatyi par) peasants sowed fast-maturing grasses like vetch as early as possible in the 
spring and harvested it for hay in June. This technique made it possible for peasants to 
accumulate at least four times more fodder than if the land had remained green fallow 
and still left enough time for planting and sowing grains like rye for the next year.128   
     Tillage regimes could also be intensified within the three-field system. The second 
tillage (dvoenie) of the fallow field represented one of the most widespread examples of 
such improvement. Usually performed about a month after the raising of fallow, second 
tilling improved the structure and moisture of the soil and suppressed the growth of 
weeds, thus creating better conditions for subsequently sown crops. In Voronezh district, 
for example, this practice allowed to raise rye yields from 78 to 82.1 puds (from 1.4 to 
1.5 tons) of grain per desiatina and to collect nine extra puds of straw in one year. In drier 
years, increases in grain yields due to this technique could be even larger. The rapid 
spread of second tilling demonstrated communal peasants' willingness to adopt improved 
farming techniques even at the cost of increased labor intensity. Despite the fact that the 
second tillage often overlapped with the reaping of rye, thus demanding an additional 
labor investment during one of the busiest periods in the agricultural calendar, many 
communes readily included it into their tillage regimes. Communal peasants were 
agreeing to work harder in order to produce more, even though dvoenie could provide 
only a relatively modest return in the form of crop yields.129 
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     Another improved tilling technique—the plowing of the spring field during the 
preceding fall (ziablevaia vspashka, or simply ziab)--began spreading rapidly among 
communal peasants in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Aware of the harmful 
effects of premature spring tillage on soil quality, peasants often chose not to till the 
spring field at all, especially because grains like oat could be sown directly onto the 
remnants of the rye stubble and then immediately tilled in and harrowed. The 
introduction of ziab reduced the potential dangers of early spring tillage and at the same 
time provided all the benefits of pre-sowing tillage. In various regions, the execution of 
the ziab system increased average grain yields by 7 to 20 per cent. In addition to 
productivity increase, ziab allowed to improve the peasants' overall labor regime and 
resource allocation. Instead of working horses in the early spring, when they were more 
likely to be weakened by malnutrition or illnesses over the long winter, peasants could 
complete plowing in September or October without overstressing themselves and their 
horses. Consequently, this permitted peasants to begin sowing earlier in the spring, which 
significantly relieved the spring labor crisis.130  
     In addition to improving the traditional farming techniques, peasants experimented 
with new multi-field systems that included grass cultivation. They quickly recognized 
that grasses like clover not only provided large yields of excellent fodder for livestock but 
also acted as fertilizers for subsequent crops. In many cases, zemstvo agronomists 
encouraged and assisted peasants in these experiments by helping them to set up 
demonstration plots and explaining the benefits of crops like clover. Grasses regenerated 
the soil by accumulating reserves of nitrogen from the air and storing them in their roots. 
The northern and central non-black-earth regions of Russia, where nitrogen-deficient 
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arable lands predominated, particularly needed such improvements. In the black-earth 
provinces, where lands generally did not suffer from nitrogen shortage, grasses could still 
enrich the quality of frequently over-tilled land by choking out weeds and pulling up 
phosphate and potassium from deeper layers of the soil, which grain roots could not 
normally reach.131 
     As a rule, a village-wide introduction of grass cultivation occurred after several years 
of trial on the garden plots of individual members, on rented or purchased land, or on 
specially allotted “experimental” lands (vygorodki) separated from the regular three-field 
system. Once a village majority recognized the advantages of grass cultivation, a 
communal assembly passed a resolution to incorporate the new technique into the regular 
crop rotation cycle.132  Such gradualism, however, did not necessarily reflect the peasants' 
conservatism or apathy, as it has been commonly argued. As we have seen, practical 
considerations most often determined the pace of change. Because grass cultivation 
required significant adjustments and modifications in the traditional three-field system, a 
commune could adopt it only after trying it on lands outside the regular rotation, thus 
ensuring that its introduction would not threaten the peasants' subsistence.  
     With the aid of zemstvo agronomists, peasants in various regions came up with 
different alternatives to the existing three-field arrangements: four-, or six-, or even eight-
field rotation systems. Four-field farming spread particularly rapidly in non-black-earth 
provinces. In the Iamburg district of Petersburg province, for example, 14 per cent of 
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communes had introduced four-field cultivation by the late 1890s.133 In the Volokolamsk 
district of Moscow province, where only two villages were sowing forage crops and 
employing a four-field rotation in 1892, 127 villages were using the system by 1900, and 
two years later, 245 out of 368 villages in the district practiced it.134 Not surprisingly, 
zemstvo agronomists enthusiastically praised the role of Russian communes as 
“pioneers” in the progressive transition to grass cultivation.135    
     Communal peasants devised simple but effective strategies to reduce or eliminate the 
negative effects of strip farming. Boundary furrows, verges, and headlands, commonly 
believed to reduce the amount of arable land, could be utilized for multiple purposes. 
Furrows and ditches marking strip borders could serve as drainage channels. In extremely 
dry years, peasants could collect at least some crop from the furrows, and in wet years 
crops could be yielded on the well-drained ridges. Verges and headlands provided space 
for depositing stones cleared from the land. Occasionally, peasants used these areas for 
mowing or grazing of tethered livestock. Distant strips could be converted to pasture or 
hay for collective use by the entire village or rented out to neighboring villages. In 
Moscow province, peasants assigned abandoned distant parcels, called pustyri, to 
households that had managed the land badly in the past or were in the process of giving 
up farming. In the context of the commune's joint obligation to meet the annual tax levy, 
this measure represented a rational means of conserving the collective land resource and 
ensuring its most effective use for the benefit of the community.136  
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     As recent peasant studies have demonstrated, critics of the commune tended to 
overstate the time wasted by peasants in journeys from strip to strip. Even when an 
individual household held its land in multiple strips, it rarely needed to work more than a 
few strips in a single day. Moreover, separate strips could be adjusted to the size of a 
single day's plowing. In England and right-bank Ukraine, strips traditionally held the 
amount of land that could be tilled in one day: a “day of land” (den' zemli). Russian 
peasants practiced similar adjustments of the size of strips to the performance of 
agricultural tasks. In Iaroslavl province, peasants arranged the width of strips to allow 
“four revolutions of the scythe,” and in Kaluga province they measured strips in units of 
three paces, which matched the distance that seeds could be broadcast.137              
     Peasants tried various strategies to combat excessive thinning of strips. Households 
with narrow strips practiced exchanging strips with the neighbors to make their holdings 
wider. Small families could merge and reapportion strips among themselves. Some 
communes preferred to rent a part of their land to neighboring villages instead of dividing 
it into very thin strips. Larger communes could fight the negative effects of land 
scattering by forming new, smaller villages, or sub-communes affiliated with a parent 
commune.138 
     In fact, peasants tried to avoid throwing seeds onto neighbors’ strips. Appreciating the 
value of grains, they sowed carefully enough to keep all the seeds on their own land. 
Concerns about unlike sowings on adjacent fields did not deter peasants from 
experimenting with new crops. For instance, the survey of communal peasants and 
individual farmers in the six provinces of the central agricultural region in 1910-1911 
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revealed approximately the same percentage of respondents from the both groups who 
had adopted improved seeds. Communes rarely imposed any restrictions on crops choices 
beyond the general division into winter and spring crops, and even these limitations could 
be modified. With the exception of the fallow field, peasants could select their sowings as 
they saw fit. The quality of each unit of soil determined crop choices in most cases. Crops 
that tended to grow poorly on a particular field would not be sown there. In some 
instances, peasants even managed to overcome the commune's prohibition to sow on the 
fallow field.139    
     Land redistributions, commonly blamed for intensifying land fragmentation, could in 
fact be used to reduce it. In Vladimir and Tver provinces, for example, peasants 
undertook general repartitions to eliminate the excessive multiplication of strips that 
resulted from frequent partial redistributions. Instead of multiple strips in the fields, each 
household received one parcel per field. Communes modified their repartitioning 
techniques in order to redistribute land in wider strips. For example, they could reduce 
the precision of their qualitative evaluation of land and thus decrease the number of 
furlongs subject to repartitioning. This measure alone was reported to reduce 
fragmentation by four to six times. Some communes enforced regulations regarding the 
width of strips, not allowing its members to subdivide their holdings below a certain size. 
In Smolensk province, for example, each parcel had to contain at least a quarter of a 
desiatina. In Iaroslavl, Moscow, Orenburg, and Tver provinces, peasants adopted a new 
system of allocating land to households in standard units called hundreds (sotni). In 
Moscow province, communes practiced a variety of other techniques, including 
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apportioning land to small households collectively and allowing them to decide among 
themselves how to divide it, or allotting double-sized strips to small households in 
alternate fields.140  
     Families that received lower-grade or distant parcels as a result of the new methods of 
strip widening could be compensated in money or with supplementary land. In Moscow 
province, for example, households whose strips were vulnerable to trespass and 
compaction due to their proximity to roadways and meadows received additional strips. 
The Kekhotskaia commune in Archangel province divided all arable land into three 
categories according to its distance from the village. Households which did not have land 
in the first category were entitled to receive twice as much land in the second category 
and three times as much in the third.141      
     The massive evidence gathered by zemstvo surveys indicates that communes could 
utilize the repartition mechanism to sustain high farming standards and even to foster 
agricultural advancements. Communes could manipulate their repartition techniques to 
reward their member households for manuring and other land improving measures. 
Again, the motive underlying these practices was predominantly economic, not 
egalitarian, in nature. Repartitioning land in order to ensure the effective use and 
improvement of communal land facilitated the reproduction of the village land resource 
base and the payment of taxes.142  
     In the non-black-earth provinces, communes often practiced the so-called “shuffling 
repartition” (peredel v peredvizhku), which involved the widening or narrowing of strips 
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in accordance with changes in household structure. The majority of strips typically 
retained their central core, migrating slightly backwards and forwards across a field. 
Shuffling repartitions thus allowed households to extend their use of the same strips for 
up to thirty years. The shuffling repartitions represented another example of communal 
peasants’ attempts to maximize the effective use of land by retaining existing strips in the 
hands of their current users and simply adjusting the size of holdings to changes in 
households without relocating them. This technique allowed communal peasants not only 
to extend their use of the same strips, but also to widen strips when needed.143 
     Agricultural innovation and productivity growth depended on consistent efforts to 
improve soil quality by the use of fertilizers. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
fertilizer use became widespread in communes all over Russia, except the southern black-
earth provinces, where manuring did little to improve the already fertile soil. Zemstvo 
statistics indicated that communes in the central non-black-earth region used organic 
fertilizers even more intensively than private land owners.144   
     Communes devised various reward mechanisms to stimulate peasants to manure their 
land. Peasants who fertilized their allotments received either special monetary payments 
at the time of repartition, or similarly well-fertilized plots, or the right to retain their 
original allotments. Manured strips (navozniki) could be excluded from repartitions and 
kept in the permanent possession of their current users. Once peasants stopped using 
manure, however, these strips again became subject to general repartition rules, to be 
redistributed to other owners. If a household consistently failed to maintain or improve 
soil quality on its lands, a village assembly could penalize it by assigning it the same or 
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even more degraded strips at the next repartition. Thus, contrary to the conventional 
belief that repartitions discouraged peasants from innovations and fertilizer use because 
peasants were likely to lose their allotments in the next repartition, communes in fact 
used the repartition mechanism to stimulate soil quality improvement.145 
     Some communes went even further by making manuring mandatory for all member 
households. In Moscow province, for example, village assemblies passed resolutions 
specifying how much manure each household was required to place on its allotment each 
year. In some cases, communes prohibited the sale of manure to neighboring villages as 
well as its use on non-commune lands until the commune's requirements had been met.146 
Such uniform measures, however, were possible only in the regions with more or less 
equal quality of land. Often, great variations in soil quality within a single commune 
required more flexible approaches. In such cases, peasants adjusted the use of manure 
according to a variety of factors, including the type of soil, the location of the land 
allotment, the amount of livestock, and the specific needs of the household and the 
community. Fertilizer use might also vary according to cultivation regimes necessary for 
different crops. In the black-earth provinces, for example, manure was rarely used in 
cereal cultivation, but frequently applied to strips reserved for crops like tobacco, 
vegetables, and hemp, which required intensive cultivation.147 The communal practice of 
mutual aid (pomochi) also promoted the village-wide use of fertilizers. Long before the 
Emancipation, communal peasants assisted each other in delivering manure to the fields. 
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Joint effort in this case helped to complete manuring in a more effective and timely 
manner.148  
     Zemstvo statistics provided similarly impressive record of communes' other land 
improvement activities, such as swamp drainage, irrigation, and land clearing. Again, 
because such projects usually required large labor input, communes often possessed 
better resources than individual farmers to implement them fast and effectively. V.I. 
Orlov documented numerous examples in Moscow province of communal peasants 
acting in common in swamp-drainage projects and transforming massive amounts of 
infertile soil into productive land. In addition to collective digging of drainage ditches, 
communes used special machinery, with rental payments raised by means of levies that 
the communes imposed on their members. Although typically zemstvo experts assisted 
peasants in these projects, peasants often acted independently, devising and implementing 
improvement plans without any outside guidance.149 
     In Tambov and Saratov provinces, communes organized irrigation projects including 
the digging of ditches, wells, and ponds and the use of primitive but effective peasant-
designed and built water-raising machines. In Ekaterinoslav province, communes in one 
district built a water-supply system which extended over a distance of three versts. In the 
thickly forested Vologda province, collective land clearing projects included tree cutting, 
digging up of roots, and the burning of stubble. Although zemstvo statisticians never 
claimed that all communes engaged in such activities, they used land improvement 
measures as evidence of the commune's capacity to act as an agent of economic progress. 
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     Zemstvo statistics also reported the peasants' growing interest in technological change. 
Although the wooden plow (sokha), the wooden-framed harrow, the scythe, and the flail 
still predominated the late nineteenth-century Russian countryside, the use of plows, seed 
drills, and reaping machines was becoming standard practice. Characteristically, the 
equipment-lending stations established by local zemstvos during the Stolypin reform 
were often unable to meet increasing peasant demand for improved tools and 
machinery.150  
     Despite the challenges that the introduction of new tools presented, communal 
peasants quickly recognized their advantages. The plow, for example, improved soil 
fertility by tilling the soil deeper and eliminating weeds more effectively than the sokha. 
Unlike the sokha, which could easily skid off the tillage line in stubble and tough soils, 
the plow went straight along the tillage line and maintained an even depth of plowing. 
This constituted a significant advantage because keeping tillage lines straight helped to 
maintain a proper distance between furrows. Straight tillage also eliminated the 
probability of leaving the significant portion of unutilized land in between the furrows, 
which would be the case if the gaps were too wide. The plow offered a significantly 
wider range of adjustment than the sokha in both the depth and width of plowing. Its 
stability enabled it to perform operations like cross-tillage (perpendicular to previous 
furrows), which was important for leveling off the surface. The plow's land-improving 
effects allowed peasants to sow less seeds per unit of land and thus to economize on seed 
grains. Finally, whereas the sokha could easily swell up in wet weather and become 
brittle in dry weather, the plow was much more resistant to weather conditions and less 
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likely to break. The iron parts of the sokha tended to dull faster than the steel share of 
good plows.151 
     The next stage of the farming process, sowing, was improved by the increasing use of 
the seed drill instead of hand-sowing. This tool maximized the seeds' growth potential by 
sowing them at a predetermined depth and at an appropriate distance from each other, 
which allowed crops to grow faster and more uniformly, so all of them would ripe by the 
time of reaping. The seed drill also made it possible to employ the so-called “ribbon 
sowing” (lentochnyi posev), an advanced technique that permitted peasants to arrange the 
sprouts in even rows set widely apart, after which they could perform additional tillage 
between the rows in order to kill weeds and retain soil moisture.152  
     Mechanized threshing increasingly replaced traditional technologies like flail 
threshing, rail beating, and animal trampling. Threshing machines powered by hand, 
horse, and engines increased productivity at a dramatic rate. Despite the fact that they 
could smash from a minimum of two to four per cent of the grains to a maximum of 
twenty to twenty-six percent when improperly adjusted or operated, they could thresh up 
to twenty or even twenty-five haystacks (kopen) of grain per day, which equaled to 
around half of the quantity of an average family's annual harvest. The major problem 
with threshing machines was that even its simplest hand-powered versions were 
expensive, while horse-driven models might require from four to six horses to operate. 
Wealthier peasants, who were most likely to acquire these machines, usually hired them 
out, together with a couple of horses, to other families for an affordable fee. According to 
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zemstvo data, more than half of the peasants were using machine threshers by the early 
1900s.153  
     About the same time, peasants started utilizing winnowing and sorting machines 
instead of the traditional spades, sieves, and shovels. The most advanced models of the 
winnowing machine could winnow as much as 100-150 puds from the threshing floor in 
just one hour. Since most peasants rarely or never needed such a work rate, they 
commonly preferred slower, cheaper, and less advanced versions. Very popular among 
European Russian peasants were hand-powered models manufactured in Riazan and 
Smolensk provinces.154  
     The sorting machine, due to its ability to combine winnowing, cleaning, and sorting 
operations, represented an even more efficient tool. Its high speed, low labor input 
requirement, and the capacity to separate chaff, weed seeds, and different-size grains 
made it one of the most advanced technological innovations available at the time. Again, 
due to its extremely high cost, only communes and agricultural cooperatives could afford 
it. Local agronomists enthusiastically propagandized the benefits of the various models of 
sorters and strongly encouraged peasants to purchase them for collective use.155  
     In general, peasants selected new agricultural implements very carefully. Local 
geographical and economic conditions, soil quality, and other specific circumstances of a 
given area determined peasants' decisions to adopt or reject the use of improved tools and 
machines. Often, peasants combined new tools with traditional ones. The fact that 
communal peasants could be reluctant to adopt a particular tool did not necessarily reflect 
their indifference or hostility to innovation. As a rule, they were unwilling to use 
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advanced tools when they were convinced of their counter-productivity. The plow, for 
example, presented significant disadvantages for owners of multiple thin strips. First, 
being heavier than the sokha, the plow was more difficult to maneuver around obstacles 
and to carry from strip to strip. Second, the wheeled plow might need up to five yards to 
make a comfortable turn at the end of a furrow, whereas the ability of the sokha to turn 
tightly was important when tilling very thin strips. Third, the sokha's adjustable politsa 
enabled the tiller to direct all lifted soil toward one side of the strip. Because the plow did 
not allow this, it required double the number of dead furrows per strip. A plowman had to 
walk all the way to the other side of the strip each time he completed a furrow.156  
     Poorer peasants also had many reasons to prefer the sokha over the plow. The low 
price of the sokha made it affordable. It could operate with a single horse, whereas the 
use of the plow often required two horses. In addition, the sokha could perform a variety 
of additional functions such as covering seeds, planting potatoes, or tilling in between 
ribbon-sown crops. Finally, because of its simpler construction, local blacksmiths could 
always repair a sokha and village experts could help peasants to assemble it, which was 
not always the case with plows. Only the establishment of agronomic networks 
throughout European Russia in 1910 eased the problems associated with the acquisition 
and maintenance of plows and other new tools.157 
     Most importantly, the plow performed poorly on certain types of soils or in certain 
weather conditions. In Vladimir province, for example, peasants preferred to use the 
sokha on sandy soils because the plow tended to till the land too deeply and bring up a 
layer of unfertile sand, which significantly decreased productivity. For similar reasons, 
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agronomists recommended the use of the sokha instead of the plow for the second tillage 
in the black-earth region. Plowing during dry summer months could result in raising large 
brick-like clods that no harrow could reduce.158 
     In some cases, deeper tillage provided by the plow could actually damage soil quality. 
Plowing more than one and a half vershki (2.5 inches) deeper than the soil had previously 
been tilled might lift hard and unfertile soil that had not been in contact with air for a long 
time. Even harrows with metal teeth often could not handle thick layers of such soil. 
Generally, tilling deeper than about thirteen centimeters was rarely needed. Rye, oats, and 
potatoes did in fact require slightly deeper tillage than other crops. For the most part, 
however, as experimental stations in Samara and Simbirsk demonstrated, deeper tillage 
increased crop yields by only a few percent. Contrary to the widespread belief that deeper 
tillage increased productivity by facilitating the penetration of roots into the soil, Russian 
agronomic knowledge determined that crop roots would seek nourishment and grow 
below the tilled layer of land anyway, regardless of tillage depth. As a matter of fact, the 
timing of tillage represented a much more important factor than the depth, especially in 
drier climates.159 
     On lands infected with couch grass, the plow could even worsen the situation. The 
plow's shares cut under the entire surface of the soil and turned it over, leaving most of 
the root fragments intact. As a result, the grass would resprout from the undamaged root 
fragments and spread to an even larger territory than before plowing. The sokha's blades, 
by contrast, undercut at least two-thirds of the surface and brought most of the root 
fragments up to the surface, where they could dry out. It would not then come as a 
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surprise that even in regions where peasants widely used the plow, they still continued to 
combine it with the sokha. In Moscow province in the 1880s, for example, peasants tilled 
the land with a plow and after harrowing tilled it again with a sokha.160 
     Land cultivation was not the only area of economic improvement. Communal peasants 
actively responded to the expanding market opportunities opened up by Russia's intensive 
industrialization and urbanization in the second half of the nineteenth century. Growing 
urban demand for agricultural products provided the rural population with regional 
markets and incentives to engage in commercial farming and gardening, or the 
production of meat and dairy. Villagers delivered milk, butter, eggs, poultry, and 
vegetables to neighboring cities and towns or sold their products to buyers traveling 
around the countryside. Families used their private garden plots (usad'ba) or part of their 
arable land holdings for cultivating onions, potatoes, cabbages, raspberries, sunflowers, 
tobacco, flax, hemp, and other cash crops that might yield a profitable price at the 
markets. Some communities or entire rural regions specialized in particular cash crops 
and practiced inter-village trade. Many realized the commercial advantages of fishing, 
horse-breeding, raising geese and chicken, and rearing cattle and sheep. During the non-
agricultural season or when local conditions did not allow for enough income from 
farming operations, peasants focused on non-agrarian activities. Local industries and 
trades (promysly) have always played a significant role in augmenting rural household 
incomes. Growing markets prompted individual peasants and families to expand their 
pursuits in handicrafts and small-scale manufacturing. They realized that spinning, 
weaving, hand-knitting, and cloth-making could serve much more than merely domestic 
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needs. By the turn of the twentieth century, a growing number of villages had been 
turning into semi-farming, semi-industrial communities.161 
     In addition to diversifying economic activities within the commune, peasants 
increasingly sought supplementary income outside the village. Critics commonly blamed 
the commune for placing severe restrictions on peasant mobility, which allegedly 
impeded rural development by causing over-population and aggravating the land hunger 
problem. The village assembly might in fact take some of the household's land at the next 
repartition if an adult family member had been absent from the village for an extended 
period of time. Evidence suggests, however, that peasants were able to leave the village 
in search of alternate employment when they were willing to do so. Because the time 
between redistributions tended to be relatively long and, most importantly, because 
outside earnings could add substantially to the family's income, peasants actively 
engaged in seasonal or long-term migrant labor (otkhodnichestvo). They might find a job 
in a factory or a small business in a nearby city or work as hired laborers in bigger farms. 
Frequently, migrant peasants formed cooperatives (arteli) specializing in a certain area of 
production. The data on internal passports issued during the post-Emancipation period 
demonstrate the dramatic increase in peasant mobility. The notions of the commune's 
restrictive nature and of peasants' isolationism and attachment to the commune appear to 
be largely overstated. As a matter of fact, it was not the commune but the pace of 
urbanization and industrialization that limited peasant mobility. Despite their intensive 
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growth, Russian industries could not absorb migrant labor in greater numbers than they 
did.162  
     In light of the above discussed evidence of the commune's capacity to innovate and to 
respond to market opportunities, what conclusions can we make about its economic 
performance? There is no doubt, of course, that communal farming at the turn of the 
twentieth century continued to rely predominantly on the traditional practice of extensive 
rather than intensive production. In most cases, the need for subsistence rather than a 
desire to maximize productivity determined the peasants' economic decisions. Peasants 
preferred to use crops and farming techniques that had been tried and trusted by 
generations and could thus ensure the production of food sufficient for subsistence. They 
tended to avoid risky experimentation, which might improve production but might also 
ruin the entire harvest and therefore jeopardize the household's survival.  
     Do these features of the communal economy testify to its stagnant and backward 
nature, as its critics argued? Evidence gathered by Russian zemstvo statisticians, 
agronomists, and economists (and “rediscovered” by recent studies) suggests much more 
complex patterns of communal peasants' economic behavior than it has been commonly 
assumed. In line with the pragmatic risk-aversion logic, communal peasants certainly 
exercised caution in adopting innovations, but they never were hostile or unreceptive to 
beneficial change. In fact, as Kovalevskii's comparative-historical analysis demonstrated, 
communal practices never remained static and uniform. Peasants modified and adapted 
their economic behavior to local environments and changing socioeconomic conditions, 
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which led to considerable regional variations in repartitioning and farming techniques. 
They readily adopted new tools and techniques when they proved to be more effective or 
better suited to specific local conditions than traditional practices.  
     The capacity of the village commune to introduce technological and farming 
improvements became particularly evident during the post-Emancipation period. 
Communal peasants responded to the changes that Russia's intensive modernization and 
industrialization brought to the countryside. Peasants increasingly used new tools and 
machines, engaged in commercial farming, trade, and other market-oriented activities. 
They improved and diversified traditional farming techniques such as the three-field 
system and experimented with grass cultivation and multi-field systems.  
     Critics of the commune underestimated the viability and flexibility of Russian 
communal agriculture. The commune's restrictive rules and regulations, they argued, 
made productivity improvements and individual initiative impossible. Strong evidence, 
however, indicates that the actual operating arrangements of the village commune were 
much more flexible than its formal rules might suggest.163 As we have seen, despite 
imposing some constraints, the commune left substantial room for individual initiative. 
The three-field system allowed for considerable flexibility in the selection of crops and 
farming procedures. The commune provided entrepreneurial peasants with resources and 
opportunities for experimentation that individual farmers could rarely afford. Commune 
members could try new crops and farming methods on specially designated lands or 
collectively rented plots. Once the majority in the commune became convinced of the 
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benefits of a new crop or technique, the assembly decided to adopt it on a village-wide 
scale.  
     Contemporary observers, including Kovalevskii, stressed the dual character of the 
Russian village commune. The commune's economy and property relations, in fact, 
represented a combination of both collective and individualistic claims and practices. 
Each family possessed its own dwelling and a garden plot, as well as livestock and tools, 
with which it cultivated its portion of communal land. The commune did not command 
the farming and economic operations of individual member households or appropriate the 
product of their labor. Strip cultivation and common grazing usually did not prevent 
peasants from managing their sowings as they saw fit.164  
     Contemporary observers pointed to the capacity of the village communes to adopt and 
spread innovations faster and more effectively than individual farmers. Irrigation and 
other improvements that required collective effort could be implemented more rapidly in 
communal villages than on private farms. Unlike individual cultivators, communes 
possessed sufficient labor and financial resources to buy new tools and machines and to 
engage in large-scale projects. Communes often fostered manuring and other advanced 
agricultural techniques by rewarding peasants for their efforts at improvement. 
     The growth of agricultural output in the 1880s-1890s corroborates the significant 
economic potential of the post-Emancipation village commune. According to Gregory, 
Russian net grain and potato output in the 1880s-1900s rose at an annual rate of over 
three percent, that is, well ahead of rural population growth (1.2 percent per annum).165 
Average grain yields per hectare increased by 1.5 percent and output per worker grew by 
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approximately 1.35 percent each year, which by 1911 allowed Russian peasants to collect 
yields close to those in the countries with similarly short and moisture-deficient growing 
seasons like Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Argentina. By the early 1890s, Russia's per-
capita grain and potato output slightly exceeded the European average and was more than 
double the levels for Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Japan.166 Russia's stock of agricultural 
equipment roughly trebled between 1890 and 1913.167 In the 1890s, agriculture consumed 
more of Russia's iron output than did the rapidly expanding railway industry.168 
     In view of this evidence, the widespread assumption that the village commune trapped 
peasants in an “almost unbreakable cycle of poverty”169 appears to be an exaggeration. 
The predominantly subsistence-oriented communal economy did not keep peasants on the 
edge of starvation and destitution. In fact, conclusive evidence suggests that peasant 
living standards steadily improved in the last two decades before the inception of the 
Stolypin land reform. A key indicator of peasant real income, grain retained by peasants 
for their own consumption, grew three times faster than did rural population. Grains like 
wheat, which had been considered a “luxury” and produced primarily for the market prior 
to the 1890s, were becoming part of the peasant diet. Peasants also enriched their diets by 
growing diverse crops and vegetables, particularly potatoes, which significantly increased 
their calorie intake. In the 1890s, per-capita food supplies in Russia were considerably 
higher than those in Southern Europe and Japan. Agricultural capital stock (farm 
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equipment, structures, and livestock) was also growing more rapidly than farm 
population during this period.170 
     Undoubtedly, extreme poverty did exist in pre-revolutionary rural Russia, particularly 
in the most densely populated central black-earth region. Recent studies, however, have 
criticized the tendency of many Russian and Western historians to generalize about the 
condition of the entire Russian agriculture based on the extreme cases of rural poverty in 
some areas. Economic historians have convincingly demonstrated that the existence of 
rural poverty in a particular time and place does not necessarily reflect its trend over time 
and its spatial distribution. Evidence of the economic decline in one area may conceal 
evidence of successful agricultural performance in other regions. Even though some 
agricultural regions may experience a decline in per capita output, the aggregate national 
per capita output can be on the rise.171 Some types of sources can produce misleading 
evidence. For example, government surveys, which have commonly been used as a 
graphic proof of agricultural decline in late nineteenth-century Russia, generally focused 
on problematic cases rather than success stories. Literary accounts of that period also 
often tended to depict the most downtrodden families rather than average ones.   
     Evidence of the compatibility of subsistence and rational economic orientations tends 
to vindicate Kovalevskii's analysis of the Russian village commune. The subsistence 
priorities of communal peasants did not prevent them from maximizing productivity and 
profit. The village commune possessed a significant economic potential, which allowed it 
to become an agent of change and improvement. The Russian government, however, 
chose to ignore the capacity of the commune to contribute to economic progress. 
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               Chapter IV. Kovalevskii's Opposition to Stolypin's Land Reform 
 
     The inception of the Stolypin land reform in 1906 presented Kovalevskii with an 
opportunity to voice his opinions about the Russian village commune. Kovalevskii’s 
scholarly findings led him to oppose the Stolypin land reform. He criticized Stolypin's 
attempts to undermine the village commune and to pressure peasants to separate from 
communes. Although he believed firmly in private agriculture, he argued that in country 
dominated by communal traditions the state must not destroy the collective economy by 
legislative fiat. He accused the government of advancing its own political agenda instead 
of promoting beneficial change in the countryside.172 
     Prior to the Revolution of 1905, the attitudes of Russian officials toward the post-
Emancipation peasant commune had been strikingly ambivalent. On the one hand, 
bureaucrats viewed communal practices as economically “backward” and “irrational.” On 
the other, the tsarist government strongly supported the village commune on political, 
fiscal, and administrative grounds. In the absence of seigniorial authority in the village, 
communes acted as local organs of social control. Communal regulations proved to be an 
effective hindrance to the impoverishment of the peasant masses, which, in government's 
eyes, made the commune a guarantor of social stability and a strong safeguard against 
revolution. Repartition practices ensured that peasants redistributed land among 
themselves instead of making land claims against the gentry. Finally, the principle of 
collective financial responsibility ensured that peasants met their fiscal obligations and 
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thus provided a stable flow of revenue for the state. Clearly, political and administrative 
concerns predominated in the governmental policy toward the commune prior to the 
Stolypin reform. 
     The same proved to be true after the revolution of 1905, when the active participation 
of communal peasants in rural upheavals radically changed official attitudes. Once the 
communes demonstrated that they could serve as agents of the peasants' organized 
protest, the government immediately decided to replace them by private farms. A series 
of legislative acts introduced in 1906-1911 suggested two major changes. First, every 
peasant family received the right to consolidate their strips into one plot and withdraw 
from the commune by forming a separate farm (otrub) or requesting an individual land 
allotment outside the village (khutor). In contrast to previous laws requiring the consent 
of at least a two-third majority in the village to allow a peasant to leave the commune, the 
Stolypin decrees permitted peasants to separate from the commune without approval of 
the other commune members. Second, peasants living in villages which had not 
undertaken general repartitions during the previous twenty four years were automatically 
declared owners of their individual land holdings. This measure represented the most 
radical change in the rural economy, allowing the authorities to eliminate non-repartition 
village communes regardless of whether or not their members were willing to abandon 
communal practices.  
     By creating a large class of rural property owners, the government sought to 
consolidate the political support for the regime among the country's largest social group. 
According to reformers, private ownership rights would ensure farmers' loyalty and 
obedience to the regime. Stolypin himself repeatedly emphasized the explicitly political 
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significance of the land reform. Presented the land reform as “the wager on the strong,” 
he proclaimed that privatization would turn hard-working peasants into economically 
prosperous and politically conservative citizens. Ignoring both the evidence of the 
commune's economic capacity and the potential dangers of the radical change in the 
peasant economy, state officials sought to eliminate the commune as soon as possible.173            
     Kovalevskii warned Russian policy-makers that Stolypin might well achieve his goal 
of creating a class of politically conservative private property owners, but at the cost of 
increasing the mass of impoverished and potentially revolutionary peasants. An 
accelerated transition to private agriculture, he insisted, would intensify social 
polarization in the village. Although a few wealthy villagers would benefit from 
privatization and new market opportunities, millions of poor peasants would be unable to 
compete with them. As a result, they would lose their lands, turn into rural proletarians, 
and, in desperation, opt for violent protests that would threaten political stability. 
     Kovalevskii emphasized that the Russian political and economic system was 
unprepared to deal with the social consequences of the Stolypin land reform. Despite 
intensive industrialization in 1890s-1900s, capitalism in Russia had not reached the stage 
when urban industries would be able to offer jobs to millions of rural proletarians. The 
cities would fail to absorb a large-scale migration of the peasant masses desperately 
searching for work and new places to live. The state, in turn, lacked financial resources to 
implement a large-scale poor relief program to prevent a massive social chaos.  
                                                 
173 See, for example, David A.J. Macey, Government and Peasant in Russia, 1861-1905: The Pre-History 
of the Stolypin Reforms (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987) for an argument that the 
1905 Revolution forced the government to elevate political over economic considerations. In Macey’s 
opinion, the pressure for speedy results meant that the land reform measures lacked coherence and clear 
direction. 
 100  
     Instead of fostering stability, Kovalevskii stressed, the Stolypin reform would only 
aggravate the existing social problems. Referring to the studies by leading Russian 
economists and zemstvo statisticians, he pointed to the fact that the post-Emancipation 
village had already been suffering from the mounting social and economic differentiation. 
In Kovalevskii's opinion, the government acted irresponsibly in seeking to weaken the 
traditional communal guarantees of security. The destruction of the source of peasants' 
livelihood would “quite legitimately” provoke violent protests and resistance to reform. 
As a result, peasants would come to form part of an impoverished and frustrated majority, 
which would be easily driven to revolution. 
     To support his prognosis, Kovalevskii cited numerous historical precedents 
demonstrating the potential social dangers of radical agrarian change. His research on late 
medieval and early modern England provided compelling evidence of the devastating 
social consequences of enforced enclosure of the common fields which produced masses 
of landless rural proletarians, who fled to already crowded cities in search of work and 
food.174 Similarly disastrous were the results of the aggressive anti-communal policies of 
the British colonial administration in nineteenth-century India. The break-up of the Indian 
panchayat commune led to peasant impoverishment, the decline of competition, the 
concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few, and social unrest. His other 
examples included North Africa and Latin America, where the use of force by colonial 
authorities eager to eliminate local communal practices caused social polarization and 
long-term economic decay.175   
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     Kovalevskii urged the Russian government to refrain from acting like “colonizers” of 
their own people. He ridiculed the rhetoric used by the British colonial administrators to 
describe the disappearance of the Indian panchayat communes. Claims about the alleged 
backwardness of communal practices, Kovalevskii asserted, allowed the British to avoid 
responsibility for the poverty and suffering caused by their anti-communal policies. 
Similarly, in North Africa, French colonists ridiculed the backwardness of local peasants 
and justified the forcible introduction of private land tenure by the claim that they were 
serving the cause of economic progress. In fact, as Kovalevskii demonstrated, they were 
pursuing the political aim of destroying the basis of Algerian society. As he saw it, 
idealized notions of the unconditional advantages of private-property rights simply 
disguised French efforts to establish their control over the Algerian economy.      
     Kovalevskii was not alone in his attempts to apply the historical experience of other 
nations to Russia's rural development. His colleague and friend, Paul Vinogradoff, used 
his studies of medieval England to criticize Stolypin for creating the prospect of social 
upheaval and “gambling with revolution.” Blaming Stolypin for radicalism, Vinogradoff 
emphasized that Russia needed “thorough organic reforms, something like the movement 
of the sixties on a larger scale.”176 The historian Ivan V. Luchitskii likewise drew on his 
examination of the village commune in Spain to stress the importance of social 
consequences of the rural reform in Russia.177 
     Kovalevskii would have undoubtedly agreed with another Russian student of medieval 
English agriculture, Aleksandr N. Savin, who argued that destroying the village 
commune in Russia was the same as “planting gunpowder in the cellar of a house where 
                                                 
176 Paul Vinogradoff, The Russian Problem (London: Constable and Company, 1914), 40. 
177 Ivan V. Luchitskii, “Pozemel'naia obshchina v Pireneiakh,” Otechestvennye zapiski, no. 9, 10, 12 
(1883). 
 102  
you yourself live.”178 Instead of attempting to eliminate communal guarantees of security, 
Kovalevskii insisted, the state should protect them by legislative measures. He questioned 
the possibility of creating a class of socially stable and politically conservative class of 
strong individual farmers in the near future, which the authors of the land reform widely 
propagandized. Instead, Kovalevskii urged the government to support communal 
institutions with their security mechanisms and mutual aid practices that had proven to 
impede the process of social differentiation in the countryside and thus acted as 
safeguards of stability. He suggested that reducing tax burdens, promoting the migration 
of peasants to sparsely populated regions, and permitting them to rent land owned by the 
state or the gentry would promote stability much more effectively than radical attempts to 
demolish communal institutions.179             
     In addition to intensifying social problems, Kovalevskii maintained, a radical land 
reform would fail to ensure significant economic improvement. Peasants would be 
reluctant to accept any innovations that put their livelihood at risk. Kovalevskii reminded 
Russian politicians that it took centuries in Western Europe to transform peasants into 
individual farmers. In Russia, it would also take a long time to change the peasants' 
economic behavior. Capitalist farmers could not instantly emerge from the constraints of 
the commune. The peasants could not miraculously acquire the skills and knowledge 
necessary to successful entrepreneurship by the simple act of leaving the commune. He 
cited evidence from India, Algeria, and the Spanish colonies in Latin America 
demonstrating that the disappearance of the commune in these regions did not generate 
any significant improvements in farming and even caused a short-term economic decline. 
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He also referred to Russian zemstvo surveys revealing that many peasants who 
consolidated their lands into individual otruba and khutora continued to employ the same 
tools and farming methods that they had become accustomed to in communes. 
     Kovalevskii accused government officials of using administrative pressure in order to 
force peasants to leave the commune. Believing that the process of land privatization 
must be exclusively voluntary, he urged the political elites to abandon their traditional 
paternalistic and dirigiste attitudes toward the allegedly “backward” peasantry and to let 
the peasants decide for themselves whether to stay in the commune or to separate from it. 
He reminded Russian policy-makers that peasants possessed sufficient expertise and 
pragmatism to be able to make informed economic decisions. Regarding peasants as 
actors in the reform process rather than passive recipients of state-directed reform, he 
argued that peasants desired economic improvement and knew better than the St. 
Petersburg officials how to reform the village. 
     Finally, Kovalevskii criticized the authors of the Stolypin land reform for focusing 
exclusively on land-tenure issues and presenting the communal system as the single 
source of all rural problems. Asserting that changes in land ownership could not provide 
the ultimate solution to peasant poverty, he urged agrarian reformers to concentrate their 
efforts on such issues as increasing capital investment in the agricultural sector, 
developing rural infrastructure, building roads and communications, improving housing 
and public health conditions, and providing agronomic assistance to peasants. Moreover, 
Kovalevskii emphasized, farming and technological improvements could be implemented 
without any change in land tenure arrangements. He drew attention to the capacity of 
communal peasants to introduce innovations just as rapidly and effectively as individual 
 104  
farmers. In his opinion, both the private and communal sectors of Russian agriculture 
could equally contribute to rural progress. 
     Could communal egalitarianism prevent the growth of social and economic 
differentiation among peasants? Or were opponents of the commune correct in arguing 
that collective mechanisms in the village declined to the extent that it was no longer 
possible to consider the commune a safeguard of social harmony and stability? 
Kovalevskii's answers to these questions were not simple. As we have already noted, he 
repeatedly stressed the growth of individualism and economic stratification in the 
commune and, at the same time, believed that communal practices could prevent the 
excesses of economic differentiation.  
     Recent research has provided evidence in support of Kovalevskii's complex vision of 
communal egalitarianism. Communes were by no means model egalitarian societies, as 
some Slavophile and populist intellectuals argued. In fact, economic inequality has 
always been a common feature of communal life. Numerous accounts documented the 
existence of wide disparities in peasants' wealth and economic status. Differences in 
households' farming ability, family size, fertility of holdings, and many other factors 
contributed to different economic outcomes. The fundamentally egalitarian practices such 
as repartition could in reality promote inequalities. Wealthier households might benefit 
from the fact that repartitions, while redistributing land allotments, very rarely addressed 
the inequalities in livestock and garden holdings. The expanding economic opportunities 
of the post-Emancipation period only intensified the existing disparities. This was clearly 
manifested by the increase in conflicts between peasant families and the growing 
influence of rich peasants on village affairs. Frequently, the wealthier families were able 
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to affect the votes and decisions of the village assembly and to exert economic pressures 
on their poorer co-villagers who depended on them financially due to indebtedness or 
worked for them as hired laborers. Not surprisingly, commune members often referred to 
wealthy peasants pejoratively as miroedy (literally “commune-eaters”).180 
     Despite increasing peasant stratification in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, communal practices did continue to serve as an effective counter-balance to 
excessive economic differentiation. Communes mediated disputes between households 
and organized assistance for the families suffering from a sudden economic crisis. A 
household experiencing extreme material difficulties could be temporarily freed from 
some or all of its tax obligations, be allowed to defer payments, or receive an interest-free 
loan. Communes could help a family to rebuild a house destroyed by fire or flood or even 
assist in plowing or harvesting its land allotment in case of a family member's illness. As 
evidence indicates, mutual aid continued to be a common practice among turn-of-the-
century Russian peasants.181  
     Although critics regarded peasants' collectivism and cooperation as a manifestation of 
their primitive egalitarian instincts, peasants themselves understood them in purely 
pragmatic terms. Through generations of experience, they realized that providing mutual 
aid and maintaining some degree of egalitarianism served their interests better than 
seeking their own advantage at the expense of others. By ensuring the subsistence of each 
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family in the village, communal practices prevented excessive impoverishment and 
destitution. In the absence of the organized social welfare system, cooperation performed 
the functions of mutual insurance policy. During hard times, the commune acted as a 
defense mechanism allowing rich and poor peasants to band together to survive during 
famines or to protect themselves against the excessive demands of the state. As Dorothy 
Atkinson noted, “the conditions of rural life gave rise to a social concept of 
egalitarianism, not as a ‘Utopian illusion’ but as a practical and culturally conditioned 
adjustment to limited resources.”182 
     Since the principle of joint financial responsibility required commune members to 
make up the difference for the households that failed to pay their share of taxes, it made 
perfect economic sense to provide temporary relief to families in crisis so they could 
recover as soon as possible and be able again to make their contribution to the commune's 
obligations. Peasants also offered assistance not to abstract individuals but to their fellow 
villagers, whom they knew well and whose help they expected to receive reciprocally at 
times of need. In that respect, mutual aid practices served as a pragmatic group survival 
mechanism.      
     This does not mean, however, that the commune acted as a safety net for everybody. 
Well aware of the possibility that egalitarian benefits might allow “free-riders” to take 
advantage of the other villagers, peasants were very selective in providing assistance to 
their less fortunate neighbors. Typically, a temporary crisis due to a natural disaster, an 
accident like fire, or a family member's serious illness could qualify a household for 
communal help. Those who continuously failed to be productive village members, 
particularly of alcoholism or laziness proved to be the cause of the problem, had very 
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little or no chances to receive neighborly support. Moreover, communal assemblies 
punished repeated instances of tax evasion by fines, arrest, or even property 
confiscation.183 
     The realities of peasant life and economy were far too complex to fit a single-factor 
explanation. Contrary to the political elites' unconditional belief in the “magic of 
property,” tenure changes could not provide the ultimate solution to all problems in the 
Russian countryside. Scholars have stressed that transition from subsistence to market-
oriented economy requires large-scale social and economic transformations, of which 
tenure forms are only a part. In fact, evidence from various regions of the world indicates 
that land privatization by itself does not necessarily lead to significant agricultural 
improvement. While Stolypin and his supporters referred to England as a model of 
successful agricultural reform, historians of English agriculture have repeatedly 
questioned the results of the land enclosures. Many studies have demonstrated that 
enclosures in England did not always foster improvements in husbandry. In both open 
and enclosed fields, peasants continued to use the same outmoded farming techniques.184   
     The Russian economist Aleksandr S. Posnikov, Kovalevskii's contemporary and an 
expert in rural economics, argued that changes in property rights did not always correlate 
with productivity increase and agricultural innovation. His findings demonstrated that 
English tenant farmers improved their farming methods and productivity despite the fact 
that they did not own the land they worked. Temporary rental contracts did not diminish 
their economic incentive to invest time and money. Posnikov concluded that factors other 
than property arrangements determine the dynamics of productivity growth and overall 
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agricultural progress. Another Kovalevskii's contemporary, the statistician-economist 
Nikolai A. Kablukov pointed to the rapidly declining levels of productivity and 
innovation among late nineteenth-century English private farmers. He found that, instead 
of intensifying land-use regimes and diversifying their crops, large farm owners 
responded to market fluctuations by resorting to cheaper and more primitive cultivation 
methods, which resulted in soil degeneration and even the abandonment of arable fields 
to grazing.185   
     Similarly, local surveys indicated little or no correlation between tenure arrangements 
and economic initiative. A survey in the Simbirsk province, for example, revealed that 
only fifteen percent of privatizers sought to enclose their land with the purpose of 
improving their farming operations. The surveys by the Free Economic Society found no 
difference in the use of agricultural techniques between communal peasants and 
individual farmers. Peasants who privatized their lands often retained the same farming 
methods that they had employed in the commune. In some cases, they continued to use 
strip cultivation and even agreed to shift the location of their strips when the remaining 
members of the commune undertook a land repartition. On the other hand, when 
improvements occurred, they took place on both communal and private farms. No 
compelling evidence suggests that individual farmers adopted advanced techniques or 
equipment at a faster rate than did their neighbors in the commune.186 
     Comparisons of productivity rates in the communal and private sectors of Russian 
agriculture also do not provide any conclusive evidence of a better economic 
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performance on privatized farms. Bideleux, for instance, has found no evidence of the 
advantages of private farming in turn-of-the-century Russia. His analysis of regional 
variations in rates of grain yields increase shows that regions and provinces with 
predominantly communal agriculture could have both the lowest and highest increases in 
yields. Grain productivity levels in the predominantly communal central black-earth 
regions did not deviate significantly from the average rates for all regions. Most of the 
individual farmers who did achieve higher grain yields appear to have been stronger 
households, who had been receiving above average yields before they privatized their 
land holdings.187 
     Numerous factors unrelated to land tenure played a greater role in peasant poverty 
than allegedly backward communal practices. Shortage of capital, lack of infrastructure, 
weakly developed markets, little access to existing markets because of poor roads and 
communication, as well as, of course, such factors as low living standards, unsatisfactory 
housing conditions, the poor quality of medical care, and low literacy rates, produced 
deleterious effects on Russian agriculture. Russian peasants did not enjoy the benefits of 
public health care services that ordinary people experienced in other European countries. 
As a result, infant mortality rates in Russia, which in 1861 did not differ much from those 
in Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, remained unchanged until 1900, whereas in the 
other countries they had declined significantly.188 Inadequate infrastructure and 
communications discouraged peasants from setting up a separate farm far away from a 
village, where they could regularly attend a church and send their children to school. 
Many feared the inevitable social isolation of the life in a farmstead. The global 
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agricultural depression of the 1880s-1890s affected the peasant economy by significantly 
reducing grain prices. The state, however, instead of encouraging capital investment and 
expanding financial and agronomic assistance to the most poverty-stricken rural regions, 
further increased tax burdens on peasants in order to finance its ambitious 
industrialization and railroad construction programs. Characteristically, Kovalevskii 
repeatedly criticized the government for its short-sighted policy of modernizing Russia's 
economy at the expense of agriculture.  
     Some historians have linked the relatively low productivity on peasant lands to the 
terms of the Emancipation, which allowed gentry owners to retain the best-quality land in 
their possession and apportion less productive sections to communes. Landlords did not 
give up their top-quality lands even when they were located in the midst of peasant 
holdings. The fact that gentry lands were often closer to the village, whereas peasants had 
to travel considerable distances to their allotments, also affected productivity. In the 
decades following the reform, gentry owners increasingly sold portions of their land to 
communal peasants, but, again, these lands typically had lower potential for productivity 
improvement than those that the gentry kept to themselves. In addition, to compensate the 
gentry for the loss of labor and land as a result of the Emancipation, the government 
frequently established redemption payments above market value. Consequently, peasants 
received less land and more financial and fiscal obligations than before the 
Emancipation.189 
     Finally, unfavorable climatic, geographical, and environmental conditions could 
considerably limit the scope of economic improvement. Peasants developed elaborate 
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strategies to cope with the environments they lived in. In the absence of modern 
technology, however, the possibilities for improvement were limited. Weather 
fluctuations, environmental changes, and other random natural factors over which 
peasants had no control continued to influence peasant farming choices and economic 
decision-making. A recent study, for instance, has shown that the prevailing conditions in 
the central black-earth provinces simply did not allow for the spread of multi-field 
systems. In many regions, the sparse distribution of water resources, meadows, and 
forests created unfavorable conditions for the formation of separated farms.190 
     One of the crucial factors that bureaucrats had traditionally ignored was the peasants' 
willingness and ability to contribute to rural reform.  Blinded by their elitist attitudes 
toward the peasantry, officials could not admit that peasant economic behavior could be 
rational or innovative. Peasant culture and interests seemed to them “grey” and 
unremarkable. A conviction that allegedly “backward” and “apathetic” peasants needed 
tutelage and direction from above led Russian reformers to rely on paternalism as the 
most effective rural policy.   
     Although it is hard to measure precisely the scope of peasants' intelligence and 
agronomic expertise, many observers have stressed peasant pragmatism and sharp-
mindedness (smekalka).191 Russian rural studies of the post-Emancipation period pointed 
to economic interest as the dominant factor in peasant behavior. The peasant came to be 
seen as essentially an economic actor who “struggled with the Russian soil and climate in 
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an effort to master the land rather than be mastered by it.”192 The influential economist 
Nikolai Bervi, for example, concluded that, provided with better access to technology and 
education, peasants could themselves play a leading role in the improvement of Russian 
agriculture.193 
     As social and cultural history flourished in the second half of the twentieth century, 
historians began to “rediscover” the role of the peasantry in the technological change. 
Peasants are now credited with a more active role in introducing innovations than has 
been previously perceived. Following anthropologists and sociologists, historians have 
abandoned the notion of peasant primitivism and irrationalism. Peasant culture is no 
longer seen as rigid and stagnant, but flexible and complex. Scholars have increasingly 
stressed that custom and tradition did not prevent peasants from choosing what they 
thought suited them best. Communal practices and customs “allowed for an adaptation so 
spontaneous and natural that it was often unperceived.”194  
     Likewise, Russian peasants are now seen not as merely passive subjects but as active 
participants in the process of change. Whereas earlier works focused primarily on the 
static and authoritarian aspects of peasant culture,195 recent studies have stressed the 
pragmatic nature and flexibility of peasant mentality and behavior. Based on data 
gathered by Russian zemstvo statisticians, recent works have demonstrated the peasants' 
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continuous efforts to modify traditional farming strategies and devise new ones. It has 
been shown that in most cases peasants acted independently, without any outside help. 
Sometimes, zemstvo specialists assisted them in adopting innovations. Overall, 
communal peasants responded to innovations with the same degree of enthusiasm and 
appreciation as individual farmers. In the 1880s, two decades before the inception of the 
Stolypin reform, communes in the western Russian provinces started spontaneous 
consolidations of their strips into unified plots (voloki), similar to the enclosed farms 
(otruba) suggested by Stolypin.196   
     In contrast to the elitist vision of peasants as a “grey mass” of mindless primitives 
suffering from a “culture deficit,” a vast body of evidence indicates that Russian peasants 
possessed a complex and rich culture of their own. As one expert wrote, “peasants did not 
need to wait for outsiders to fill the void in the lives with meaning. Despite widespread 
illiteracy and the low level of technological achievements, peasants did not seem to lack 
useful and practical knowledge, motivation, or images of well-being and public 
virtue.”197  Although typically unaware of latest scientific discoveries and innovations, 
peasants developed extensive agronomic knowledge and skills. Repartitions alone 
involved complex land surveying procedures that required a detailed knowledge of soil 
fertility, local topography, accessibility, drainage, and many other agronomic and 
environmental factors. Characteristically, local agronomists who dealt with peasants on a 
regular basis attributed the peasants' ignorance to the lack of specialized education rather 
than their inability to comprehend rational economic principles.198  
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     Collective practices did not represent merely static “relics” of the past, but continued 
to serve important and pragmatic functions. They reflected the interests and worldview of 
the peasants, helping them to defend themselves against the pressures of the environment 
they lived in. They bound peasants together in a complex web of economic, social, and 
legal relationships. They transmitted the collective wisdom, expertise, and experience, 
which not only offered tried and trusted ways of survival but also fostered, if not 
required, adaptation and change. Modernization processes occurred in Russian post-
Emancipation agriculture not simply because of the involvement of the elites. Peasants 
themselves took an active part in shaping rural change.199 
     Critics cited indifference and even antagonism to children's education as one of the 
most illustrative examples of peasants' low intellectual horizons. In reality, long before 
zemstvos started establishing village schools, peasants had organized and maintained 
their own informal “free schools” (vol'nye shkoly) taught by local priests or retired 
soldiers. Viewed by peasants in purely pragmatic terms, reading and writing skills offered 
important advantages. The ability to read documents was necessary to avoid being 
cheated by local bureaucrats or traders. Innovation-minded peasants appreciated the 
opportunity to learn about agricultural improvements. In many villages, local agronomists 
encountered “peasant-intellectuals” who read agronomic literature.200  
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     This explains why village and district authorities, not the peasants, often resisted 
peasant literacy, fearing that it would give villagers too much freedom and enable them to 
keep track of bureaucratic operations. Not surprisingly, when the government launched 
the rural educational reform in the 1880s, peasants displayed suspicion toward the state's 
attempts to replace old informal village schools with formal schools operated by local 
zemstvos and with a uniform curriculum approved from above. They did have all 
practical reasons to see such educational changes as another attempt on the part of the 
state to control peasants' behavior and culture. Despite the general distrust of the state-
imposed measures, however, peasants were typically respectful of teachers. Although 
they might have regarded zemstvo school teachers as cultural outsiders, they knew that, 
unlike bureaucrats, teachers did not have formal authority to coerce and command. Most 
importantly, teachers taught literacy, which every peasant recognized as useful, if not 
necessary.201 
     Commonly accused of the lack of understanding of private property rights, peasants in 
reality could clearly distinguish between private and collective property arrangements. 
They held to communal practices not because of their inability to comprehend a modern 
conception of private property and the advantages it offered, as it was commonly thought, 
but because they believed that the communal system served their interests better than 
individual farming. As we have seen, the commune allowed for economic flexibility by 
permitting peasants to own private garden plots and to buy or rent additional arable land 
when needed. Peasants cherished their communal allotments but also appreciated the 
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value of property acquired by purchase and the advantages associated with it. The 
communal system did not thus prevent peasants from understanding private property 
rights and, of course, did not promote disrespect for private property, as its critics 
insisted. On the contrary, the commune offered its members an opportunity to benefit 
from both collective and private property arrangements. Undoubtedly, compared to their 
counterparts in Western Europe, Russian peasants may have had a weaker understanding 
and appreciation of private property. This applied, however, to all strata of Russian 
society. The notion of private property and legal support for it had been traditionally less 
developed in Russia than elsewhere in Europe.202 
     It is true that peasants often disapproved of their neighbors who decided to consolidate 
their holdings and separate from the commune. This was due, however, not to the 
peasants' alleged innate hostility toward private property, but to the economic problems 
they experienced as a result of consolidations. Each separation led to the reduction of the 
commune's arable and common grazing land and, consequently, to significantly 
decreased fodder resources for those who stayed in the commune. Peasants were also 
dissatisfied when they were forced to relocate some of their best-quality land strips to 
make room for consolidated plots for separators. As Kerans has suggested, it was the 
sense of private property that could discourage peasants from forming a separate 
farmstead. Moving to a khutor meant selling the household's individual garden plot, 
which many peasants valued as much as the communal allotment of arable land.203 
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     Convinced that peasants were incapable of change, officials believed the state needed 
to assume the directing role in rural transformation. The peasants’ unwillingness to 
follow the state-led reform was simply dismissed as a sign of peasant backwardness. 
Coercive policies could thus be employed when needed and were accepted as a necessary 
element of the “civilizing process.” The use of force was justified as a means to achieve 
the goal of promoting the triumph of reason and science over peasant backwardness.204 
     Historians disagree in their evaluations of the scope of coercion used by the authorities 
to accelerate peasant participation in the Stolypin reform. All, however, agree that the 
government did pressure land captains and other local administrators to push peasants to 
consolidate and privatize their lands. Despite the fact that many peasants were 
particularly hostile to the idea of khutora, local bureaucrats pressured peasants to arrange 
khutora, not otruba, whenever possible. In addition to extra-legal coercion, they might 
offer generous financial assistance to cover the costs of relocating to new sites.205  
     The Stolypin reform thus represented an example of the reform from above, an 
attempt of the government to impose its own vision of progress while ignoring the 
alternative reform projects suggested by zemstvo experts and peasants themselves. 
Characteristically, the sources that Stolypin and his supporters used as evidence of the 
commune's inefficiency were often produced by government officials themselves. 
Frequently, bureaucrats manipulated this information. For example, the data gathered by 
the Valuev Commission in the 1870s were based exclusively on the testimony of local 
bureaucrats and gentry representatives. Contemporary commentators questioned the 
reliability of the Commission's report and strongly criticized Valuev, the Minister of State 
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Properties widely known as an opponent of the commune, for deliberately excluding 
direct peasant testimony.206  
     Desiring to transform the village, the Russian government never intended to allow 
“initiative from below,” particularly initiative from the peasants, who presumably needed 
guidance from above. The reform's authors failed to understand that the peasants might 
have their own economic rationality and their own understanding of the costs and 
benefits of different land arrangements. The measure that peasants favored most during 
the Stolypin reform, the so-called group land settlement (gruppovoe zemleustroistvo), did 
not require any tenure changes but did help to reduce the worst effects of inter-stripping. 
Nearly half of all peasant requests in 1906-1914 involved such group settlements. Despite 
its appeal to the peasants, the government gave this type of change low priority, turning 
down applications for it and allowing it only after more radical solutions proved to be 
impossible. The government was determined to eliminate communes, not to improve 
them.207   
          Importantly, local resistance to the Stolypin reform came not only from peasants, 
but from zemstvo specialists, who were well aware of the commune's capacity to 
introduce innovations. Despite the government's attempts to pressure the zemstvos into 
providing special assistance exclusively to consolidated and privatized farms, zemstvo 
experts refused to focus their efforts on the small minority of consolidators, but insisted 
on extending agronomic aid and training to all peasants including those living in the 
communes. In fact, zemstvo specialists argued that, due to the lack of agronomists and 
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resources, it was more practical to arrange agronomic assistance to communal villages 
rather than to individual farmers. The widespread collaboration between zemstvo experts 
and communal peasants became a sort of a grass-roots alternative to the Stolypin land 
reform. Zemstvo specialists preferred to provide technical and agronomic aid to village 
communes, where they could help to a greater number of peasants within a relatively 
short period of time. Reaching out peasants who separated from the commune, 
particularly otrubniki frequently living in remote areas, required more specialists and 
more time, which often presented a serious problem for local zemstvo organizations. The 
lack of agricultural experts, as well as of financial and technical resources, made it 
extremely difficult to assist every individual farmer.208 
     As disappointment with the Stolypin reform grew among peasants, zemstvo activities 
expanded even more actively. Relying on the “magic of property”, the government made 
little effort to provide agronomic assistance to individual farmers. The authors of the 
reform appeared to have expected an agricultural revolution to occur instantly once 
farmers privatized their lands. The only financial assistance provided by the state 
included coverage of peasants' expenses on moving their dwellings to new locations. 
Officials ignored the necessity of arranging agronomic instruction, equipment stores, and 
animal-breeding services for consolidators. Inevitably, this led to widespread economic 
failures among consolidators all over the country.209  
     Zemstvo agronomists assisted communal peasants by distributing agronomic 
literature, offering lectures, and organizing discussions of agronomic issues at village 
meetings. They advised and consulted peasants individually, set up experimental stations, 
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where peasants could see advanced tools and techniques in action, managed equipment-
lending stations, supervised peasant experiments with new tools, farming techniques, or 
crops on specially designated demonstration plots. By seeking to promote technological 
change in the communes, the zemstvos inevitably came to challenge the government's 
program of reform. Unlike state officials, zemstvo agronomists saw their main goal in 
working through existing institutions, not in uprooting the farmer from the village and 
turning him into individualistic yeomen. Characteristically, local agronomists generally 
opposed Stolypin's over-emphasis on privatization measures.210 
     As an alternative to land consolidation and privatization favored by the government, 
zemstvo agronomists suggested a number of effective improvement measures within the 
framework of the commune. Decreasing the number of furlongs, or komassatsiia, for 
example, could help reduce the negative effects of land fragmentation by widening strips 
while at the same time allowing the retention of the benefits of common grazing. Another 
measure called “group land organization” could ease the problem of distant and 
inaccessible lands by forming out-settlements from over-sized communes. According to 
Kerans, local zemstvo agronomists in the Tambov province preferred group land 
organizations over consolidations. In March 1912, the agronomic conference in the 
Tambov province passed a resolution approving group land organization projects. The 
state officials, on the other hand, strongly opposed such measures. It was only in 1913 
that the Ministry of Agriculture began admitting the effectiveness of group land 
organization, thus breaking the Ministry of Internal Affairs' pressure to emphasize 
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consolidations. Such discord among the two ministries, however, did not change the 
government's overall policy stressing the consolidation and privatization of land.211 
     It is important to note that the government's distrust of the peasantry—and of zemstvo 
specialists who advocated the peasants’ rights—reflected its general distrust of Russian 
society as a whole, its traditional desire to exercise control over every aspect of public 
life in almost a military fashion. The Stolypin land reform represented essentially a 
radical attempt on the part of the government to create the “well-ordered” rural society in 
a rapidly changing world. Restoring and enhancing order in the largest sector of the 
Russian economy was crucial to the survival of the tsarist regime, weakened by the defeat 
in the Russo-Japanese war, the revolutionary chaos of 1905, and the challenges of the 
new constitutional system.   
     Whereas state officials claimed that the land reform was liberating peasants from the 
constraints imposed on them by the commune, it was in fact the government that was 
imposing on peasants its elitist vision of the reform. In contrast to the classical liberal 
assertion that private property rights enhance personal freedom and independence, 
Russian political elites had quite different goals in mind when they initiated land 
privatization programs. For Stolypin, the primary goal of the land reform was to create a 
class of obedient and loyal citizens in the countryside. Earlier, Count Illarion I. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, Minister of the Imperial Court and a member of the State Council, 
advocated the extension of private land tenure as a measure limiting rather than fostering 
peasant freedom of action. Like the English proponents of enclosure, who saw one of the 
dangers of communal practices in peasants' self-reliance and independence from 
authorities, Vorontsov-Dashkov blamed the Russian village commune for its “excessively 
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democratic” features, which, in his mind, undermined peasants' respect for authority. 
Similarly, many state officials favored the destruction of the commune as a means to 
reinforce the loyalty and subordination of the peasantry to the authorities in the face of 
the increasing influence of political radicalism in Russian society.212  
     Russian government's approach to reform was in many ways reminiscent of 
eighteenth-century German rulers who, inspired by the Cameralist theory of a well-
ordered police-state, sought to replace the “irrational” practices of the peasant commune 
with “rational” bureaucratic controls of the state. Viewing the commune as an obstacle to 
the expansion of state power, German political elites denounced it as a hindrance to 
economic progress. Land privatization came to be seen as a part of the “rationalization” 
of the entire social order, which, in the opinion of German rulers, justified the use of 
force when peasants resisted improvement measures imposed from above. During the 
reign of Frederick the Great, for example, peasants could be subject to corporal 
punishment if they refused to grow recommended crops. Ironically, Russian elites did not 
recognize such actions as constraints on individual freedom. Influenced by the statist 
economic traditions of Germany, Russian rulers themselves readily used coercion to 
enforce peasant loyalty and compliance.213  
     The results of the reform revealed the government's misconceptions and 
miscalculations about rural realities. According to official figures, between 1906 and 
1914, about 25 percent of all peasant households left the commune, including 10 percent 
of those who consolidated their lands and the other 15 percent who withdrew without 
consolidating. Contrary to the government's expectations, only a small percentage of the 
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strongest households consolidated and privatized their lands. Wealthier peasants could 
buy their own land or rent additional holdings without leaving the commune. 
Entrepreneurial individuals had a chance to open a store in the village, operate a windmill 
or a threshing machine, or simply live off interest on loans to fellow villagers. If they 
wanted to try a new crop or an advanced farming technique, they could do so on some of 
their non-communal lands. In some cases, a big household could arrange for one of the 
sons to separate and thus enjoy the advantage of both having an otrub on the side and 
maintaining communal benefits, particularly the right to common grazing of livestock.214 
     In many cases, it was not the most prosperous, but the poorest and smallest villages 
that requested village-wide consolidations. As a rule, these villages contained many 
failing households, with extremely small land holdings. Conversely, larger villages 
resisted land consolidation, because this would have made it inevitable for some 
households to accept a plot far away from their home. Many of those who consolidated 
their lands never completely cut off their ties with the commune. Wealthy peasants could 
accumulate large private land holdings by buying the consolidated plots from weaker 
farmers, but at the same preferred to retain their original communal allotments so they 
could continue to enjoy the right to common grazing. Overall, more than a half of the 
consolidators kept at least a portion of their communal allotments in order to remain 
eligible to communal benefits. Even more strikingly, neighboring individual farmers 
sometimes “simulated” communal arrangements by coordinating their sowing and 
farming operations so that to allow common herd grazing on the arable land. Many 
individual farmers continued to practice common grazing, subdivided their holdings into 
strips during family divisions, and even undertook land repartitions with their neighbors 
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as they had in the communes. One of the most devastating effects of forced privatization 
was the creation of a large amount of ineffective individual farms. Purchasers of 
consolidated plots often found themselves in a desperate situation when they realized 
that, even with the loans from the Peasant Land Bank, they lacked financial resources to 
relocate their dwellings, pay for their plots, and reorganize their farming operations at the 
same time.215  
     As we can see, substantial evidence corroborates Kovalevskii’s thesis that, due to its 
misplaced focus, the Stolypin land reform failed to reform Russian agriculture. Instead of 
addressing the numerous issues hindering economic improvement in the countryside, the 
Russian leadership concentrated its efforts on eliminating the village commune as the 
only source of peasant poverty and other rural problems. Ignoring the economic potential 
of the existing communal institutions, the government chose to destroy them.  
     Kovalevskii’s assessment of the Stolypin land reform fits in the concept of “repressive 
modernization” suggested by modern scholars.216 The tsarist government used the reform 
to strengthen the power of the state.  Moreover, the reform represented essentially a 
radical project of social engineering, an attempt to fashion a “well-ordered” peasant 
society according a preconceived plan of rural progress, a plan that was largely based on 
abstract economic theories and general cultural assumptions rather than on systematic 
empirical studies. In that respect, the reform represented an example of “administrative 
utopia,”217 based on the government's narrow—and in many respects utopian—vision of 
rural transformation, which inevitably resulted in its very limited practical impact on the 
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peasant economy. Its goal was not only to transform the rural economy but also to change 
peasants' mentality and value system. As Kovalevskii’s analysis has demonstrated, the 
Stolypin land reform failed to realize these goals. 
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                                                         Conclusion 
 
     Kovalevskii’s analysis demonstrates that, despite their ancient origins, both communal 
forms—the patriarchal family and the village commune—had survived well into the early 
twentieth century in Russia. Both types of the commune represented dynamic institutions 
that changed over time. Despite the predominance of collective elements, both the family 
commune and the village commune experienced the growth of individualism within their 
framework. The fundamental difference between them was that, while the family 
commune was rapidly decaying in post-Emancipation Russia, the village commune 
retained its social and economic viability and displayed the signs of significant economic 
potential. Kovalevskii criticized the authors of the Stolypin land reform for ignoring the 
evidence of the village commune’s capacity to contribute to economic progress and 
attempting to destroy communal institutions by legislative fiat. 
     Kovalevskii's scholarship deserves to be praised for its distinctly scientific qualities. 
His efforts to minimize political bias distinguished him strikingly from many other 
Russian thinkers. Unlike the majority of Russian intellectuals, he built up his theories not 
on political considerations but on a balanced, detailed, and meticulously documented 
study of social, political, and economic institutions. He therefore became one of the first 
Russian social scientists, in the true meaning of the word.  
     The scope of Kovalevskii's scholarship distinguished him as well. As a historian, he 
investigated a variety of political, social, economic, legal, and cultural issues. In addition, 
he was recognized as a prominent sociologist, political scientist, legal expert, 
anthropologist, and ethnographer. The geographical scope of his studies was also 
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impressive, as he was one of the first historians in Russia and Europe to use records and 
sources from virtually all continents and historical periods in his comparative and cross-
cultural research. In many cases, he worked with documents that had never attracted 
scholarly attention before. He pioneered the application of statistical techniques in 
historical research. Finally, he relied on his own ethnographic field work in his analysis.  
     Historians of Russia have long recognized the contributions of Vorontsov, Chuprov, 
Posnikov, Chelintsev, and Chaianov to our understanding of the peasant economy and 
culture. Kovalevskii's studies of the peasantry, however, remain largely unappreciated 
and misunderstood. Historians have particular difficulty conceptualizing and 
contextualizing Kovalevskii's views of the Russian village commune. They found it hard 
to reconcile his positivist belief in the universal laws of historical progress, according to 
which rural communes would inevitably decline and give way to private farms, with his 
criticism of Stolypin's attempts to destroy communal institutions in Russia. It seems 
contradictory that a convinced liberal and an advocate of private property rights such as 
Kovalevskii could oppose the land privatization reform and defend the traditional 
communal practices of Russian peasants.  
     This study has attempted to demonstrate that Kovalevskii's understanding of the 
Russian village commune remained remarkably consistent throughout his academic 
career. In accordance with the positivist idea of unilinear progress, he accepted the notion 
that private agriculture would eventually replace traditional collective farming 
everywhere in the world. Unlike many other positivists, however, he extended the 
concept of progress to include traditional communal institutions as well. In his 
comparative studies of communal forms, he argued that communal practices also changed 
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over time, progressing from simple forms to more complex and advanced ones. For 
Kovalevskii, adaptation and change constituted integral parts of the communal economy. 
At the time when Stolypin was attempting to destroy the village commune, it possessed a 
significant economic potential, which led Kovalevskii to conclude that it should have 
been supported, instead of being undermined, so that it could continue to contribute to 
economic progress in the Russian countryside. As paradoxical as it may seem, such an 
unconventional positivist analysis of agriculture remained consistent with Comte's well-
known contention that human societies develop from simple to more complex forms. The 
greater the complexity of social phenomena, the more they admit modification. Thus, 
Kovalevskii considered it perfectly logical to apply this developmental scheme to peasant 
societies and to assume that the village commune could also progress from simpler to 
more advanced forms.   
     Kovalevskii's analysis also challenged common assumptions about tradition and 
change, which are often regarded as antagonistic forces in the historical process. He was 
one of the first social scientists to argue that these two categories appear not as mutually 
exclusive but as inseparable and even complementary. In fact, they exist in a dialectical 
relationship, interacting permanently and beneficially. Tradition emerges not as 
anachronism or transmission of outdated knowledge but as the heritage that continues to 
hold value, as the collective wisdom of the past that has full contemporary legitimacy and 
relevance. Moreover, Kovalevskii stresses the adaptive and dynamic nature of traditional 
practices. Inherent in human history, change represents an integral part of traditional 
institutions, not just an attribute of modernity. 
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     Drawing on this notion of tradition and change, Kovalevskii urged Russian policy-
makers to move from a static vision of traditional peasant institutions to a more dynamic 
consideration of their social and economic potential. He repeatedly pointed to Stolypin's 
failure to recognize the innovative potential of the village commune, which, according to 
Kovalevskii, would inevitably lead to the failure to modernize Russia's agriculture. He 
warned the Russian government that it was making a fatal mistake by seeking to destroy 
traditional communal institutions instead of incorporating them into the reform process. 
As we have seen, such an interpretation of the “tradition versus innovation” dichotomy 
radically differed from the prevailing visions of progress among Kovalevskii's 
contemporaries. Remarkably, it anticipated the understanding of tradition and change that 
historians began articulating only in the last decades of the twentieth century. Recent 
studies of economic development in the Third-World countries have legitimized this 
analysis.218 The controversy continues until today, and the assertions that tradition and 
modernity are not necessarily conflicting forces are still being perceived by many as 
revisionist, if not revolutionary.  
     Kovalevskii defined the meanings of the “traditional” and the “modern” in their 
specific historical and cultural context. While acknowledging the theoretical validity of 
the “modern” notion of advantages of private over communal land ownership, he warned 
that this notion might be inapplicable to a particular situation in a particular society. The 
actual operations of both traditional and modern institutions varied significantly in 
different historical contexts. In early twentieth-century Russia, he argued, traditional 
communal institutions successfully adopted modern techniques, just as allegedly 
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“modern” private farms continued to hold to traditional practices. The imposition of 
“modern” private land tenure, he stressed, would not automatically elevate the economic 
efficiency of agricultural production to the “modern” level. 
     Kovalevskii arrived at such conclusions on the basis of empirical studies by Russian 
economists, agronomists, and zemstvo statisticians, as well as his own comparative 
historical research. This comparative approach not only determined his attitude toward 
the commune and the Stolypin land reform, but also confirmed his reservations about the 
positivist concept of unilinear progress. Although he agreed in principle with the general 
postulates of the evolutionary doctrine as outlined by Comte and Spencer, he emphasized 
great variations in the course and manifestations of progress in different societies 
depending on the political, socioeconomic, cultural, demographic, and environmental 
conditions. Aware of the increasing skepticism toward the positivist idea of progress 
among late nineteenth-century intellectuals, he in fact contributed to its criticisms and 
revisions. He regretted “the unfortunate dominance of the organic theory of society”219 
and criticized scholars who uncritically accepted the notion of unilinear evolution as 
taking place uniformly in all societies. Moreover, in his late works, he preferred to 
describe the historical process in terms of social change rather than social progress. In 
opposition to the widespread misconception that “evolution always tends to the cure of 
social ills and to the growth of public welfare,”220 he called for a broader and more 
particularistic understanding of historical progress than that of the founding fathers of 
positivism. As much as he admired England and its achievements, he rejected the idea 
that Russia should emulate English political and economic institutions. He encouraged 
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Russian leaders to learn important lessons from England's historical experience, 
especially from the mistakes of forcible enclosures, but insisted at the same time that it 
was primarily Russia's own historical and cultural context that determined what progress 
meant for Russian society.      
     These aspects of Kovalevskii's thought suggest a much more varied picture of 
positivism than it is commonly assumed. They allow us to speak of a variety of schools 
of thought within positivism. Characteristically, Kovalevskii himself never perceived 
positivism as a strict dogma but rather as a mode of thinking or a general intellectual 
orientation that could produce different intellectual results when applied to different 
phenomena. Positivist rationalism implied critical approach to any theory, including 
positivism itself, which justified its constant revisions and re-evaluations by positivist 
thinkers themselves, not only by its critics. In fact, as we know, positivist scholars 
differed greatly in their interpretations of the key concepts of positivism. Kovalevskii was 
no exception. The simplistic picture of positivism generated by its numerous critics does 
not reflect the complexity and diversity of positivist thought.  
     Kovalevskii's example challenges much of the conventional knowledge about Russian 
liberalism and its responses to social and economic problems in late imperial Russia. It is 
commonly believed that Russian liberal thinkers and politicians unconditionally 
supported land privatization as an essential component of rural modernization. Petr B. 
Struve and Boris N. Chicherin, for example, enthusiastically advocated the destruction of 
peasant communal institutions. The case of Kovalevskii, however, demonstrates that 
liberal visions of rural modernization were much more nuanced. His liberal convictions 
did not prevent him from criticizing the Russian government for attempting to impose 
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private landownership by legislative fiat. As we have seen, he repeatedly emphasized that 
the accelerated destruction of the village commune would result in the massive 
impoverishment of the peasantry and, instead of promoting stability, would lead to a 
nation-wide social and economic crisis. 
     Because of such assertions, which diverged from classical liberal thought, one might 
reasonably doubt Kovalevskii's commitment to liberalism. In fact, some scholars have 
stressed the importance of populist and Marxist ideas in shaping his critique of the 
Stolypin land reform.221 A close look at his European contemporaries, however, reveals 
that such views were becoming increasingly common among liberal thinkers and 
politicians of that time. They reflected the transition in late nineteenth-century European 
liberal thought from laissez-faire capitalism to more socially-oriented strategies of 
economic development. The mounting social problems caused by the Industrial 
Revolution prompted European liberals to favor the welfare state. This new type of 
liberalism recognized the importance of a more balanced distribution of wealth as a 
guarantor of stability in a democratic society. Disturbed by the prospect of revolution and 
the proliferation of radical political ideologies, new liberals considered economic security 
for the poor essential to maintaining the peaceful course of the political and economic 
progress of European nations. In Germany, a group of scholars known as “academic 
socialists” (Kathedersozialisten) justified government regulation of the economy as a 
means of promoting social justice. One of the most respected economists of that period, 
Émile de Laveleye, argued that unregulated markets fostered extreme social 
differentiation and thus posed a threat to political stability and the advance of freedom in 
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Western societies. John Stuart Mill, to whom Laveleye dedicated his most influential 
book, endorsed this argument.222  
     It was in the context of the new liberalism that Kovalevskii criticized Stolypin for his 
socially irresponsible agrarian policy, which essentially prescribed economic disaster for 
millions of peasants. Urging the government to devise more socially-oriented strategies 
of rural development, he pointed to the lesson of the French Revolution which, in his 
opinion, could have been prevented if the French monarchy had been more sensitive to 
the economic demands of the rural population. In his magisterial four-volume study, The 
Origins of Contemporary Democracy (1895-1897), Kovalevskii argued that the failure of 
the French ancien régime to resolve the pressing social and economic problems of the 
peasantry had led to the outbreak of the French Revolution. The Russian monarchy, he 
maintained, was paving the way for the same catastrophic scenario by implementing a 
radical land privatization program that would sanction the immiseration of the peasant 
masses. 
     Kovalevskii's analysis of the peasant commune also appears to be remarkably relevant 
to contemporary debates about the nature of the peasant economy. Both scholars and 
policy-makers continue to debate this issue today, particularly in regard to the ongoing 
land reforms in Russia and in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Two major schools of 
thought dominate scholarly discourse today. Following Chaianov, James C. Scott and 
Teodor Shanin emphasize the predominance of subsistence priorities in the peasant 
economy, which they describe as a peculiar type of the so-called “moral economy” with 
its own rationality, distinct from the rationality of capitalist market relations. According 
to this view, the primary goal of peasants' economic activities is to satisfy the 
                                                 
222 See Kingston-Mann, In Search, 117, 121-123, 139. 
 134  
consumption needs of the household and to avoid the risks associated with market-
oriented production, particularly the risks of specialization and experimentation.223 By 
contrast, Samuel L. Popkin and his followers assert that the peasants' economic behavior 
is often just as rational as that of capitalist entrepreneurs. In Popkin's opinion, peasants 
operate according to capitalist logic because they seek to maximize productivity and 
profitability of their labor.224   
     Kovalevskii's scholarship provides us with evidence that both aspects—subsistence 
needs and productivity-maximizing efforts—characterize peasants' economic behavior. 
Paradoxically, it took several decades for scholars to recognize the idea of the duality of 
the peasant economy. Sadly, Kovalevskii's insights did not contribute to this recognition, 
they remained largely ignored in the Soviet period. 
     The first discussions of the dual nature of the peasant economy appeared in academic 
journals devoted to peasant studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. George Dalton, for 
example, was one of the first scholars to mention the presence of both subsistence and 
market production in peasant economies.225 More recently, scholars have begun 
systematic empirical studies of the plurality of economic rationalities and productive 
relations within peasant communities around the world. Victoria Bernal, for example, has 
found evidence of the intertwining of market and non-market relations in modern African 
rural communities. According to her, peasants respond to market conditions by their 
involvement in off-farm work, particularly wage work, and participation in food markets. 
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Subsistence production, although not driven by the profit motive, becomes increasingly 
dependent on the operation of labor and food markets.226 A growing body of literature 
suggests that non-market transactions characterize productive exchanges within the 
village, while market relations link peasants to the larger economic system of which they 
are a part. In light of these contemporary discussions, Kovalevskii's insights appear to be 
particularly noteworthy.  
     Regarding the complexity of peasant society, another important historical parallel 
could be made. Although there is no indication that Kovalevskii ever met Ferdinand 
Tönnies or was familiar with his works, we can see clear similarities in their visions of 
peasant life and culture. Tönnies described pre-industrial communities as dominated by 
Gemeinschaft type of relations but also containing elements of Gesellschaft. Likewise, 
Kovalevskii demonstrated the coexistence of tradition and collectivism with growing 
individualism and modern rationality within the Russian village. This is an important 
reminder to those present-day scholars who tend to define societies in the framework of 
either the Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft paradigm.227 It should be noted that Kovalevskii 
avoided the extremes of such “either-or” thinking and offered a balanced and nuanced 
analysis of peasant communities.  
     Kovalevskii urged scholars to refrain from simplistic interpretations of the peasant 
economy and warned them of the dangers of what Esther Kingston-Mann called “strictly 
dichotomized thinking”228 and what Robert Allen defined as “agrarian 
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fundamentalism.”229 He cautioned that contradistinctions between private and collective 
practices, as well as their supposed advantages, might not be as clear-cut as many tended 
to think. In the context of the Russian village commune, collective and individualistic 
elements complemented rather than contradicted each other. 
     While the elitist ideas of Auguste Comte encouraged Russian intellectuals and 
politicians to assume the role of missionaries to the allegedly “backward” peasants, 
Kovalevskii urged them to abandon their intellectual arrogance toward peasants and to 
recognize the peasants' capacity and willingness to improve and innovate. Kovalevskii 
recognized the civilizing and enlightening mission of intellectual and political elites, but 
at the same time he stressed that peasants could actively contribute to social and 
economic progress in Russia. The village commune, he believed, was capable of 
generating from within itself the impulse to change. He argued for projects of economic 
reform that would recognize the significance of the peasants' expertise, as well as 
peasants' real—not imagined—interests and needs.  
     Only recently, historians of Russia have begun to focus their attention on the active 
role of the peasantry in shaping rural modernization. Remarkably, Kovalevskii attempted 
to draw scholarly attention to this issue more than a century ago. His analysis challenges 
us to revise our understanding of the logic and dynamic of social and economic change. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
229 Allen, Enclosure. 
 137  
                                                          Bibliography 
 
                                                     1. Primary sources 
 
                                                 1.1 Kovalevskii's works 
                                           
Kovalevskii, Maksim M. Angliiskaia konstitutsiia i eia istorik. Moscow: Izd. A.L. 
     Vasil’eva, 1880. 
 
--------.  Ekonomicheskii rost Evropy do vozniknoveniia kapitalisticheskogo khoziaistva. 3  
     vols. Moscow: Tipo-litografiia V. Rikhter, 1898. 
 
--------. Ekonomicheskii stroi Rossii. St. Petersburg: Izd. A.V. Ermolaevoi, 1900. 
 
--------. “Evoliutsiia sobstvennosti: istoricheskii perekhod ot kollektivnykh form  
     zemlevladeniia k chastnoi sobstvennosti.” Vestnik vsemirnoi istorii no. 3 (1900): 85- 
     124. 
 
--------. Istoriia politseiskoi administratsii i politseiskogo suda v angliiskikh grafstvakh, s  
     drevneishikh vremen do smerti Eduarda III-go: k voprosu o vozniknovenii mestnogo 
     samoupravleniia v Angliii. Prague: Tip. V. Nagela, 1877. 
 
--------. Istoriko-sravnitel’nyi metod v iurisprudentsii i priemy izucheniia istorii prava. 
      Moscow: Tip. F.B. Millera, 1880.  
 
--------. “Le passage historique de la propriété collective a la propriété individuelle.”  
     Annales de l'Institut Internationale de Sociologie 2 (1895): 175-230. 
 
--------. Le Regime Économique de la Russie. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1898. 
 
--------. Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia: The Ilchester lectures for 1889-90.  
     London: David Nutt, 1891. 
 
--------. Obshchestvennyi stroi Anglii v kontse srednikh vekov. Moscow, 1880. 
 
--------. Obshchii khod razvitiia politicheskoi mysli vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka. St.  
     Petersburg: Tip. Al’tshullera, 1905. 
 
--------. “Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie na Zapade.” Vestnik Evropy no. 3 (1909): 196-216. 
 
--------. Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie, prichiny, khod i posledstviia ego razlozheniia. Part 
1. Moscow: Tip. F.B. Millera, 1879. 
 
--------. Ocherk po istorii raspadeniia obshchinnogo zemlevladeniia v kantone Baadt.  
     London, 1876. 
 
 138  
--------. Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia i razvitiia sem'i i sobstvennosti. St. Petersburg: Tip. 
     Iu.N. Erlikh, 1895. 
 
--------. Ocherki po istorii politicheskikh uchrezhdenii v Rossii. St. Petersburg: Izd. N. 
     Glagoleva, 1905. 
 
--------. Pervobytnoe pravo. 2 vols. Moscow: Izd. A.I. Mamontova, 1886. 
 
--------. “Pozemel’naia politika severoamerikantsev.” Russkaia mysl’ no. 4 (1883): 152- 
     194. 
 
--------. “Prichiny obezzemelivaniia krest’ian v Anglii.” Vestnik Evropy no. 4 (1909):  
     758-770. 
 
--------. Proiskhozhdenie sovremennoi demokratii. 4 vols. Moscow: Izd. A.I. Mamontova, 
     1895-1897. 
 
--------. Proiskhozhdenie melkoi krest’ianskoi sobstvennosti vo Frantsii. St. Petersburg: 
     Tip. M.M. Stasiulevicha, 1912. 
 
--------. “Proshloe i nastoiashchee krest'ianskogo zemleustroistva.” Vestnik Evropy no. 5 
     (1911): 234-264. 
 
--------. Razvitie narodnogo khoziaistva v Zapadnoi Evrope. St. Petersburg: Izd. F.  
     Pavlenkova, 1899. 
 
--------. Rodovoi byt v nastoiashchem, nedavnem i otdalennom proshlom: Opyty v oblasti  
     sravnitel'noi etnografii i istorii prava. 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Tip. Brokgauz- 
     Efron, 1905. 
 
--------. Russian Political Institutions: The Growth and Development of These Institutions 
     from the Beginnings of Russian History to the Present Time. Chicago: University of  
     Chicago Press, 1902. 
 
--------. Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh. St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 1997. 
 
--------. Sotsiologiia. St. Petersburg: Tip. M.M. Stasiulevicha, 1910. 
 
--------. Sovremennye sotsiologi. St. Petersburg: L.F. Panteleev, 1905. 
  
--------. Sovremennyi obychai i drevnii zakon: obychnoe pravo osetin v istoriko- 
     sravnitel’nom osveshchenii. 2 vols. Moscow: Tip. V. Gatsuk, 1886. 
 
--------. “Spor o sel’skoi obshchine v komissii Gosudarstvennogo soveta.” Vestnik  
     Evropy no. 1 (1910): 259-84. 
 
 139  
 
--------. “Sud’by obshinnogo zemlevladeniia v nashei verkhnei palate.” Vestnik Evropy  
     no. 6 (1910): 58-81. 
 
--------. Zakon i obychai na Kavkaze. 2 vols. Moscow: Tip. A.I. Mamontova, 1890. 
 
 
                                          1.2 Russian-language sources 
 
Arsen'ev, Konstantin K., and others. Intelligentsiia v Rossii: sbornik statei. St.  
     Petersburg: Knigoizdatel'stvo “Zemlia”, 1910. 
 
Bazhaev, Boris G. Travopol’noe khoziaistvo v nechernozemnoi polose Evropeiskoi  
     Rossii. St. Petersburg, 1903. 
 
Bervi, Nikolai. “Sokhranitsia li obshchinnoe vladenie?” Otechestvennye zapiski no. 1 
     (1877): 213-38. 
 
Brutskus, Boris D. Zemleustroistvo i rasselenie za granitsei i v Rossii. Moscow, 1908. 
 
Chernov, Viktor M. K voprosu o kapitalizme i krest'ianstve. Moscow, 1904. 
 
Chernyshev, Illarion V. Agrarno-krest'ianskaia politika Rossii za 150 let. Petrograd: Tip. 
     Ministerstva putei soobshcheniia, 1918. 
 
--------. Krest'iane ob obshchine nakanune 9 noiabria 1906 g. St. Petersburg: Severnaia  
     pechatnia, 1912. 
 
--------. Obshchina posle 9 noiabria 1906 g. Petrograd: Vol’noe ekonomicheskoe 
     obshchestvo, 1917. 
 
Chicherin, Boris N. Sobstvennost’ i gosudarstvo. 2 vols. Moscow: Tip. Martynova, 1882- 
     1883. 
 
Chuprov, Aleksandr I. Agrarnaia reforma i ee veroiatnoe vliianie na  
     sel’skokhoziaistvennoe proizvodstvo. Moscow: Izd. E.V. Kozhevnikovoi i E.A.  
     Kolomiitsevoi, 1906. 
 
--------. Krest'ianskii vopros: stat’i 1900-1908 godov. Moscow: Izd. M. i S.  
     Sabashnikovykh, 1909. 
 
--------. Po povodu ukaza 9 noiabria 1906 g. Moscow: Izd. M. i S. Sabashnikovykh,  
     1908. 
 
--------. Rechi i stat'i. 2 vols Moscow: Izd. M. i S. Sabashnikovykh, 1909. 
 
 140  
Chuprov, Aleksandr I., and Aleksandr S. Posnikov, eds. Vliianie urozhaev i khlebnykh  
     tsen na nekotorye storony narodnogo khoziaistva. 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Tip. V. 
     Kirshbauma, 1897.  
 
Daniel'son, Nikolai F. Ocherki nashego poreformennogo khoziaistva. St. Petersburg,  
     1893. 
 
De-Roberti, Evgeniy V., Iurii S. Gambarov, and Maksim M. Kovalevskii, eds. Russkaia 
     Vysshaia Shkola obshchestvennykh nauk v Parizhe: lektsii professorov R.V.Sh.o.n. v  
     Parizhe. St. Petersburg: Tip. Al'tshulera, 1905.  
 
Dzhivilegov, Aleksei K., and others, eds. Velikaia reforma: Russkoe obshchestvo i 
     krest'ianskii vopros v proshlom i nastoiashchem. 6 vols. Moscow: Izd. I.D. Sytina,  
     1911. 
 
Efimenko, Aleksandra Ia. Issledovaniia narodnoi zhizni. 2 vols. Moscow: Izd. V.I. 
     Kasperova, 1884. 
 
Engel'gardt, Aleksandr N. Iz derevni: 12 pisem, 1872-1887. St. Petersburg: Izd. A.S.  
     Suvorina, 1897. 
 
Ermolov, Aleksei S. Nash zemel'nyi vopros. St. Petersburg: Tip. V. Kirshbauma, 1906. 
 
Gertsenshtein, Mikhail Ia. Agrarnyi vopros v programmakh razlichnykh partii. Moscow: 
     Izd. red. Vestnik sel’skogo khoziaistva, 1906. 
 
Gurko, Vladimir I. Ustoi narodnogo khoziaistva Rossii: agrarno-ekonomicheskie etiudy.  
     St. Petersburg: Tip. A.S. Suvorina, 1902. 
 
Kablukov, Nikolai A. Ob usloviiakh razvitiia krest'ianskogo khoziaistva v Rossii.  
     Moscow: Izd. magazina Knizhnoe delo, 1899. 
 
Kareev, Nikolai I. “Zametka o raspadenii pozemel'noi obshchiny na Zapade.” Znanie no.  
     4 (1876): 1-14.  
 
Kaufman, Aleksandr A. Obshchina i uspekhi sel'skogo khoziaistva v Sibiri. Tomsk: Izd.  
     P.I. Makushina, 1894. 
 
--------. Russkaia obshchina v protsesse ee zarozhdeniia i rosta. Moscow: Izd. T-va I.D.  
     Sytina, 1908. 
 
Kavelin, Konstantin D. Krest'ianskii vopros: issledovanie o znachenii u nas  
     krest'ianskogo dela, prichinakh ego upadka, i merakh k podniatiiu sel'skogo     
     khoziaistva i byta poselian. St. Petersburg: Izd-vo Stasiulevicha, 1882. 
 
 
 141  
Kofod, Andrei A. Bor'ba s cherezpolositsei v Rossii i za granitsei. St. Petersburg: Tip. 
     A.S. Suvorina, 1906. 
 
--------. Russkoe zemleustroistvo. St. Petersburg: Tip. V.F. Kirshbauma, 1913. 
 
Koshelev, Aleksandr I. “Obshchinnoe pozemel’noe vladenie.” Sel’skoe blagoustroistvo  
     no. 8 (1858): 107-113. 
 
--------. Ob obshchinnom zemlevladenii v Rossii. Berlin: B. Behr, 1875. 
 
Leontovich, Fedor I. Drevnee khorvato-dalmatskoe zakonodatel’stvo. Odessa: Tip. G. 
     Ul’rikha, 1868. 
 
Luchitskii, Ivan V. “Pozemel’naia obshchina v Pireneiakh.” Otechestvennye zapiski no. 
     9, 10, 11 (1883). 
 
Manuilov, Aleksandr A. Pozemel'nyi vopros v Rossii. Moscow: Tip. O.L. Samovoi, 1905.  
 
Maslov, Petr P. Agrarnyi vopros v Rossii. 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Tip. T-va  
     Obshchestvennaia pol’za, 1906. 
 
Oganovskii, Nikolai P. Individualizatsiia zemlevladeniia i eia posledstviia. Moscow:  
     Zadruga, 1917. 
 
Orshanskii, Il’ia G. Issledovanie po russkomu pravu obychnomu i brachnomu. St.  
     Petersburg: Tip. A.E. Landau, 1879. 
 
Pakhman, Semen V. Obychnoe grazhdanskoe pravo v Rossii. 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Tip. 
     Vtorogo Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E.I.V. Kantselarii, 1877-79. 
 
Posnikov, Aleksandr S. Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie. Iaroslavl': Tip. G. Fal’k, 1875. 
 
Samokvasov, Dmitrii Ia. Istoriia russkogo prava. 3 vols. Warsaw: Tip. M. Zemkevicha i 
     V. Noakovskogo, 1888-96.  
 
Savin, Aleksandr N. “Russkie razrushiteli obshchiny i angliiskie ogorazhivateli.”  
     Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik no. 2 (1909): 38-51. 
 
Semevskii, Vasilii I. Krest'ianskii vopros v Rossii v XVIII i pervoi polovine XIX veka. 2  
     vols. St. Petersburg: Tip. T-va Obshchestvennaia pol’za, 1888. 
 
Skaldin (Fedor P. Elenev). V zakholust’i i v stolitse. St. Petersburg: Tip. Imperatorskoi 
     akademii nauk, 1870. 
 
Sokolovskii, Pavel A. “O prichinakh raspadeniia pozemel'noi obshchiny.” Slovo no. 10  
     (1887): 139-45. 
 142  
 
--------. Ocherk istorii sel'skoi obshchiny na Severe Rossii. St. Petersburg: Tip. V.F. 
     Demakova, 1877.  
 
Stolypin, Dmitrii A. Uchenie Konta i primenenie ego k resheniiu voprosa ob organizatsii 
     zemel'noi sobstvennosti. Moscow, 1891. 
 
Stolypin, Petr A. Nam nuzhna Velikaia Rossiia: polnoe sobranie rechei v 
     Gosudarstvennoi Dume i Gosudarstvennom Sovete: 1906-1911. Moscow: Molodaia  
     gvardiia, 1991. 
 
Struve, Petr B. Kriticheskie zametki k voprosu ob ekonomicheskom razvitii Rossii. St. 
     Petersburg: Tip. I.N. Skorokhodova, 1894. 
 
Uspenskii, Gleb I. Vlast’ zemli: ocherki i rasskazy, 1882-1883. Moscow: Izd-vo AN  
     SSSR, 1949. 
 
Vitte, Sergei Iu. Zapiska po krest'ianskomu delu. St. Petersburg: Tip. V.F. Kirshbauma, 
     1904. 
 
Vorontsov, Vasilii V. Progressivnye techeniia v krest'ianskom khoziaistve. St.  
     Petersburg: Tipografiia I.N. Skorokhodova, 1892. 
 
Zigel’, Fedor F. Zakonnik Stefana Dushana. St. Petersburg: Tip. T-va Obshchestvennaia  
     pol’za, 1872. 
 
 
                                         1.3 Non-Russian-language sources 
 
Bachofen, Johann J. Das Mutterrecht. Stuttgart: Krais & Hoffman, 1861. 
 
Bogišić, Valtasar. Pravni običaji u slovena: privatno pravo. Zagreb: D. Albrecht, 1867. 
 
--------. Zbornik sadašnjih pravnih običaja u južnih slovena. Zagreb: D. Albrecht, 1874. 
 
Engels, Friedriech. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State in the Light  
     of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan. New York: International Publishers, 1942. 
 
--------. The Peasant War in Germany. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
     1956. 
 
Freeman, Edward A. Comparative Politics: Six Lectures Read before the Royal  
     Institution in January and February, 1873, with the Unity of History, the Rede Lecture  
     Read before the University of Cambridge, May 29, 1872. New York: Macmillan and  
     Company, 1874. 
 
 143  
Fustel de Coulanges, Numa D. The Origin of Property in Land. London: George Allen & 
     Unwin Ltd., 1927. 
 
--------. Recherches sur quelques problèmes d’histoire. Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1885. 
 
Haxthausen, August F. von. Studien uber die inneren Zustände, das Volksleben und  
     insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands. 3 vols. Hannover: Hahn'sche  
     Buchhandlung, 1847. In English, Studies on the Interior of Russia. Chicago:  
     University of Chicago Press, 1972. 
 
Herzen, Alexander I. My Past and Thoughts: The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen. 4 vols. 
     New York: Knopf, 1968. 
 
Keussler, Johannes von. Zur Geschichte und Kritik des bäuerlichen Gemeindebesitzes in  
     Russland. 3 vols. Riga: J. Deubner, 1876-1887. 
 
Kofod, Alexander A. My Share in the Stolypin Agrarian Reforms. Translated by Bend 
     Jensen. Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 1985. 
 
Kraus, Friedrich S. Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven. Vienna: A. Hölder, 1885. 
 
Le Play, Frédéric. Les ouvriers européens: études sur les travaux, la vie domestique et la 
     condition morale des populations ouvrières de l'Europe. Paris: Imprimerie impériale,  
     1855. 
 
Letourneau, Charles. Property: Its Origin and Development. London: Walter Scott Press,  
     1901. 
 
Lubbock, John. The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man. London:  
     Longmans, Green, and Co., 1870. 
 
Maine, Henry S. Ancient Law, Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and Its 
     Relation to Modern Ideas. London: J. Murray, 1861; reprint, Tucson, Ariz.: University  
     of Arizona Press, 1986. 
 
--------. Village Communities in the East and West. London: J. Murray, 1871. 
 
--------. Lectures on the Early History of Institutions. London: J. Murray, 1875. 
 
--------. Dissertations on Early Law and Custom. London: J. Murray, 1883. 
 
Maitland, Frederic W. Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of  
     England. London, 1897; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921. 
 
Maurer, Georg R. von. Einleitung zur Geschichte der Mark-, Hof-, Dorf-, und Stadt- 
     Verfassung und öffentlichen Gewalt. Munich: Kaiser, 1854. 
 144  
 
McLennan, John F. The Patriarchal Theory. London: Macmillan and Co., 1885. 
 
Meitzen, August. Siedlung und Agrarwesen der Westgermanen und Ostgermanen, der  
     Kelten, Römer, Finnen und Slaven. Berlin: W. Hertz, 1895. 
 
Morgan, Lewis H. Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from 
     Savagery , through Barbarism to Civilization. London: Macmillan and Co., 1877;  
     reprint,  Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1964. 
 
Nasse, Erwin. On the Agricultural Community of the Middle Ages and Inclosures of the 
     Sixteenth Century in England. London: Macmillan, 1871. 
 
Pollock, Frederick. The Land Laws. London: Macmillan and Co., 1883. 
 
Probyn, J.W., ed. Systems of Land Tenure in Various Countries: A Series of Essays  
     Published under the Sanction of the Cobden Club. London: Cassell, Petter, Galpin & 
     Co., 1881. 
 
Ross, Denman W. The Early History of Land-Holding among the Germans. Boston:  
     Soule and Bugbee, 1883. 
 
Seebohm, Frederic. Customary Acres and Their Historical Importance. London:  
     Longmans, Green and Co., 1914. 
 
--------. The English Village Community Examined in Its Relations to the Manorial & 
      Tribal Systems and to the Common or Open Field System of Husbandry: An Essay in 
      Economic History. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883. 
 
Tylor, Edward B. Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology,  
     Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom. London: J. Murray, 1871. 
 
Utesenović, O.M. Die Hauskommunion der Südslaven. Vienna, 1859. 
 
Vinogradoff, Paul. English Society in the Eleventh Century: Essays in English Medieval  
     History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908. 
 
--------. The Growth of the Manor. 2d revised ed. London, 1911; reprint, New York: Burt  
     Franklin, 1951. 
 
--------. Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence. Vol. 1, Introduction, Tribal Law. London:  
     Oxford University Press, 1920. 
 
--------. The Russian Problem. London: Constable and Company, 1914. 
 
 
 145  
--------. Villainage in England: Essays in English Medieval History. Oxford: Clarendon 
     Press, 1892. 
  
Wallace, Donald M. Russia on the Eve of War and Revolution. Princeton: Princeton  
     University Press, 1961. 
 
 
                                                 2. Secondary sources 
 
Adams, Arthur E. Imperial Russia after 1861: Peaceful Modernization or Revolution? 
     Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965. 
 
Afanas'ev, Iurii N., and N. A. Ivnitskii. Derevnia v nachale veka: revoliutsiia i reforma.  
     Moscow: Rossiiskii gos. gumanitarnyi universitet, 1995. 
 
Aiatskov, Dmitrii F., ed. Sobstvennost' na zemliu v Rossii: istoriia i sovremennost'.  
     Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002. 
 
Aleksandrov, Vadim A. Obychnoe pravo krepostnoi derevni Rossii, XVIII—nachalo XIX  
     v. Moscow: Nauka, 1984. 
 
--------. Sel'skaia obshchina v Rossii (XVII—nachalo XIX v.) Moscow: Nauka, 1976. 
 
--------. “Semeino-imushchestvennye otnosheniia po obychnomu pravu v russkoi  
     krepostnoi derevne XVIII—nachale XIX veka.” Istoriia SSSR no. 6 (1979): 37-54. 
 
--------. “Tipologiia russkoi krest'ianskoi sem'i v epokhu feodalizma.” Istoriia SSSR no. 3 
     (1981): 78-96. 
 
Alekseev, V.V. and others, eds. Sobstvennost' v XX stoletii. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001. 
 
Allen, Robert. Enclosure and the Yeoman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Alpatov, Mikhail A. Politicheskie idei frantsuzskoi burzhuaznoi istoriografii XIX veka.  
     Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1949. 
 
Anderson, J.L. Explaining Long-Term Economic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge  
     University Press, 1995. 
 
Andrle, Vladimir. A Social History of Twentieth-Century Russia. London: Edward  
     Arnold, 1994. 
 
Anfimov, Andrei M. Krest'ianskoe khoziaistvo Evropeiskoi Rossii, 1881-1904. Moscow:  
     Nauka, 1980. 
 
--------. “Neokonchennye spory.” Voprosy istorii no. 6 (1997). 
 146  
 
--------. P.A. Stolypin i rossiiskoe krest'ianstvo. Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN,  
     2002. 
 
Anfimov, Andrei M., and I.F. Makarov. Dinamika zemlevladeniia v Rossii, 1906-1914  
     gg. Moscow: Nauka, 1989. 
 
Anfimov, Andrei M., and Pavel N. Zyrianov. “Elements of the Evolution of the Russian  
     Peasant Land Commune in the Post-Reform Period (1861-1914).” Soviet Studies in  
     History 21 (Winter 1982-83): 68-96. 
 
Ascher, Abraham. P.A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia.  
     Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
--------. The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray. Stanford: Stanford University Press,  
     1988. 
 
Astill, Grenville, and John Langdon, eds. Medieval Farming and Technology: The Impact  
     of Agricultural Change in Northwest Europe. Leiden: Brill, 1997. 
 
Aston, T.H., ed. Landlords, Peasants, and Politics in Medieval England. Cambridge:  
     Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
 
Atkinson, Dorothy. The End of the Russian Land Commune, 1905-1930. Stanford:  
     Stanford University Press, 1983. 
 
--------. “The Statistics on the Russian Land Commune, 1905-1917.” Slavic Review 32  
     (Winter 1973): 773-87. 
 
--------. “The Zemstvo and the Peasantry.” In The Zemstvo in Russia, ed. Terence  
     Emmons and Wayne Vucinich, 79-132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
     1982.  
 
Attir, Mustafa O., Burkart Holzner, and Zdenek Suda, eds. Directions of Change:  
     Modernization Theory, Research, and Realities. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,  
     1981. 
 
Avrekh, Aron Ia. P.A. Stolypin i sud'by reform v Rossii. Moscow: Izd-vo politicheskoi  
     literatury, 1991. 
 
--------. Stolypin i Tret'ia Duma. Moscow: Nauka, 1968. 
 
Baker, Alan R.H., and Robin A. Butlin, eds. Studies of Field Systems in the British Isles. 
     Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.  
 
 
 147  
Baker, Anita. “Community and Growth: Muddling Through with Russian Credit  
     Cooperatives.” Journal of Ecocomic History 37 (March 1977): 139-60.  
 
Balkanova, E.N. Krest'ianskii dvor i obshchina na russkom Severe (konets XVII— 
     nachalo XVIII v.) Moscow: Nauka, 1976.   
 
Balzer, Marjorie M., ed. Russian Traditional Culture: Religion, Gender, and Customary  
     Law. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992. 
 
Barnes, Harry E. Historical Sociology: Its Origins and Development: Theories of Social  
     Evolution from Cave Life to Atomic Bombing. New York: Philosophical Library,  
     1948. 
 
--------.  A History of Historical Writing. 2d revised ed. New York: Dover Publications,  
     1962. 
 
--------, ed. An Introduction to the History of Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago 
      Press, 1948.  
 
Bartlett, Roger P., ed. Land Commune and Peasant Community in Russia: Communal  
     Forms in Imperial and Early Soviet History. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 
 
--------, ed. Russian Thought and Society 1800-1917: Essays in Honor of Eugene  
     Lampert. Keele: University of Keele Press, 1984. 
 
Bater, James H., and R.A. French, eds. Studies in Russian Historical Geography. 2 vols.  
     New York: Academic Press, 1983. 
 
Belikhin, V.G. Reformirovanie zemel'nykh otnoshenii v Rossii v XIX—XX vv. Moscow:  
     Belikhin, 2000. 
 
Bernal, Victoria. “Peasants, Capitalism, and (Ir)Rationality.” American Ethnologist 21,  
     no. 4 (1994): 792-810. 
 
Bethell, Tom. The Noblest Triumph: Property and Prosperity through the Ages. New  
     York: St. Martin's Press, 1998. 
 
Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture.  
     New York: Random House, 1970. 
 
Black, Cyril E., ed. Comparative Modernization: A Reader. New York: Free Press, 1976. 
 
--------. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. New York: 
     Harper & Row, 1966. 
 
 
 148  
--------,ed. The Modernization of Japan and Russia: A Comparative Study. New York:  
     Free Press, 1975. 
 
--------, ed. The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change since 1861.  
     Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. 
 
Bloch, Marc. Land and Work in Medieval Europe. Berkeley: University of California  
     Press, 1967. 
 
--------. Les caractéres originaux de l'histoire rurale française. Oslo, 1931. English  
     translation: French Rural History: An Essay on Its Basic Characteristics. Berkeley:  
     University of California Press, 1966. 
 
Blum, Jerome. The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe. Princeton: Princeton  
     University Press, 1978.  
 
--------. “The European Village as Community.” Agricultural History 45 (Spring 1971):  
     157-178. 
 
--------. Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century. New York:  
     Atheneum, 1968. 
 
Bohac, Rodney D. “Peasant Inheritance Strategies in Russia.” Journal of  
     Interdisciplinary History 16 (Summer 1985): 23-42. 
 
Borodin, Anatolii P. Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Rossii (1906-1917). Kirov: Viatka, 1999. 
 
Boronoev, Aleksandr O., ed. M.M. Kovalevskii v istorii rossiiskoi sotsiologii i  
     obshchestvennoi mysli: sbornik statei: k 145-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia M.M.  
     Kovalevskogo. St. Petersburg: Izd-vo S.-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 1996. 
 
--------, ed. Maksim Kovalevskii i sovremennaia obshchestvennaia mysl’: s 150-letiiu so  
     dnia rozhdeniia M. M. Kovalevskogo: tezisy dokladov nauchnoi konferentsii 20-21  
     sentiabria 2001 g. St. Petersburg: Sotsiologicheskoe obshchestvo im. M.M.  
     Kovalevskogo, 2001. 
 
Boserup, Ester. The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. New York: Aldine, 1982. 
 
Bradley, Joseph. Muzhik and Muscovite: Urbanization in Late Imperial Russia. Berkeley, 
     Calif.: University of California Press, 1985. 
 
Brint, S. “Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community  
     Concept.” Sociological Theory 19 (March 2001): 1-23. 
 
Brooks, Jeffrey. When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-  
     1917. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 
 149  
 
Brower, Daniel. The Russian City Between Tradition and Modernity, 1850-1900.  
     Berkeley.: University of California Press, 1990. 
 
Bryan, Enoch A. The Mark in Europe and America: A Review of the Discussion on Early  
     Land Tenure. Boston: Ginn & Company, 1893. 
 
Bryant, Christopher G.A. Positivism in Social Theory and Research. New York: St.  
     Martin’s Press, 1985. 
 
Burds, Jeffrey. Peasant Dreams & Market Politics: Labor Migration and the Russian  
     Village, 1861-1905. Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. 
 
Burguiere, Andre and others, eds. A History of the Family. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.:  
     Belknap Press, 1996. 
 
Burke, Peter. History and Social Theory. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992. 
 
Burrow, John W. The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914. New Haven,  
     Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. 
 
--------. Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory. Cambridge:  
     Cambridge University Press, 1966. 
 
--------. A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past. Cambridge:  
     Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
 
Buzeskul, V. Vseobshchaia istoriia i ee predstaviteli v Rossii v XIX i nachale XX veka.  
     Leningrad: Izd. Akademii nauk SSSR, 1929. 
 
Byrnes, Robert F. Communal Families in the Balkans: The Zadruga. Notre Dame, Ind.: 
     University of Notre Dame Press, 1976. 
 
Camic, Charles, ed. Reclaiming the Sociological Classics: The State of Scholarship.  
     Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997. 
 
Carneiro, Robert L. Evolutionism in Cultural Anthropology: A Critical History. Boulder,  
     Colo.: Westview Press, 2003. 
 
Chayanov, Aleksander V. The Theory of Peasant Economy. Homewood, Ill.: R.D. Irwin, 
     1966. 
 
Childe, V. Gordon. Social Evolution. London: Watts & Co., 1951. 
 
Christian, David. Imperial and Soviet Russia: Power, Privilege and the Challenge of  
     Modernity. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. 
 150  
 
Christoff, Peter. “A.S. Khomiakov on the Agricultural and Industrial Problem in Russia.”  
     In Essays in Russian History, ed. A. Fergusson and A. Levin. Hamden, Conn.: Archon  
     Books, 1964. 
 
Clements, Barbara E., Barbara A. Engel, Christine D. Worobec, eds. Russia's Women:  
     Accomodation, Resistance, Transformation. Berkeley, Calif.: University of Califonia  
     Press, 1991.  
 
Clowes, Edith W., Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West, eds. Between Tsar and  
     People: Educated Society and the Quest for Identity in Late Imperial Russia.  
     Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 
Coleman, D.C. History and the Economic Past: An Account of the Rise and Decline of  
     Economic History in Britain. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 
 
Collini, Stefan. Liberalism and Sociology: L.T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in  
     England, 1880-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
 
Collini, Stefan, Donald Winch, and John Burrow. The Noble Science of Politics: A Study 
     in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
     1983. 
 
Confino, Michael. “Russian Customary Law and the Study of Peasant Mentalites.”  
     Russian Review 44 (January 1985): 35-45. 
 
--------. Systèmes agraires et progrès agricole: L'assolement triennal en Russie aux  
     XVIIIe-XIXe siècles. Paris: Mouton, 1969. 
 
Coser, Lewis A. Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social  
     Context. Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2003. 
 
Crisp, Olga. Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914. London: Macmillan Press,  
     1976. 
 
Crisp, Olga, and Linda Edmondson, eds. Civil Rights in Imperial Russia. New York:  
     Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 
Czap, Peter. “The Perennial Mulptiple Family Household, Mishino, Russia, 1782-1858.”  
     Journal of Family History 7 (Spring 1982): 5-26. 
 
Dahlman, Carl J. The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an  
     Economic Institution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.   
 
Dalton, George. “Peasantries in Anthropology and History.” Current Anthropology 13  
     (1972). 
 151  
 
Danilov, Aleksei I. Problemy agrarnoi istorii rannego srednevekov'ia v nemetskoi  
     istoriografii kontsa XIX—nachala XX v. Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1958. 
 
Danilov, Viktor P. “Ob istoricheskikh sud'bakh krest'ianskoi obshchiny v Rossii.” In  
     Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii. Vol. 6, Problemy istorii russkoi obshchiny. Vologda, 
     1976. 
 
--------, and others, eds. Krest'iane i vlast': materialy konferentsii. Moscow: Moskovskaia  
     vysshaia shkola sotsial'nykh i ekonomicheskikh nauk, 1996. 
 
Danilova, Liudmila V. Sel'skaia obshchina v srednevekovoi Rusi. Moscow: Nauka, 1994. 
 
Delaney, Tim. Classical Social Theory: Investigation and Application. Upper Saddle  
     River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004. 
 
Denman, D.R. Origins of Ownership: A Brief History of Land Ownership and Tenure in  
     England from Earliest Times to the Modern Era. London: George Allen & Unwin,  
     1958. 
 
Desai, A.R., ed. Essays on Modernization of Underdeveloped Societies. New York:  
     Humanities Press, 1972. 
 
Di Scala, Spencer M., and Salvo Mastellone. European Political Thought, 1815-1989.  
     Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998. 
 
Diakin, Valentin S. Byl li shans u Stolypina?: sbornik statei. St. Petersburg: LISS, 2002. 
 
--------. Krizis samoderzhaviia v Rossii 1895-1917. Leningrad: Nauka, 1984. 
 
--------. Samoderzhavie, burzhuaziia i dvorianstvo v 1907-1911 gg. Leningrad: Nauka,  
     1978. 
 
Dodgshon, Robert A. The Origin of British Field Systems: An Interpretation. New York:  
     Academic Press, 1980. 
 
Donnorummo, Robert P. The Peasants of Central Russia: Reactions to Emancipation and  
     the Market, 1850-1900. New York: Garland, 1987. 
 
Dopsch, Alfons. The Economic and Social Foundations of European Civilization.  
     London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., 1937. 
 
Drake, Michael, ed. Time, Family and Community: Perspectives on Family and  
     Community History. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. 
 
 
 152  
Dubrovskii, Sergei M. “Rossiiskaia obshchina v literature XIX i nachala XX v.” In  
     Voprosy istorii sel'skogo khoziaistva, krest'ianstva i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v  
     Rossii: sbornik statei k 75-letiiu akademika Nikolaia Mikhailovicha Druzhinina, ed.  
     L.M. Ivanov and others, 348-61. Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1961. 
 
--------. Stolypinskaia zemel'naia reforma: iz istorii sel'skogo khoziaistva i krest'ianstva  
     Rossii v nachale XX veka. Moscow: Nauka, 1963. 
 
Dyer, Christopher. Lords and Peasants in a Changing Society: The Estates of the  
     Bishopric of Worcester, 680-1540. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
 
--------. Making a Living in the Middle Ages: The People of Britain, 850-1520. New  
     Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. 
 
Edelman, Robert. Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest.  
     Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987. 
 
Efremenko, Anatolii V. Zemskaia al'ternativa stolypinskoi privatsizatsii. Iaroslavl':  
     Iaroslavskaia gos. sel'skokhoziaistvennaia akademiia, 1999. 
 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., ed. Patterns of Modernity. 2 vols. New York: New York  
     University Press, 1987. 
 
--------. Multiple Modernities. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002. 
 
Eklof, Ben. Russian Peasant Schools: Officialdom, Village Culture, and Popular  
     Pedagogy, 1861-1914. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1986. 
 
--------. “Ways of Seeing: Recent Anglo-American Studies of the Russian Peasant (1861- 
     1914).” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 36 (January 1988): 57-79. 
 
Eklof, Ben, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, eds. Russia's Great Reforms, 1855- 
     1881. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
 
Eklof, Ben, and Stephen P. Frank, eds. The World of the Russian Peasant: Post- 
     Emancipation Culture and Society. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990. 
 
Engel, Barbara A. Between the Fields and the City: Women, Work, and Family in Russia,  
     1861-1914. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
--------. “The Woman's Side: Male Outmigration and the Family Economy in Kostroma  
     Province.” Slavic Review 45 (Summer 1986): 257-71. 
 
Engelstein, Laura. The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de- 
     Siècle Russia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992. 
 
 153  
Etsioni-Halevy, Eva. Social Change: The Advent and Maturation of Modern Society.  
     London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 
 
Farnsworth, Beatrice, and Viola Lynne, eds. Russian Peasant Women. New York: Oxford  
     University Press, 1992. 
 
Fedorov, Boris G. Petr Arkad'evich Stolypin. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002. 
 
Figurovskaia, N.K. and others, eds. Iz istorii ekonomicheskoi mysli i narodnogo  
     khoziaistva Rossii. Moscow: Institut ekonomiki RAN, 1993. 
 
Fischer, George. Russian Liberalism from Gentry to Intelligentsia. Cambridge, Mass.:  
     Harvard University Press, 1958. 
 
Forster, Robert, and Orest Ranum, eds. Family and Society: Selections from the Annales  
     Economies, Societes, Civilisations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
 
Fossier, Robert. Peasant Life in the Medieval West. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. 
 
Fowler, Peter. Farming in the First Millenium AD: British Agriculture Between Julius  
     Caesar and William the Conqueror. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Francis, Mark, and John Morrow. A History of English Political Thought in the  
     Nineteenth Century. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 
 
Frank, Stephen P. “Popular Justice, Community, and Culture Among the Russian  
     Peasantry, 1870-1900.” Russian Review 46 (July 1987): 239-65. 
 
--------. “'Simple Folk, Savage Customs?' Youth, Sociability, and the Dynamics of  
     Culture in Rural Russia, 1856-1914.” Journal of Social History 25, no. 4 (1992): 711- 
     36. 
 
Frank, Stephen P., and Mark D. Steinberg, eds. Cultures in Flux: Lower Class Values,  
     Practices, and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia. Princeton: Princeton University  
     Press, 1994. 
 
Freedman, Paul. The Origins of Peasant Servitude in Medieval Catalonia. Cambridge: 
      Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
 
Frierson, Cathy A. Peasant Icons: Representations of Rural People in Nineteenth- 
     Century Russia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
 
--------. “Razdel: The Peasant Family Divided.” Russian Review (January 1987): 35-51. 
 
Fulbrook, Mary. Historical Theory. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
 154  
Gatrell, Peter. The Tsarist Economy, 1850-1917. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 
 
Gaudemet, Jean. Les communautés familiales. Paris: Editions Marcel Rivière et Cie,  
     1963. 
 
Geiger, George R. The Theory of the Land Question. New York: Macmillan, 1936. 
 
Genicot, Leopold. Rural Communities in the Medieval West. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  
     University Press, 1990. 
 
Gerasimenko, Grigorii A. Bor'ba krest'ian protiv stolypinskoi agrarnoi politiki. Saratov:  
     Izd-vo Saratovskogo universiteta, 1985. 
  
Gerschenkron, Alexander. Continuity in History and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: 
     Belknap Press, 1968. 
 
--------. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays.  
     Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1962. 
 
Gimpel, Jean. The Medieval Machine: The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages.  
     New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976. 
 
Gleason, Abbot. European and Muscovite: Ivan Kireevsky and the Origins of  
     Slavophilism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. 
 
Glickman, Rose. Russian Factory Women: Workplace and Society, 1880-1914. Berkeley:  
     University of California Press, 1984. 
 
Gluckman, Max. Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. Chicago: Aldine, 1965. 
 
Godelier, Maurice. Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge  
     University Press, 1977. 
 
Goehrke, Carsten. Die Theorien über die Entstellung und Entwicklung des “Mir.”  
     Wiesbaden: O. Harassowitz, 1964. 
 
Golosenko, I.A. “Istoricheskie sud'by idei Konta: transformatsiia pozitivizma v russkoi  
     sotsiologii.” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia no. 4 (1982): 146-60. 
 
Golosenko, I.A., and V.V. Kozlovskii. Istoriia russkoi sotsiologii XIX—XX vv. Moscow:  
     Onega, 1995. 
 
Gooch, G.P. History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century. London: Longmans,  
     Green and Co., 1935. 
 
 
 155  
Goody, Jack. The European Family: An Historico-Anthropological Essay. Malden,  
     Mass.: Blackwell, 2000. 
 
Goody, Jack, Joan Thirsk, and E.P. Thompson, eds. Family and Inheritance: Rural  
     Society in Western Europe, 1200-1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
     1976. 
 
Goriushkin, Leonid M. Opyt narodnoi agronomii v Sibiri: vtoraia polovina XIX— 
     nachalo XX v. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1993. 
 
Gorshkov, Boris. “Serfs on the Move: Peasant Seasonal Migration in Pre-Reform Russia,  
     1800-1861.” Kritika no. 1 (Fall 2000): 627-656. 
 
Gottlieb, Beatrice. The Family in the Western World from the Black Death to the  
     Industrial Age. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.  
 
Grant, Steven. “Obshchina and Mir.” Slavic Review 35, no.4 (1976): 636-51. 
 
--------. “The Peasant Commune in Russian Thought, 1861-1905.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard  
     University, 1973.  
 
Grass, Norman S.B. A History of Agriculture in Europe and America. 2d ed. New York:  
     F.S. Crofts & Co., 1946. 
 
Gregory, Paul R. Before Command: An Economic History of Russia from Emancipation  
     to the First Five-Year Plan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
--------. “Grain Marketings and Peasant Consumption in Russia, 1885-1913.”  
     Explorations in Economic History 17 (1980). 
 
Grekov, Boris D. Krest'iane na Rusi. 2nd ed. Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1952. 
 
Gridchin, Iurii V., and others, eds. Iz istorii burzhuaznoi sotsiologicheskoi mysli v  
     dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii. Moscow: Institut sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii AN SSSR,  
     1986. 
 
Grigg, David. The Dynamics of Agricultural Change: The Historical Experience. New  
     York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 
 
Gromyko, Marina M. Mir russkoi derevni. Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1991. 
 
--------. Traditsionnye normy povedeniia i formy obshcheniia russkikh krest'ian XIX v.  
     Moscow: Nauka, 1986. 
 
Gromyko, Marina M., and T.A. Listova, eds. Russkie: semeinyi i obshchestvennyi byt.  
     Moscow: Nauka, 1989. 
 156  
 
Grossi, Paolo. An Alternative to Private Property: Collective Property in the Juridicial  
     Consciousness of the Nineteenth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  
     1981. 
 
Gutnova, E.V. Istoriografiia istorii srednikh vekov (seredina XIX v.--1917 g.) Moscow:  
     Vysshaia shkola, 1974. 
 
Haimson, Leopold H., ed. The Politics of Rural Russia, 1905-1914. Bloomington:  
     Indiana University Press, 1979.  
 
Hamburg, Gary. Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism, 1828-1866. Stanford:  
     Stanford University Press, 1992. 
 
Hanavalt, Barbara A. The Ties that Bound: Peasant Families in Medieval England. New  
     York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
Hareven, Tamara, and Andrejs Plakans, eds. Family History at the Crossroads: A Journal  
     of Family History Reader. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 
 
Harevy, Edward B., ed. Perspectives on Modernization: Essays in Memory of Ian  
     Weinberg. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.  
 
Harris, Marvin. The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture.  
     New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968. 
 
Hatcher, John, and Mark Bailey. Modelling the Middle Ages: The History & Theory of  
     England's Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Havinden, M.A. “Agricultural Progress in Open-Field Oxfordshire.” Agricultural History  
     Review 9 (1961): 73-83. 
 
Heilbron, Johan. The Rise of Social Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,  
     1995. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge:  
     Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
 
Hoch, Steven L. “On Good Numbers and Bad: Malthus, Population Trends and Peasant  
     Standard of Living in Late Imperial Russia.” Slavic Review 53 (Spring 1994): 41-75. 
 
--------. Serfdom and Social Control in Russia: Petrovskoe, a Village in Tambov.  
     Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. 
 
Hodgen, Margaret T. The Doctrine of Survivals: A Chapter in the History of Scientific  
     Method in the Study of Man. London: Allenson and Company, 1936. 
 157  
 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical  
     Specificity in Social Science. London: Routledge, 2001. 
 
Hosking, Jeoffrey. Russia and the Russians: A History. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap  
     Press, 2001. 
 
Hryniuk, Stella. Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 1880-1900.  
     Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1991. 
 
Huggett, Frank E. The Land Question and European Society since 1650. London:  
     Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. 
 
Hughes, H. Stuart. Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social  
     Thought, 1890-1930. New York: Vintage Books, 1958. 
 
Hulme, David, and Mark M. Turner. Sociology and Development: Theories, Policies and  
     Practices. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 
 
Inglehart, Ronald. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and  
     Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
 
Ischboldin, Boris. History of the Russian Non-Marxist Socio-Economic Thought. New  
     Delhi: New Book Society of India, 1971. 
 
Itenberg, Boris S., and Valentin V. Shelokhaev, eds. Rossiiskie liberaly: sbornik statei.  
     Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001.  
 
Janssens, Angelique. Family and Social Change: The Household as a Process in an  
     Industrializing Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
Jeudwine, J.W. The Foundations of Society and the Land: A Review of the Social Systems  
     of the Middle Ages in Britain, Their Growth and Their Decay with a Special Reference  
     to Land User, Supplemented by Some Observations on the Connection with Modern  
     Conditions. London: Williams & Norgate, 1918; reprint, New York: Arno Press,  
     1975, 
 
Johnson, Robert E. Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in the Late  
     Nineteenth Century. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1979. 
 
Jones, Adrian. Late Imperial Russia: An Interpretation: Three Visions, Two Cultures,  
     One Peasantry. Bern: Peter Lang, 1997. 
 
Kahan, Arcadius. “Continuity in Economic Activity and Policy During the Post-Petrine 
     Period in Russia.” Journal of Economic History 25 (March 1965): 61-85. 
 
 158  
 
--------. “The Costs of 'Westernization' in Russia: The Gentry and the Economy in  
     Russian History.” In The Structure of Russian History: Interpretive Essays, ed.  
     Michael Cherniavsky. New York: Random House, 1970. 
 
--------. The Plow, the Hammer, and the Knout: An Economic History of Eighteenth- 
     Century Russia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
 
--------.  Russian Economic History: The Nineteenth Century. Chicago: University of  
     Chicago Press, 1989. 
 
Karataev, Nikolai K. Russkaia ekonomicheskaia mysl’ v period krizisa feodal’nogo  
     khoziaistva 40-60-kh godov XIX veka. Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta,  
     1957. 
 
Karsten, Peter, and John Modell, ed. Theory, Method, and Practice in Social and  
     Cultural History. New York: New York University Press, 1992.  
 
Kazakov, Anatolii P. Teoriia progressa v russkoi sotsiologii kontsa XIX veka (P.L.  
     Lavrov, N.K. Mikhailovskii, M.M. Kovalevskii.) Leningrad: Izd-vo Leningradskogo  
     universiteta, 1969. 
 
Kazannik, A.I. and others, eds. P.A. Stolypin i istoricheskii opyt reform v Rossii: tezisy  
     dokladov i soobshchenii nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii, posviashchennoi 135- 
     letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia P.A. Stolypina. Omsk: Omskii gos. universitet, 1997. 
 
Kelly, Donald R. Fortunes of History: Historical Inquiry from Herder to Huizinga. New  
     Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003. 
 
Kerans, David. Mind and Labor on the Farm in Black-Earth Russia, 1861-1914.  
     Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001. 
 
Kerridge, Eric. The Agricultural Revolution. London: Allen & Unwin, 1967. 
 
--------. The Common Fields of England. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992. 
 
Kertzer, David I. “Household History and Sociological Theory.” Annual Review of  
     Sociology 17 (January 1991): 155-79. 
 
Kertzer, David I., and Marzio Barbagli, eds. The History of the European Family. 2 vols.  
     New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002. 
 
Kertzer, David I., and Richard P. Saller, eds. The Family in Italy from Antiquity to the  
     Present. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. 
  
 
 159  
Kingston-Mann, Esther. “In the Light and Shadow of the West: The Impact of Western  
     Economics in Pre-Emancipation Russia.” Comparative Studies in Society and History  
     33 (January 1991): 86-105. 
 
--------. In Search of the True West: Culture, Economics, and Problems of Russian  
     Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
 
--------. Lenin and the Problem of Marxist Peasant Revolution. New York: Oxford  
     University Press, 1983. 
 
--------. “Marxism and Russian Rural Development: Problems of Evidence, Experience, 
     and Culture.” American Historical Review 86 (October 1981): 731-52. 
 
Kingston-Mann, Esther, and Timothy Mixter, eds. Peasant Economy, Culture, and   
     Politics of European Russia, 1800-1921. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 
Klimin, Ivan I. Stolypinskaia agrarnaia reforma i stanovlenie krest'ian sobstvennikov v  
     Rossii. St. Petersburg: Klio, 2002. 
 
Kobzanenko, V.A. Parlamentskie fraktsii v I i II Gosudarstvennykh dumakh Rossii:  
     1906-1907 gg. Moscow: 1996. 
 
Kon, Igor' S. Pozitivizm v sotsiologii: istoricheskii ocherk. Leningrad: Izd-vo  
     Leningradskogo universiteta, 1964. 
 
Korros, Alexandra S. A Reluctant Parliament: Stolypin, Nationalism, and the Politics of  
     the Russian Imperial State Council, 1906-1911. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,  
     2002. 
 
Kosven, Mark O. Semeinaia obshchina i patronimiia. Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk  
     SSSR, 1963. 
 
Kotsonis, Yanni. Making Peasants Backward: Agricultural Cooperatives and the  
     Agrarian Question in Russia, 1861-1914. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. 
 
Koval'chenko, Igor' D., and Tishkov, V.A. Agrarnaia evoliutsiia Rossii i SShA v XIX— 
     nachale XX veka: materialy sovetsko-amerikanskikh simpoziumov. Moscow: Nauka,  
     1991. 
 
Kozlov, Sergei A. Agrarnye traditsii i novatsii v doreformennoi Rossii: tsentral'no- 
     nechernozemnye gubernii. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002. 
 
Krandievskii, Semen I. Ocherki po istoriografii ekonomicheskoi istorii (XVII—XIX vv.)  
     Kharkov: Izd-vo Kharkovskogo gos. universiteta imeni A.M. Gor'kogo, 1964. 
 
 
 160  
Kuper, Adam. The Invention of Primitive Society: Transformations of an Illusion. New  
     York: Routledge, 1988. 
 
Kuprits, Nikolai Ia. Kovalevskii. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1978. 
 
Kuznetsov, Sergei V. Traditsii russkogo zemledeliia: praktika i religiozno-nravstvennye  
     vozzreniia. Moscow: In-t etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1995. 
 
Landers, John. The Field and the Forge: Population, Production, and Power in the Pre- 
     Industrial West. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
 
Laptin, Petr F. Obshchina v russkoi istoriografii poslednei treti XIX—nachala XX veka.  
     Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1971.   
 
Laslett, Peter. The World We Have Lost: Further Explored. New York: Charles Scribner's  
     Sons, 1984. 
 
Laslett, Peter, and Richard Wall, eds. Household and Family in Past Time: Comparative  
     Studies in the Size and Structure of the Domestic Group over the Last Three Centuries  
     in England, France, Serbia, Japan and Colonial North America, with Further  
     Materials from Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 
 
Lebedev, Iurii V., ed. Pis'ma iz derevni: ocherki o krest'ianstve v Rossii vtoroi poloviny  
     XIX veka. Moscow: Sovremennik, 1987. 
 
Leikina-Svirskaia, Vera R. Intelligentsiia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka. Moscow, 
     1971. 
 
Lewin, Moshe. “Customary Law and Russian Rural Society in the Post-Reform Era.”  
     Russian Review 44 (January 1985): 1-19. 
 
Lewinski, Jan S. The Origin of Property and the Formation of the Village Community.  
     London: Constable & Company, 1913. 
 
Liashchenko, Petr. History of the National Economy of Russia. New York: Macmillan,  
     1949. 
 
Lieven, Dominic. Russia's Rulers under the Old Regime. New Haven, Conn.: Yale  
     University Press, 1989. 
 
Lipson, E. An Introduction to the Economic History of England. Vol. 1, The Middle Ages.  
     London: A. & C. Black, 1915. 
 
Litvak, Boris G. Russkaia derevnia v reforme 1861 goda: chernozemnyi tsentr 1861- 
     1895. Moscow: 1972.  
 
 161  
Lloyd, Christopher. Explanation in Social History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 
 
Logue, William. From Philosophy to Sociology: The Evolution of French Liberalism,  
     1870-1914. DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1983. 
 
Lotman, Iurii M., Lidiia Ia. Ginsburg, and Boris A. Uspenskii. The Semiotics of Russian  
     Cultural History. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. 
 
Lukashevich, Stephen. Ivan Aksakov, 1823-1886: A Study in Russian Thought and  
     Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. 
 
Lundahl, Mats, and Thommy Svensson, eds. Agrarian Society in History: Essays in  
     Honor of Magnus Morner. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
 
Macey, David A.J. Government and Peasant in Russia, 1861-1905: The Prehistory of the  
     Stolypin Reforms. DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987. 
 
Macfarlane, Alan. The Culture of Capitalism. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
 
--------. The Origins of English Individualism: The Family Property and Social  
     Transition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
 
--------. Reconstructing Historical Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
     Press, 1977. 
 
Magagna, Victor V. Communities of Grain: Rural Rebellion in Comparative Perspective.  
     Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
 
Malia, Martin. Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812-1855.  
     Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. 
 
Mandel, Ernest. Marxist Economic Theory. Vol. 1. New York: Monthly Review Press,  
     1968.  
 
Mandelbaum, Maurice. History, Man, & Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-Century  
     Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. 
 
Manning, Roberta. Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government. Princeton:  
     Princeton University Press, 1982. 
 
Manuel, Frank E. A Requiem for Marx. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,  
     1995. 
 
Matsuzato, Kimitaka. “The Fate of Agronomists in Russia: Their Quantitative Dynamics  
     from 1911 to 1916.” Russian Review 55 (April 1996): 172-200. 
 
 162  
--------. “Stolypinskaia reforma i rossiiskaia agrotekhnologicheskaia revoliutsiia.”  
     Otechestvennaia istoriia no. 6 (1992): 194-200. 
 
McCay, Bonnie J., and James M. Acheson, eds. The Question of the Commons: The  
     Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Tucson: University of Arizona Press,  
     1987. 
 
McCleland, Charles E. The German Historians and England: A Study in Nineteenth- 
     Century Views. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 
 
McCloskey, Donald N. “English Open Fields as Behavior Toward Risk.” In Research in  
     Economic History, ed. Paul Uselding, vol. 1, 124-170. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press,  
     1976. 
 
--------. “The Prudent Peasant: New Findings in Open Fields.” Journal of Economic  
     History 51 (June 1991): 343-355. 
 
McDaniel, Tim. The Agony of the Russian Idea. Princeton: Princeton University Press,  
     1996. 
 
--------. Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia. Berkeley: University of  
     California Press, 1988. 
 
--------. Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran. Princeton:  
     Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 
McKendrick, Neil, ed. Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society:  
     In Honour of J.H. Plumb. London: Europa Publications, 1974. 
 
Medushevskii, Andrei N. Istoriia russkoi sotsiologii. Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1993. 
 
Melton, Edgar. “Proto-Industrialization, Serf Agriculture and Agrarian Social Structure:  
     Two Estates in Nineteenth-Century Russia.” Past & Present 115 (1987). 
 
Mendel, Arthur P. Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia: Legal Marxism and Legal  
     Populism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. 
 
Miagkov, G.P. 'Russkaia istoricheskaia shkola': metodologicheskie i ideinye pozitsii.  
     Kazan': Izd-vo Kazanskogo universiteta, 1988. 
 
Milov, Leonid V. Velikorusskii pakhar' i osobennosti rossiiskogo istoricheskogo  
     protsessa. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001.  
 
Milov, Leonid V., and others, eds. Agrarnye tekhnologii v Rossii IX-XX vv.: XXV sessiia  
     simpoziuma po agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy: Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii,  
     Arzamas, 10-13 sentiabria 1996 g. Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1996. 
 163  
 
--------. Formy sel'skokhoziaistvennogo proizvodstva i gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie:  
     XXIV sessiia simpoziuma po agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy. Moscow: Izd-vo  
     MGPU im. V.I. Lenina, 1995. 
 
--------. Zazhitochnoe krest'ianstvo Rossii v istoricheskoi perspektive: Materialy XXVII  
     sessii Simpoziuma po agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy. Vologda: Rus', 2001. 
 
Minenko, Nina A. Russkaia krest'ianskaia obshchina v Zapadnoi Sibiri, XVIII—pervaia  
     polovina XIX v. Novosibirsk: Izd-vo Novosibirskogo universiteta, 1991. 
 
--------. Zhivaia starina: budni i prazdniki sibirskoi derevni v XVIII—pervoi polovine XIX  
     v. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1989. 
 
Mingay, George A., ed. Arthur Young and His Times. London: Macmillan, 1975. 
 
--------. A Social History of the English Countryside. London: Routledge, 1990. 
 
Mironov, Boris. “The Russian Peasant Commune After the Reforms of the 1860s.” Slavic  
     Review 44 (Fall 1985): 438-67.  
 
--------, and Ben Eklof. The Social History of Imperial Russia, 1700-1917. 2 vols.  
     Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000. 
 
Mitchell, G. Duncan. A Hundred Years of Sociology. Chicago: Aldine Publishing  
     Company, 1968. 
 
Mitrany, David. Marx Against the Peasant. New York: Collier, 1961. 
 
Mitterauer, Michael, and Alexander Kagan. “Russian and Central European Family  
     Structures: A Comparative View.” Journal of Family History 7 (Spring 1982): 103-31. 
 
Mitterauer, Michael, and Reinhard Sieder. The European Family: Patriarchy to  
     Partnership: From the Middle Ages to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
     1982. 
 
Mogil'nitskii, Boris G. Politicheskie i metodologicheskie idei russkoi lieral'noi  
     medievistiki serediny 70-kh godov XIX v.--nachala 900-kh godov. Tomsk: Izd-vo  
     Tomskogo universiteta, 1969.  
 
Mokyr, Joel. Twenty-Five Centuries of Technological Change: An Historical Survey.  
     London: Routledge, 2001. 
 
Moon, David. The Russian Peasantry, 1600-1930: The World the Peasants Made. New  
     York: Longman, 1999. 
 
 164  
Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant  
     in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
 
Moritsch, Andreas. Landwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik in Russland vor der Revolution.  
     Vienna: Hermann Bohlaus, 1986. 
 
Narezhnyi, A.I. and others, eds. Liberal'nyi konservatizm: istoriia i sovremennost':  
     materialy Vserossiiskoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii, Rostov-na-Donu, 25-26  
     maia 2000 g. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001. 
 
Newman, Katherine S. Law and Economic Organization: A Comparative Study of Pre- 
     Industrial Societies. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
 
Nikonov, Aleksandr A. Spiral' mnogovekovoi dramy: agrarnaia nauka i politika Rossii  
     (XVIII-XX vv.) Moscow: Entsiklopediia rossiiskikh dereven', 1995. 
 
Nisbet, Robert A., ed. Social Change. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 
 
--------. Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development. New  
     York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 
 
Novikova, L.I., and I.N. Sizemskaia. Russkaia filosofiia istorii. Moscow: Aspekt Press,  
     1999.  
 
Offord, Derek. Portraits of Early Russian Liberals: A Study of the Thought of T.N.  
     Granovsky, V.P. Botkin, P.V. Annenkov, A.V. Druzhinin, and K.D. Kavelin.  
     Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
Osipov, Igor' D. Filosofiia russkogo liberalizma XIX—nachalo XX veka. St. Petersburg:  
     Izd-vo S.-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 1996. 
 
Ostrovskii, Igor' V. P.A. Stolypin i ego vremia. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1992. 
 
Overton, Mark. Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian  
     Economy, 1500-1850. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Pallot, Judith. “Agrarian Modernization on Peasant Farms in the Era of Capitalism.” In  
     Studies in Russian Historical Geography, ed. James H. Bater and R.A. French, vol. 2,  
     423-49. New York: Academic Press, 1983. 
 
--------. “Imagining the Rational Landscape in Nineteenth-Century Russia.” Journal of  
     Historical Geography 26 (Spring 2000): 273-291. 
 
--------. “Khutora and Otruba in Stolypin’s Program of Farm Intensification.” Slavic  
     Review 42 (Spring 1982): 242-256. 
 
 165  
--------. Land Reform in Russia, 1906-1917: Peasant Responses to Stolypin's Project of  
     Rural Transformation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. 
 
--------. “The Stolypin Land Reform as Administrative Utopia: Images of Peasantry  
     Nineteenth-Century Russia.” In Social Identities in Revolutionary Russia, ed. M.  
     Palat, 113-133. London: Palgrave, 2001. 
 
--------, ed. Transforming Peasants: Society, State, and the Peasantry, 1861-1930:  
     Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies.  
     New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.  
 
Pallot, Judith, and Dennis J.B. Shaw. Landscape and Settlement in Romanov Russia,  
     1613-1917. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.  
 
Parker, David, ed. Revolutions and the Revolutionary Tradition in the West 1560-1991.  
     London: Routledge, 2000. 
 
Parker, William N., and Eric L. Jones, eds. European Peasants and Their Markets:  
     Essays in Agrarian Economic History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. 
 
Parsons, Kenneth H., Raymond J. Penn, and Philip M. Raup, eds. Land Tenure:  
     Proceedings of the International Conference on Land Tenure and Related Problems in  
     World Agriculture Held in Madison, Wisconsin, 1951. Madison, Wis.: University of 
     Wisconsin Press, 1956. 
 
Pashkov, A.I., ed. Istoriia russkoi ekonomicheskoi mysli. Vol. 1, Epokha feodalizma. Part  
     2, 1800-1861 gg. Moscow: Izd-vo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1958. 
 
Pashkov, A.I., and Nikolai A. Tsagolov, eds. Istoriia russkoi ekonomicheskoi mysli. Vol.  
     2, Epokha domonopolisticheskogo kapitalizma. Moscow: Izd-vo sotsial'no- 
     ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1959. 
 
Patniak, Utsa. “Neo-Populism and Marxism: The Chayanovian View of the Agrarian  
     Question and Its Fundamental Fallacy.” Journal of Peasant Studies 6 (July 1979):  
     375-420. 
 
Pavlovsky, George. Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution. New York: H. 
     Fertig, 1968. 
 
Perrie, Maureen. “Folklore as Evidence of Peasant Mentality.” Russian Review 48, no.2  
     (1989): 119-43. 
 
Peters, Edward. Europe and the Middle Ages. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson,  
     2004. 
 
Pipes, Richard. Property and Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. 
 166  
 
--------. Russia under the Old Regime. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. 
 
--------. Struve: Liberal on the Left. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
 
Pirumova, Natal'ia M. Zemskaia intelligentsiia i ee rol' v obshchestvennoi bor'be.  
     Moscow: Nauka, 1986. 
 
Pogodin, S.N. 'Russkaia shkola' istorikov: N.I. Kareev, I.V. Luchitskii, M.M. Kovalevskii.  
     St. Peterburg: Izd-vo SPBGTU, 1997. 
 
Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944. 
 
Popkin, Samuel L. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in  
     Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 
 
Postan, M.M. Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval  
     Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 
 
--------. The Medieval Economy and Society: An Economic History of Britain, 1100-1500.  
     Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. 
 
Postan, M.M., and H.J. Habakkuk, eds. The Cambridge Economic History of Europe.  
     Vol. 1, The Agrarian Life of the Middle Ages. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge  
     University Press, 1966. 
 
Potter, Jack M., May N. Diaz, and George M. Foster, eds. Peasant Society: A Reader.  
     Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. 
 
Potter, John P., and Richard Stock. The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture and Land Reform  
     in the Third World. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1990. 
 
Raeff, Marc. “The Peasant Commune in the Political Thinking of Russian Publicists:  
     Laissez Faire Liberalism in the Reign of Alexander II.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard  
     University, 1950. 
 
--------. Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia. Boulder, Colo.: Westview  
     Press, 1994. 
 
--------. Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime. New York:  
     Columbia University Press, 1984. 
 
Ransel, David L., ed. The Family in Imperial Russia: New Lines of Historical Research.  
     Urbana-Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1978. 
 
 
 167  
 
Reher, David S. Perspectives on the Family in Spain, Past and Present. Oxford:  
     Clarendon Press, 1997. 
 
Reynolds, Susan. Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300. Oxford: 
      Clarendon Press, 1984. 
 
Richards, John W. “The Slavic Zadruga and Other Archaic Indo-European Elements in  
     Traditional Slavic Society.” Mankind Quaterly 26 (Spring/Summer 1986): 321-37.  
 
Robbins, Richard G. Famine in Russia, 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds  
     to a Crisis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975. 
 
Robinson, Geroid T. Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord- 
     Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917. New York: The  
     Macmillan Company, 1949.  
 
Rosener, Werner. The Peasantry of Europe. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994. 
 
--------. Peasants in the Middle Ages. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1992. 
 
Rowley, Trevor, ed. The Origins of Open-Field Agriculture. London: Croom Helm, 1981. 
 
Safronov, Boris G. M.M. Kovalevskii kak sotsiolog. Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo  
     universiteta, 1960. 
 
Salzman, Catherine. “Consumer Cooperative Societies in Russia: Goals v. Gains 1900- 
     1918.” Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique 23, nos. 3-4 (1982): 351-69. 
 
Scott, James C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in  
     Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. 
 
--------. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition  
     Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
 
Semenov, Iurii I., ed. Vlast' zemli: Traditsionnaia ekonomika krest'ianstva Rossii XIX  
     veka—nachala XX veka. Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN, 2002. 
 
Seregny, Scott J. “Teachers and Rural Cooperatives: The Politics of Education and  
     Professional Identities in Russia, 1908-1917.” Russian Review 55 (October 1996):  
     567-90. 
 
Service, Elman R. A Century of Controversy: Ethnological Issues from 1860 to 1960.  
     Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1985. 
 
 
 168  
Shaffer, John W. Family and Farm: Agrarian Change and Household Organization in  
     the Loire Valley, 1500-1900. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press,   
     1982. 
 
Shanin, Teodor. The Awkward Class: Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing  
     Society: Russia 1910-1925. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. 
 
--------. Defining Peasants: Essays concerning Rural Societies, Exploratory Economics,  
     and Learning from them in the Contemporary World. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil  
     Blackwell, 1990.  
 
--------, ed. Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and the Peripheries of Capitalism.  
     New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983. 
 
--------, ed. Peasants and Peasant Societies. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
 
--------. The Roots of Otherness: Russia's Turn of the Century. Vol. 1, Russia as a  
     'Developing Society.' New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986. 
 
--------. The Roots of Otherness: Russia's Turn of the Century. Vol.2, Russia, 1905-07,  
     Revolution as a Moment of Truth. London: Macmillan Press, 1986. 
 
Shelokhaev, Valentin V. Liberal'naia model' pereustroistva Rossii. Moscow: Nauka,  
     1996. 
 
--------. “Problema sobstvennosti v programmakh politicheskikh partii Rossi v nachale  
     XX v.” In Rossia v usloviiakh transformatsii: istoriko-politologicheskii seminar:  
     materialy. Vyp. 13. Moscow, 2001.  
 
Shelokhaev, Valentin V. and others, eds. Politicheskaia istoriia Rossii v partiiakh i  
     litsakh. Moscow: TERRA, 1993. 
 
--------.  Politicheskie partii Rossii, konets XIX – pervaia tret' XX veka: entsiklopediia.  
     Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996. 
 
--------. Russkii liberalizm: istoricheskie sud'by i persepktivy: materialy mezhdunarodnoi  
     nauchnoi konferentsii, Moskva, 27-29 maia 1998 g. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999. 
 
Shinn, William T., Jr. “The Law of the Russian Peasant Household.” Slavic Review 20  
     (December 1961): 601-21. 
 
Shkurinov, P.S. Pozitivizm v Rossii XIX veka. Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo  
     universiteta, 1980. 
 
Shlapentokh, Dmitry. The French Revolution in Russian Intellectual Life, 1865-1905.  
     Wesport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. 
 169  
Shmelev, Gelii I. Agrarnaia politika i agrarnye otnosheniia v Rossii v XX veke. Moscow:  
     Nauka, 2000. 
 
Simirenko, Alex, ed. Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals.  
     Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. 
 
Simms, James Y. “The Crop Failure of 1891: Soil Exhaustion, Technological  
     Backwardness, and Russia's 'Agrarian Crisis'.” Slavic Review 41 (Summer 1982): 236- 
     50. 
 
Simonova, Marina S. “Bor'ba techenii v pravitel'stvennom lagere po voprosam agrarnoi  
     politiki v kontse XIX veka.” Istoriia SSSR no. 1 (1968): 65-82. 
 
--------. “Politika tsarizma v krest'ianskom voprose nakanune revoliutsii 1905-1907 gg.”  
     Istoricheskie zapiski 75 (1975). 
  
Simonova, Marina S., and Andrei M. Anfimov. Krizis agrarnoi politiki tsarizma  
     nakanune pervoi russkoi revoliutsii. Moscow: Nauka, 1987. 
 
Skocpol, Theda. Social Revolutions in the Moden World. New York: Cambridge  
     University Press, 1994. 
 
--------. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and  
     China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.  
 
Smith, Anthony D. The Concept of Social Change: A Critique of the Functionalist  
     Theory of Social Change. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 
 
Smith, Richard M.,ed. Land, Kinship, and Life-Cycle. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
     Press, 1984. 
 
Smith, Robert E.F. Peasant Farming in Muscovy. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
     Press, 1977. 
 
--------, and David Christian. Bread and Salt: A Social and Economic History of Food  
     and Drink in Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
 
Solovei, Tat'iana D. Ot 'burzhuaznoi' etnologii k 'sovetskoi' etnografii: istoriia  
     otechestvennoi etnologii pervoi treti XX veka. Moscow: Institut etnologii i  
     antropologii imeni N.N. Miklukho-Maklaia RAN, 1998.  
 
Solov'eva, Elena I. and others, eds. Oshchina i sem'ia v sibirskoi derevne XVIII—nachala  
     XX vv.: mezhvuzovskii sbornik nauchnykh trudov. Novosibirsk: Izd-vo NGPI, 1989. 
 
Sorokin, Pitirim A. Contemporary Sociological Theories: Through the First Quarter of  
     the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper & Row, 1928.  
 170  
 
Speranskaia, L.N. Istoriia otechestvennoi ekonomicheskoi nauki (XIX v.) Moscow: TEIS,  
     1998. 
 
Spierenburg, Pieter. The Broken Spell: A Cultural and Anthropological History of Pre- 
     Industrial Europe. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991. 
 
Stanziani, Alessandro. L’économie en révolution: le cas russe, 1870-1930. Paris: Albin  
     Michel, 1998. 
 
Starr, S. Frederick. “August von Haxthausen and Russia.” Slavonic and East European  
     Review 46 (July 1968): 462-78. 
 
--------. Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia. Princeton: Princeton University  
     Press, 1972. 
 
Stein, Peter. Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
     Press, 1980. 
 
Stephenson, Carl. Mediaeval Institutions: Selected Essays. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell  
     University Press, 1954. 
 
Stern, Bernhard J. Historical Sociology: The Selected Paper of Bernhard J. Stern. New  
     York: Citadel Press, 1959. 
 
Stevenson, Glenn G. Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land Use  
     Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Stockdale, Melissa K. Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880-1918.  
     Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
 
Stocking, George W. Victorian Anthropology. New York: Free Press, 1987. 
 
Stourzh, Gerald, ed. Annaherungen an eine europäische Geschichtsschreibung. Vienna:  
     Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2002. 
 
Stromberg, Roland N. European Intellectual History since 1789. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
     Prentice-Hall, 1975. 
 
Sverdlov, M.B. “Sem'ia i oshchina v drevnei Rusi.” Istoriia SSSR no. 3 (1981): 97-108. 
 
Sweeney, Del, ed. Agriculture in the Middle Ages: Technology, Practice, and  
     Representation. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995.  
 
Szacki, Jerzy. History of Sociological Thought. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,  
     1979. 
 171  
 
Taran, Lidia V. Istoricheskaia mysl' Frantsii i Rossii, 70-e gody XIX—40-e gody XX vv.  
     Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1994. 
 
Taranovski, Theodore, ed. Reform in Modern Russian History: Progress or Cycle? New  
     York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Teggart, Frederick J. Theory and Processes of History. Berkeley, Calif.: University of  
     California Press, 1941. 
 
Teliak, Liudmila V. Stolypinskaia agrarnaia reforma: istoriografiia 1906-1917 gg.  
     Samara: Izd-vo SamGPI, 1995. 
 
Thirsk, Joan. The Rural Economy of England: Collected Essays. London: Hambledon  
     Press, 1984. 
 
Thompson, James W. A History of Historical Writing. Vol. 2, The Eighteenth and  
     Nineteenth Centuries. New York: Macmillan, 1942. 
 
Timasheff, Nicholas S., and George A. Theodorson. Sociological Theory: Its Nature and  
     Growth. 4th ed. New York: Random House, 1976. 
 
Tiukavkin, Viktor G. Velikorusskoe krest'ianstvo i Stolypinskaia agrarnaia reforma.  
     Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2001.  
 
Tokarev, Sergei A. Istoriia russkoi etnografii: dooktiabr'skii period. Moscow: Nauka,  
     1966. 
 
Tsagolov, Nikolai A. Ocherki russkoi ekonomicheskoi mysli perioda padeniia  
     krepostnogo prava. Moscow: Gos. izd. politicheskoi literatury, 1956. 
 
Tuma, Elias H. Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform: A Comparative Analysis.  
     Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.  
 
Turner, Bryan S. The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory. New York: Basil  
     Blackwell, 1984. 
 
Turner, Jonathan H., Leonard Beeghley, and Charles H. Powers. The Emergence of  
     Sociological Theory. 5th ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 2002. 
 
Turner, Stephen P., ed. Social Theory & Sociology: The Classics and Beyond.  
     Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
Utkina, N.F. Pozitivizm, antropologicheskii materializm i nauka v Rossii. Moscow:  
     Nauka, 1975. 
 
 172  
Vainshtein, Oleg L. Ocherki razvitiia burzhuaznoi filosofii i metodologii istorii v XIX— 
     XX vv. Leningrad: Nauka, 1979. 
 
Van Doren, Charles. The Idea of Progress. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 
 
Vasilevskii, Efim G. Ideinaia bor'ba vokrug stolypinskoi agrarnoi reformy. Moscow:  
     Izd-vo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960.  
 
Vasudevan, Hari S., ed. Commercialization and Agriculture in Late Imperial Russia:  
     Essays on Russian Economic History. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Company, 1998. 
 
Veber, Boris G. Istoriograficheskie problemy. Moscow: Nauka, 1974. 
 
Venturi, Franco. Roots of Revolution. New York: Knopf, 1960. 
 
Volin, Lazar. A Century of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander II to Khrushchev.  
     Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
 
Vronskii, Oleg G. Krest'ianskaia obshchina na rubezhe XIX-XX vekov: struktura  
     upravleniia, pozemel'nye otnosheniia, pravoporiadok. Moscow: Moskovskii  
     pedagogicheskii gos. universitet, 1999.  
 
--------. Gosudarstvennaia vlast' rossiiskoi imperii i problemy formirovaniia osnov  
     perspektivnogo agrarnogo kursa na rubezhe XIX-XX vekov. Moscow: Moskovskii  
     pedagogicheskii gos. universitet, 1999.  
 
Vucinich, Alexander. Darwin in Russian Thought. Berkeley: University of California  
     Press, 1988. 
 
--------. Science in Russian Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.  
 
--------. Social Thought in Tsarist Russia: The Quest for a General Science of Society,  
     1861-1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
 
Vucinich, Wayne S., ed. The Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Russia. Stanford: Stanford  
     University Press, 1968. 
 
Wada, Haruki. “The Inner World of Russian Peasants.” Annals of the Institute of Social  
     Science (Tokyo) 20 (1979): 61-94. 
 
Wagar, W. Warren. Good Tidings: The Belief in Progress from Darwin to Marcuse.  
     Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. 
 
Wagner, William G. Marriage, Property, and Law in Late Imperial Russia. Oxford:  
     Clarendon Press, 1994. 
 
 173  
Waldron, Peter. Between Two Revolutions: Stolypin and the Politics of Renewal in  
     Russia. DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998. 
 
Walicki, Andrzej. The Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of  
     the Russian Populists. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.  
 
--------. Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 
 
--------. The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth- 
     Century Russian Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. 
 
Wall, Richard, Jean Robin, and Peter Laslett, eds. Family Forms in Historic Europe. New  
     York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
 
Ware, Caroline F. Cultural Approach to History. New York: Columbia University Press,  
     1940. 
 
Wartenweiler, David. Civil Society and Academic Debate in Russia, 1905-1914. Oxford:  
     Clarendon Press, 1999. 
 
Watts, Sheldon J. A Social History of Western Europe, 1450-1720: Tensions and  
     Solidarities among Rural People. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1984. 
 
Wcislo, Francis. Reforming Rural Russia: State, Local Society and National Politics  
     1855-1914. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
Wheaton, Robert. “Family and Kinship in Western Europe: The Problem of the Joint  
     Family Household.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 5 (Spring 1975): 601-28. 
 
White, James. “Marx and the Russians: The Romantic Heritage.” Scottish Slavonic  
     Review 7 (October 1987): 51-81. 
 
White, Lynn. Medieval Technology and Social Change. New York: Oxford University  
     Press, 1966. 
 
Wilbur, Elvira. “Was Russian Peasant Agriculture Really That Impoverished?: Evidence  
     from Case Study from the 'Impoverished Center' at the End of the Nineteenth  
     Century.” Journal of Economic History (March 1983): 137-44. 
 
Wolf, Eric R. Europe and the People Without History. Berkeley, Calif.: University of  
     California Press, 1997.  
 
--------. Peasants. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 
 
Worobec, Christine D. Peasant Russia: Family and Community in the Post-Emancipation  
     Period. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 174  
 
Wortman, Richard. The Crisis of Russian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
     Press, 1967. 
 
--------. The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness. Chicago: University of  
     Chicago Press, 1976. 
 
Yaney, George. “Some Suggestions Regarding the Study of Russian Peasant Society  
     prior to Collectivization.” Russian Review 44 (January 1985): 27-33. 
 
--------. The Urge to Mobilize: Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861-1930. Urbana, Ill.:  
     University of Illinois Press, 1982. 
 
Zaitseva, L.I., ed. Agrarnaia reforma P.A. Stolypina v dokumentakh i publikatsiiakh  
     kontsa XIX—nachala XX veka. Moscow: Institut ekonomiki RAN, 1995. 
 
Zhuravlev, L.A. Pozitivizm i problema istoricheskikh zakonov. Moscow: Izd-vo  
     Moskovskogo universiteta, 1980. 
 
Zimmerman, Judith. “Russian Liberal Theory, 1900-1917.” Canadian-American Slavic  
     Studies 14 (January 1980): 1-20. 
 
Zubchenko, L.A., and L.I. Zaitseva, eds. Russkie ekonomisty (XIX-nachalo XX veka).  
     Moscow: In-t ekonomiki RAN, 1998. 
 
Zyrianov, Pavel N. Krest'ianskaia obshchina evropeiskoi Rossii, 1907-1914 g.g.  
     Moscow: Nauka, 1992. 
 
--------. Petr Stolypin: politicheskii portret. Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1992. 
 
--------. “Stolypin i sud'by russkoi derevni.” Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost' no. 4  
     (1991): 117-25.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 175  
                                                               Vita 
 
     Evgeny Badredinov was born in January 1959 in Russia and spent his childhood in the 
city of Kazan, a major economic and cultural center of the mid-Volga region. At the age 
of sixteen, he moved to Moscow, where he started his professional career. In 1993, he 
graduated from the Russian Academy of Theatre Arts with a degree of Bachelor of Arts 
in Theatre Studies and a diploma with distinction. The following year, he returned to 
Kazan and received his first teaching position at the University of Kazan, one of the 
oldest and most prestigious educational institutions in Russia. In 1996, Badredinov came 
to the United States to study in the master’s program in mass communication at Louisiana 
State University. Two years later, he started his doctoral program in history with 
specialization in modern Europe (since 1500). In August 2000, he received a degree of 
Master of Mass Communication and in May 2005 successfully defended his dissertation 
at the Department of History. Evgeny Badredinov is currently working as Adjunct 
Professor of History at Randolph-Macon Woman’s College in Lynchburg, Virginia. 
 
 
